This article evaluates the Australian retirement system using a framework of justice. Justice (alternatively, equity or fairness) is taken as requiring a full consideration of the criteria of needs, equality, liberty and just deserts, as well as matters of efficiency. Inequity occurs when the interests of weaker stakeholders are given inadequate consideration. Applying these criteria suggests that the Australian retirement system intrudes on the liberty of some groups of stakeholders inconsistently and inappropriately in mandating contributions at younger ages particularly, and by the imposition of unnecessarily bureaucratic means tests. It also fails to provide for the incapacitated older aged.

We develop a generalisation of the World Bank (1994) model of forced saving for retirement. This broader model consists of two tiers of second pillar savings – mandated and non-mandated (voluntary). Furthermore, the government can set two types of guarantees on the first (mandated) tier – investment returns and annuity prices – leading to possible cross-subsidisation between the tiers. This has the potential to induce social redistribution, foster a liquid private market for life annuities, and obviate some of the investment risk and annuity price risk that retirees face.

We formulate a quantitative model of financial flows within such a system, which explains the mechanism by which cross-subsidisation occurs. Based on this analysis, a taxonomy of two-tiered retirement systems is presented, that is based on the choices that the government makes.

In many countries, governmental support for funded old-age programmes comes at the cost of at least partial mandatory annuitisation of accumulated assets in retirement. We survey regulatory frameworks for the payout phase of funded pension systems in seven European countries and the US and study the influence of mandatory annuitisation on the welfare of both rational and behaviourally influenced individuals using a dynamic life-cycle model. We show that mandatory immediate full annuitisation of retirement assets will reduce rational individuals’ certainty equivalent pension wealth by up to 54%. Softening the strict immediate annuitisation requirements along the line of regulatory realities in some of the surveyed countries reduces utility losses considerably. Behaviourally restricted individuals can benefit from full annuitisation at retirement, but generally they will also prefer more flexible regulation.