Making America Great Again, Again and Again focuses on a recent example of state behavior—US foreign policy during the Trump administration—to illustrate how these tools and concepts can enrich our understanding of the present moment. The Trump administration was viewed by many as historically novel and one whose actions might radically reorder the world, while others saw it as merely an extension of deep historical processes. How one positioned this present largely turned on their conception of past and future. By placing emergence and change as ontological constants, and centering this heterotemporality and discontinuity, we can better identify the temporal dynamics that characterized the Trump administration’s—and thus American—foreign policy. This chapter identifies four temporal dynamics that characterized the Trump administration—temporal othering, the production of simultaneity in a heterotemporal political environment, the accelerated pace and tempo of political action, and the (re)production of an indefinite present.

What will be the contours of the “post-post-Cold War” world? This chapter takes up that question by examining the defining international and domestic characteristics of this new age and assessing their similarities with previous eras. We begin by identifying three defining attributes of the Cold War: ideological clash, limited economic exchange, and nuclear arms racing between the American and Soviet-led blocs. Next, we explore the central feature of the post-Cold War era - namely, American primacy. We then examine the trends that have eroded primacy's material underpinnings and produced new domestic and International conditions — global power shifts, technological change, and sociopolitical fragmentation -- then project forward how those trends are likely to evolve over the next ten to fifteen years. Finally, we examine the extent to which those trends are distinct from, or continuous with, the conditions facing the United States during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, and find that some important continuities remain even as meaningful discontinuities will disrupt existing patterns of international order. The chapter concludes by arguing that the post-post-Cold War world requires a new strategic approach for the United States — one guided by a principle of openness, rather than Cold War-style containment or post-Cold War-style liberal universalism.

Chapter 8 examines the Cold War during 1984, a presidential election year. It featured a dramatic shift in US foreign policy, as the need to avert a major crisis conjoined with domestic imperatives. The pragmatists grasped the symbiosis. If his ambition of reducing nuclear arms was to be realized, Reagan would need to win a second term. His immediate political interests would be served by forging a more flexible, constructive approach with Moscow. Reagan would now emphasize the peaceful side of “peace through strength” – a candidate who could be peacemaker and statesman. The chapter provides in-depth analysis of Reagan’s move toward the center. A string of new US initiatives were undertaken without any Soviet movement: Reagan’s conciliatory address on US–Soviet relations; the pursuit of new agreements with Moscow (diplomatic and military); the reversal of Carter’s 1980 sanctions; and a White House invitation to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Although these events did not yield a major diplomatic breakthrough, 1984 witnessed a thaw in US–Soviet relations, in which the sense of fear, paranoia, and distrust were eased. Orwellian scenarios did not come to pass.

The epilogue provides an overview of the end of the Cold War. It discusses the Reagan–Gorbachev relationship, their efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons at a remarkable summit in Reykjavik (1986), and the INF Treaty of 1987. The chapter analyzes the reasons for the end of the Cold War and the change in Soviet policy. I argue that although SDI was an important part in Soviet thinking, the key changes effected from 1989 were primarily the result of factors originating in the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. These were factors largely (but not entirely) independent of the policies pursued by US administrations. They include Gorbachev’s own evolving predilections (reinforced by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster); Soviet high politics; long-term structural problems besetting the Soviet economy; the role of non-state actors; and the courageous efforts of citizens and peace groups across Eastern Europe. The epilogue concludes by highlighting the foreign policy turns of Carter and Reagan, and their significance for the Cold War. I argue that only by examining the full landscape – international and domestic – can we truly understand how US foreign policy is crafted.

Chapter 6 covers the first three months of 1983, which featured several important developments. By the mid-point of his first term, Reagan was facing a political crisis: an economic recession, a nationwide nuclear freeze movement, sagging approval ratings, heavy defeats in the midterm elections, and waning support for his military program. To counter the freeze movement and revive domestic support, Reagan would unveil a dramatic proposal for a space-based missile defense system, to protect the United States from nuclear attack. The Strategic Defense Initiative (or, to its critics, “Star Wars”) emerged as a major development in the story of the end of the Cold War. I explain the origins of SDI, arguing that the proposal stemmed from a domestic political crisis as much as strategic one. The chapter analyzes the Soviet response to SDI and the ramifications for the Cold War, as well as discussing Reagan’s famous “Evil Empire” speech of March 1983.

Chapter 4 covers the first year of Reagan’s presidency. Living up to conservative expectations, his administration embarked upon the most hardline, anti-communist agenda in at least two decades. To compel the Soviets to negotiate on arms control, Reagan would oversee the largest peacetime military buildup in American history. But there was little evidence of any strategy to complement the buildup. The Reagan administration engaged in anti-Soviet rhetoric, rejected the idea of a summit with Brezhnev, and refused to offer any serious arms control proposals. The confrontational approach raised US–Soviet tensions during 1981. This chapter also discusses Reagan’s support for the Contras in Nicaragua, which prompted resistance from Democrats in Congress, culminating in the Boland Amendment of late 1982. Finally, the chapter analyzes the crisis in Poland, which saw the imposition of martial law amid the movement led by Solidarity (a non-communist trade union). I discuss the complex factors behind Reagan’s response: his ideological beliefs, European–Soviet trade relations, the influence of the AFL-CIO, and conservative criticism.

Chapter 5 covers the second year of the Reagan administration, and the growing public concern over nuclear war. It discusses the rise of a major grassroots movement, which called for a freeze in the production, deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons by the US and the Soviet Union. The nuclear freeze campaign soon morphed into the largest peacetime peace movement in American history. The force of the movement would make foreign policy the political liability of the Reagan administration. Public demands for a “freeze” on nuclear weapons began to elicit support from within the Democratic Party. The freeze campaign, and a broader “peace movement,” became the Democrats’ most potent political weapon against Reagan’s conservative revolution. The chapter analyzes the administration’s struggle to combat the movement, and persuade the public of the benefits of its own strategy for reducing nuclear weapons. Among other aspects, it discusses Reagan unveiling of a START initiative. By late 1982, Reagan’s policies had raised tensions with Moscow, upset NATO allies, weakened support for his arms buildup, and generated antinuclear movements across America and Western Europe.

Chapter 9 covers 1985, beginning with the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader. It discusses the Soviet “new thinking,” Gorbachev’s desire to implement reform, and his decision to remove Gromyko as foreign minister. For the newly re-elected US president, Gorbachev’s arrival was perfectly timed. Riding a wave of popularity and political strength, Reagan stood by the policy of engagement and moderation. He rejected the advice of hard-liners who persisted in opposing realistic negotiation. Despite his early misgivings, Reagan realized that Gorbachev was a “somewhat different breed” of Soviet leader. The Geneva summit of November 1985 – the first meeting of a US and Soviet leader in six and a half years – marked the end of the Second Cold War. Although no agreement on arms control emerged, the meeting set a new tone for US–Soviet relations. It provided a base for trust between two men with different backgrounds and philosophies. Reagan and Gorbachev viewed the summit as a personal breakthrough. There were many issues to resolve, and Gorbachev’s policies would evolve gradually. But the events of 1985 did much to allay the tension and mutual suspicion between the two nations.

Chapter 3 covers the period from November 1979 through to the end of Carter’s presidency. On December 24, 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought détente to a final, shuddering halt. Together with the US response (the force of which would surprise Moscow), it marked the beginning of a “second” Cold War. It was a conflict that grew more tense, dangerous, and unpredictable over the next four years. Afghanistan followed on the heels of one of the most humiliating episodes in modern US history. The Iran hostage crisis became headline news and struck an emotional chord with the American public. As election season began, Iran and Afghanistan played into the hands of Carter’s critics, who accused him of “weakness.” The world’s number one power, so they argued, could neither stem the tide of Soviet expansion nor bring home the captive Americans. The setbacks allowed political opponents such as Ronald Reagan to declare that the pursuit of SALT had been misguided all along. With criticism mounting, Carter would stake his credibility on a vigorous, alarmist response to the Soviet invasion. It was, he claimed, “the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War.”

Chapter 2 examines the period from January to October 1979. Domestic troubles spiralled during Carter’s third year at the White House. An economic recession, mounting inflation (resulting from a new oil crisis), and intraparty disagreements all undermined support for the president. Together they conjured images of an administration in turmoil. As the year progressed, the idea of “national weakness” gained traction – invoked by opponents of Carter’s foreign and defense policies. In 1979 Carter came under further pressure to align foreign policy with his political needs. His decision to approve the production of the MX program appeared perverse in light of everything that had preceded it. Here was a notable policy departure, veering well beyond the sort of compromise or rhetorical device that Carter had been forced to deploy earlier in his presidency. Soon after, the bungled US response to the “discovery” of a Soviet brigade in Cuba undermined relations with Moscow, just weeks after the Vienna summit. The political maneuvering, and the administration’s mishandling of the episode, damaged the prospects for ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

Chapter 7 covers the remainder of 1983, widely regarded as the most dangerous year of the second half of the Cold War. A series of events raised US–Soviet tensions and public fears of nuclear war: Reagan’s SDI announcement; the Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner, which cost the lives of 62 Americans; the US invasion of Grenada; antinuclear protests across Western Europe and America; the US deployment of INF missiles in Europe; and the Able Archer “war scare.” But these events obscure a development quite as significant: Reagan’s growing awareness of the political context (at home and abroad), and signs of a readiness to depart from the hard-liners’ position. With Shultz’s prompting, the president sought to initiate a dialogue with Moscow and became receptive to the idea of modifying the US approach to arms control. He reacted with restraint to the KAL disaster, and toned down the anti-Soviet rhetoric. Even before the Able Archer crisis there had been a change in Reagan’s attitude. It reflected his own moderate views, a desire to improve relations, and an increased sense of his domestic imperatives. As his election campaign began, Reagan was pragmatist was emerging.

Chapter 1 explores the first half of Jimmy Carter’s term as president, from January 1977 through to late 1978. The end of the “imperial presidency,” increased Congressional powers, and the rise of special interest groups complicated life for the new administration. Carter entered the White House amid wide conservative opposition to détente and his pursuit of a new SALT Treaty with the Soviet Union. He began placating critics of the SALT I agreement, particularly Henry Jackson, who had the potential to mobilize discontented, conservative Democrats and independents against a second SALT agreement, as well as Carter’s bid for a second term. The president courted Jackson and acted on his advice in 1977 as he pursued arms control negotiations with Moscow. When Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev rejected the US proposals, Carter changed his approach in order to straddle the demands of his conservative critics and the need to maintain a working relationship with the Kremlin. The chapter also discusses Carter’s decision to promote the cause of human rights in Eastern Europe, the normalization of relations with China, and the quest to ratify the Panama Canal treaties in Congress.

The introduction outlines the period known as the Second Cold War, circa 1979–85. It marked the end of the détente, and escalated into the most dangerous phase of the conflict since the Cuban Missile Crisis. As fears of nuclear war were raised, so the domestic schisms deepened. The largest peacetime military buildup was challenged by the largest peacetime peace movement. I discuss the reasons for the rise in US–Soviet tensions and explain how they were eased – even before the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. The preface highlights the role of domestic politics in shaping American foreign policy during the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Both presidents changed course – Carter becoming more hawkish; Reagan more open to negotiation – by the end of their first terms, pushed by international affairs yet simultaneously incentivized by potential domestic gains to be found within their transformation. These dramatic “reversals” helped lead to the rise and fall of the last great Cold War struggle. I argue that the convergence of the international and domestic agendas (the “intermestic”) is the key to understanding US decision-making.

Examines September 11 attacks and the Cold War–style response of George W. Bush. Assesses competing interpretations of 9/11. Outlines Bush Doctrine and argues for its continuity with Cold War strategies. Considers case for and performance in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Details first phase of the War on Terror and the traditional alliances that it relied on.

Considers the strong realism of Obama and how his efforts to avoid the Syrian Civil War were like those of George H. W. Bush in Yugoslavia. Examines pros and cons of his nuclear deal with Iran and his failure to contain Russian power in Ukraine and Syria, an impotence he shares with several of his Cold War and post–Cold War predecessors. Assesses the Obama foreign policy legacy and how far it explains the rise of Donald Trump.

Argues for continuity (with the Cold War) and success (in the post–Cold War era) of American foreign policy. Assesses major interpretations and historiography of the Cold War and post–Cold War eras.

Argues for Clinton's reversion to Cold War diplomacy in his second term. Containment of Russia and Iraq became central concerns. Chronicles Clinton battles with Congress, his impeachment, and his expansive foreign policy of apparent humanitarian interventions (in Kosovo especially), but waged as much to contain Russian power as to advance human rights.

Considers how George W. Bush rescued the catastrophe of post-invasion Iraq with his Surge. Analyzes key events of second Bush term, his freedom agenda, and wider counterterrorism efforts. Argues that Bush continued with a foreign policy approach made in the Cold War, in which Russian power remained a central concern. Details how Bush resembled his Cold War predecessors in his Russia policy, especially during the Russo-Georgia War. Examines successes and failures of Bush Jr.’s foreign policy, with a special focus on his approach to China. Argues that Bush’s foreign toward India was a considerable success.