Do perceived obstacles about corruption matter for Indian firms when it comes to their probability to innovate? Using World Bank Enterprise Survey firm-level data, we show that a unit rise in corruption perception of firms in India lowers innovation rate by about 1 percent. The result is important in terms of policy implementation because recent studies have shown that perceived obstacles can affect firms’ probability to innovate. Such analysis is missing in the Indian context where both big and petty corruption is rampant. Our results further show that perceptions about financial barriers matter only when firms also view corruption to be bad. Perceived difficulty in accessing credit in conjunction with corruption perception lowers probability of innovation by 4 percent. This is also true for nonfinancial perceived obstacles of firms. The results remain robust to alternate identification strategies.

This paper examines two potential mechanisms – access to credit and reduction in relational risks – through which social trust can affect R&D investments. Social trust can increase R&D investments by expanding firms' access to external finance with which they can use to fund promising R&D projects. It can also increase R&D investments by reducing relational risks that expose firms to ex-ante and ex-post holdups or expropriation risks. Using industry-level data on R&D investment intensities in 20 OECD countries, I test these mechanisms by evaluating whether more external finance dependent and relational risk vulnerable industries exhibit disproportional higher R&D investment intensities in trust intensive countries. The results indicate that external finance dependent industries and relational risks vulnerable industries experience relatively higher R&D investment intensities in trust-intensive countries. Therefore, the results underline access to external finance and reduction in relational risks as causal pathways linking social trust and R&D investments.

We use survey data to study the degree to which new farming operations inAlabama were financially constrained after the 2008 financial crisis. Next,we control for farmers' self-selection out of the credit market and identifywhich farmers were able to secure loans during the period of 2009–2010. Theresults show that new farmers that started any part of their operation after2005 were financially constrained but no evidence that their financingconstraints were affected by the crisis. As expected, we find that lendingwas collateral-driven, although lenders also considered farmers'profitability and cash flows.