The 12th European ALARA Network (EAN) workshop on “ALARA issues arising for safety andsecurity of radiation sources and security screening devices” took place in Vienna(Austria) in October 2009. The aim of that workshop was to consider how the implementationof ALARA, in terms of planned and emergency situations, involving worker and public doses,is affected by the introduction of security-related measures. In the case of new equipmentand procedures, there was also the question of whether exposures arising from securityscreening devices can be justified and optimised. This workshop consisted of invited oralpresentations, which highlighted the main issues, and half of the programme was devoted todiscussions within working groups on specific topics. During their discussions, theworking groups identified recommendations dealing with the following topics: theimplementation of the Code of Conduct and HASS – ensuring ALARA; balancing security andsafety – how to achieve an optimum solution; the management of an emergency exposuresituation from an ALARA perspective; the justification and optimisation of the use ofsecurity devices. The objective of this paper is to present the main conclusions andrecommendations produced during the workshop. Individual presentations (papers andslides) as well as the reports from the working groups are available to download on theEAN website (http://www.eu-alara.net).

Fin 2008, une contamination au cobalt-60 a été découverte dans des colis contenant desboutons d’ascenseur de la société française MAFELEC, fournisseur de la compagnied’ascenseurs OTIS. Les inspections et enquêtes menées par l’ASN (Autorité de sûreténucléaire) ont permis d’identifier que cette contamination était due à du métal importéd’Inde. L’ASN a alors saisi l’IRSN (Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire)pour évaluer les impacts dosimétriques potentiels de cette contamination. Bien que lesimpacts évalués pour les travailleurs des deux entreprises et pour le public soient trèsfaibles, cet événement a eu un impact médiatique important en France. En outre, MAFELECfournissant la société OTIS à travers le monde, des boutons contaminés avaientpotentiellement été envoyés dans d’autres pays. Dans ce contexte, le réseau ALARA européen(EAN), regroupant des organismes et des institutions de radioprotection de 20 pays enEurope qui partagent l’objectif de favoriser l’échange et la diffusion d’informations surles expériences pratiques en matière de mise en œuvre de la démarche d’optimisation, alancé une requête via son Forum sur les moyens mis en œuvre pour gérercet événement. Cet article présente la synthèse des informations concernant les 13 paysqui ont répondu à cette requête entre janvier et juillet 2009.

The 11th European ALARA Network (EAN) workshop on “ALARA in radioactive waste management” took place in Athens (Greece) in April 2008. The aim of that workshop was to focus on the implementation of the ALARA principle with regard to occupational and public exposures arising from the management of radioactive waste in all sectors (nuclear, medical, industrial, etc.). This workshop consisted of invited oral presentations, which highlighted the main issues, and half of the programme was devoted to discussions within working groups on specific topics. Individual presentations (papers and slides) are available to download from the EAN website (http://www.eu-alara.net). Based on report backs from the groups and discussions with all the participants, five formal recommendations have been formulated. These recommendations, addressed to international organisations (International Atomic Energy Agency, European Commission, Nuclear Energy Agency), national authorities, national and local stakeholders and to EAN itself, deal with the following themes: international guidance on ALARA in radioactive waste management, harmonisation issues at the international level, ALARA approach in non-nuclear waste management, “broader approach” in the radioactive waste management process, stakeholder involvement. The objective of this paper is to present the main conclusions and the five recommendations produced during the workshop.

Cette publication s'attache à examiner les paramètres influant la dosimétrie des interventions de radiographie industrielles. Ces paramètres sont déterminés dans une description de la pratique, puis font l'objet de mesures sur le terrain, mais aussi de modélisations à l'aide du code de calcul MERCURAD. Cette approche a permis d'établir un estimatif dosimétrique incluant les différentes phases des contrôles radiographiques dans des conditions réelles de l'intervention elle même, mais aussi pendant les phases de transport et de manutention des irradiateurs. Les conclusions insistent sur la nécessité d'une organisation optimisée pour la réduction de la dosimétrie individuelle.

ITER will be the first fusion reactor producing much more energy than that necessary to establish and heat the plasma. This nuclear energy is mainly exported from the plasma by neutrons and deposited in the plasma facing components, generating nuclear activation. One of the elements used in the fusion reaction is tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen. Although some feedback may be used from in service fusion machines, such as JET in England, the ITER radiological protection issues need to be assessed as early as possible. The protection against radiological hazards is, as usual shielding, waiting for radioactive decay, limitation of airborne contaminants, reduction of exposure time, etc. This has been done in the present design and has followed a first step of ALARA studies. Radiation fields have been calculated and work effort estimated leading to the evaluation of a collective yearly dose of 356 p mSv, below the project dose target which is 500 p mSv. A second step of occupational radiological exposure studies should allow refining further the dose estimate as well as the ALARA optimization.

Historiquement chacune des entités nucléaires du groupe AREVA mettait en œuvre séparément la démarche ALARA. Malgré la diversité des métiers pratiqués et la diversité des environnements radiologiques AREVA a choisi de fédérer l'ensemble des entités nucléaires autour d'une politique commune de sûreté nucléaire dont nous rappelons ici les grands principes. Ce processus volontariste, pour lequel l’autorité nucléaire reste incitative, et auquel participent tous les acteurs à chaque niveau de la chaîne hiérarchique, permet d’optimiser les résultats de radioprotection.

The 10th european ALARA network (EAN) workshop took place in Prague (Czech Republic) in September 2006. This was the 10-year anniversary of the EAN, and unlike the previous workshops that addressed a particular ALARA topic, the aim of this workshop was to consider the implementation of the optimisation principle in all domains of activities (nuclear and conventional industry, medical sector, NORM industry). This principle is fundamental to radiation protection, and the workshop drew together key stakeholders to discuss its past, present and future status. The workshop was asked to consider the practical implementation of ALARA, and how this might be improved in the next 10 years. The objectives of the 10th EAN workshop were to review the past evolution of the ALARA concept, internationally, within the EU, and nationally, in terms of the practical impact on radiation protection; to examine the current status of the implementation of the ALARA principle; and to identify needs for future developments in the concept and implementation of optimisation. As with previous workshops, half the programme time was devoted to invited presentations, and half to working group discussions and report backs. After discussion, the output of these working groups was collated by the EAN co-ordinators, to produce seven formal recommendations to international organizations (IAEA, International Labour Organisation, European Commission), to EAN itself and to national authorities. These recommendations deal with justification of practices, holistic approach, ALARA culture, ALARA training, especially in the medical sector, ALARA focus through inspection and control, and stakeholder involvement. Individual presentations (papers and slides) are available to download from the EAN website (http://www.eu-alara.net).

An efficient but little known tool for the application of the ALARA principle: ISOE (Information System on Occupational Exposure).The Information System on Occupational Exposure to ionizing radiation (ISOE) is a program launched by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) in 1992. It was developed to address the needs of nuclear power plants and safety authorities as a comparison and information tool on practices in terms of optimization (ALARA principle), in NEA member countries. To date, more than 90% of the operating nuclear power plants in the world are participating in this program, which is organized in a decentralized form, with a steering group and four technical centers (Europe, Asia, north America and IAEA). The ISOE program includes an occupational exposure database and an information exchange and communication network. The databases permit the preparation of studies and comparisons of practices, either in a factual or analytical way. Thus, the ISOE program favors exchanges to the benefit of all participants and helps to bring operational radiation protection ever closer towards the "achievable" of ALARA.

Contribution of the French society for radiation protection to the current reflections onthe possible improvements of the radiological risk management system.Following the invitation from IRPA to comment on the article written by Professor Roger Clarke entitled"Control of Low Level Radiation Exposure: Time for a Change?", the Board of the French Society forRadiation Protection (SFRP) decided to set up a working group on "controllable dose". The latter, whichworked from April 1999 to July 2000, consisted of some twenty members representing the stakeholdersinvolved in radiological protection in France: authorities, experts and professionals from nuclear,medical and research fields as well as associative movement. The present article, which has been approvedby the Board of SFRP, summarises the findings of the WG presented during the IRPA-10 Congress in May 2000.The WG first examined the current hypothesis on radiological risk and noted their relevance for apractical management of such a risk. Then, a list of the different exposure situations and theirassociated characteristic was elaborated in a table form, followed by a discussion on the situations whenthe system of radiological protection fits well, less well or bad, particularly through the implementationof the general principles of radiological protection. The WG finally made proposals to ICRP for anevolution of the system towards a more operational way.

Cette note présente une étude de cas qui analyse les leçons à tirer en matière de radioprotection à partir d'un incident radiologique en vue de prévenir l'apparition d'incidents du même type. Cette note a été publiée en anglais dans la European ALARA Newsletter n$^{\circ}$ 2 (janvier 1997) et elle synthétise un des exemples recensés dans la base de données anglaise IRID (Ionising Radiation Incident Database) du “ Health and Safety Executive ", “ National radiological Protection Board " et de l'“Environmental Agency".