The question how to optimize consumption and portfolio choice over the life cycle has been widely discussed in the literature so far. In this paper we concentrate on a retiree's optimal consumption and portfolio selection over his remaining years of life. We apply the logistic model of mortality thus modeling the empirically observed increase of mortality during the retirement period. The optimal consumption strategy and portfolio choice are established by reducing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann equation to the explicit solution of an ordinary differential function (ODF) that includes the mortality rate. A general finding is that the Merton-Samuelson result of constant portfolio choice for a constant mortality is confirmed for arbitrary mortality. The portfolio choice is only influenced by risk and return of assets and the retirees’ risk aversion. To get the specific optimal consumption strategy in a realistic situation the logistic model of mortality has been fitted to the data of the Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany 2006/2008. The optimal initial value for the ODF is obtained by numerical methods. The solution provides a large increase in the ratio of optimal consumption to wealth up to about 92 years followed by a sharp decrease. A bequest motive dampens the magnitudes of the ups and downs of the consumption ratio but does not change the basic shape.

We present the results of a survey experiment where the treatment group was provided with an information brochure regarding recently implemented changes in the Norwegian pension system, whereas a control group was not. We find that those who received the information are more likely to respond correctly to questions regarding the new pension system. The information effect is larger for those with high education, but only for the most complex aspect of the reform. Despite greater knowledge of the reform in the treatment group, we find no differences between the treatment and control group in their preferences regarding when to retire or whether to combine work and pension uptake.

In many countries, governmental support for funded old-age programmes comes at the cost of at least partial mandatory annuitisation of accumulated assets in retirement. We survey regulatory frameworks for the payout phase of funded pension systems in seven European countries and the US and study the influence of mandatory annuitisation on the welfare of both rational and behaviourally influenced individuals using a dynamic life-cycle model. We show that mandatory immediate full annuitisation of retirement assets will reduce rational individuals’ certainty equivalent pension wealth by up to 54%. Softening the strict immediate annuitisation requirements along the line of regulatory realities in some of the surveyed countries reduces utility losses considerably. Behaviourally restricted individuals can benefit from full annuitisation at retirement, but generally they will also prefer more flexible regulation.

The aim of this paper is to make an assessment of the 2011 reform of the public pension system in Spain using the Swedish pension system as a benchmark, although some reference to the US pension system is also made. The paper focuses on the reform, explaining its aims, breaking down the main contents, critically examining the official view and describing the expected ageing of the Spanish population. This approach complements the quantitative analyses performed by other researchers and will enable us to assess the reformed system with the focus on four main areas: actuarial fairness, actuarial transparency, solvency and communication with the public. The main conclusion is that the reform was a wasted opportunity given that Spain did not take advantage of the lessons learned in Sweden, it did not include any elements for improving the management of pay-as-you-go systems, and there is no sound basis for claiming that the system's sustainability is assured in the medium term, the long term or even the short term. The new parametric reforms currently under consideration in Spain are targeted to correct some of the pension system's design faults that have been highlighted in this paper.