We study the influence of the corporate board network on executive pay for 3,395 US firms between 1990 and 2015. We identify three elementary structures through which the interlocking network reflects forms of inter-group reciprocity across firms: restricted exchange, when two executives sit on each other’s respective boards; delayed exchange, when y sits on the board of x after the end of x’s mandate on the board of y; and generalized exchange, when x sits on the board of y, who sits on the board of z, who sits on the board of x. These ties, which are overrepresented, are related to higher executive pay, but are not related to firm performance, which we interpret as a form of rent extraction. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) as a natural experiment to confirm our results. The impact on pay disappears after 2004, once these types of exchanges are constrained.

Analyzing 1268 stratified random samples from one of the biggest cities in China’s Pearl River Delta with the zero-inflated Poisson model, this study identifies the factors associated with the onset and severity of spousal violence by males and females separately under the social exchange perspective. The results indicate that spousal violence follows gender symmetry in migrant families, and violence against men is mainly reflected in psychological violence. The new pattern of “cradle snatching” makes men fully protected in family relationships. However, women’s education level and economic independence do not represent a protective factor against violence from husbands. Patriarchal cognition is deeply rooted in migrant families, even though the family pattern has been changed and women’s status has improved in China. Young couples should contribute to the family according to their own abilities, and should not make either one feel wronged.