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Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) exemplify a dual-use neurotechnology with significant potential in both civilian and military contexts. While BCIs hold promise for treating neurological conditions such as spinal cord injuries and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis in the future, military decisionmakers in countries such as the United States and China also see their potential to enhance combat capabilities. Some predict that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) will be early adopters of BCI enhancements. This article argues for a shift in focus: the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) should pursue translational research of medical BCIs for treating severely injured or ill SOF personnel. After two decades of continuous military engagement and on-going high-risk operations, SOF personnel face unique injury patterns, both physical and psychological, which BCI technology could help address. The article identifies six key medical applications of BCIs that could benefit wounded SOF members and discusses the ethical implications of involving SOF personnel in translational research related to these applications. Ultimately, the article challenges the traditional civilian-military divide in neurotechnology, arguing that by collaborating more closely with military stakeholders, scientists can not only help individuals with medical needs, including servicemembers, but also play a role in shaping the future military applications of BCI technology.
How international law applies to the use of information and communications technology by States is still a matter of discussion. Against this background, cyberspace has become the main area of competition between States, and this competition, to put it simply, is resulting in a constant low-intensity warfare below the threshold for a use of force. Such low-intensity cyber warfare, from a legal point of view, revitalizes the debate over the concept of a “state of intermediacy” that has the potential to overcome the dichotomy between peace and war. In the present author's opinion, this state of intermediacy also supports the idea that the international humanitarian law (IHL) principle of distinction should be applied, even before the eruption of a full-scale war, whenever wartime means and capabilities are employed by States. This paper argues that some opacities in international law have created favourable conditions for such constant low-intensity warfare, and that tackling the identified opacities would therefore be beneficial in order to achieve a more peaceful cyberspace. Thus, the paper goes on to address one of the identified opacities, namely the definition of espionage under international law, because, as international law now stands, it does not allow us to tackle the other identified opacities. Finally, the paper discusses how the proposed narrow interpretation of espionage can cope with the IHL principle of distinction in the cyber domain.
There has been limited focus placed on exploring food insecurity within the UK-ex-Armed Forces population. The present study aims to build on initial work by investigating the prevalence and associated factors of food insecurity within UK veterans and their families and their current health status. 881 veterans (or a family member) who previously served in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, Army and the Royal Air Force completed an online survey to explore health status, food insecurity and receipt of benefits. In total, 16.9% of survey respondents were part of food-insecure households, with 12% of these also experiencing some element of hunger. Working age, non-officer rank at the time of service discharge, not being married, living in rented accommodation, having at least one medical condition and in receipt of other benefits were significant risk factors associated with food insecurity. Understanding the specific risk factors associated with food insecurity is vital to develop personalised interventions and policies, such as income support programmes and affordable housing initiatives. However, more work is needed to further explore the factors associated with food insecurity, particularly in the long term.
It is almost the definition of a State that it has control over territory, control which has to be exercised through the application, or the threat of application, of physical force. The United Kingdom is no different from other States where, over time, the institutionalisation of this physical force has taken the form of an everyday service – the police – and a service which can be called in aid at times when unusual dangers have to be confronted – the armed forces. As the principle of the rule of law has evolved, so has the way in which the police and army have come to be regulated. Rather than being the enforcers of the law they are now viewed as its servants.
Throughout Ghana’s political history, soldiers have inspired socio-political change. Based on fieldwork with the Ghanaian military, this article contributes to literature on militaries and civil-military relations in Africa. Agyekum analyzes how the politicization of the military impacts dynamics within the barracks, while highlighting how the country’s political class endeavors to diminish the armed forces’ societal and political influence as a way to gain control over the institution through patronage exchanges. Since the early 2000s, the elite’s strategy entices individual soldiers as well as the whole institution through the politicization of promotions and appointments, recruitment, better service conditions, and infrastructural projects in the barracks.
The idea that Rio de Janeiro has been plunged into an actual “war” against organized crime is widely discussed and is supported by an ever-increasing number of people in Brazil. Not surprisingly, such discourse has led to less protection for the civilian population, particularly in the so-called favelas, while allowing security forces to carry out operations with even greater relative impunity. This article argues that although urban violence in Rio de Janeiro is indeed a serious problem, it does not reach the threshold required to be considered a non-international armed conflict.
Sophie Orr oversees International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operations in North, Central and South America (the ICRC Americas Region), providing strategic steering for the organization's response and contributing to humanitarian diplomacy efforts at different levels. The delegations and missions in the region work on addressing a wide range of needs of people affected by present and past situations of conflict and armed violence.
Prior to her appointment as Regional Director for the Americas, Ms Orr worked in many different and often complex environments, first as a foreign affairs producer and journalist with the UK's Channel 4 News. She has previously worked for the ICRC in several countries, mainly in protection and management positions, and later at headquarters, first as Strategic Adviser to the Director of Operations from 2012 to 2016 and then leading the ICRC's operational cooperation with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation.
Historians of appeasement make different assumptions about Britain’s ability to influence events through the threat or use of military force or economic sanctions. Attempts at measuring power are examined critically and key factors identified, including the armed forces, the arms industry, the wider economy and public willingness to support foreign policy. The strength of the Royal Navy is discussed in relation to the size of other navies and to Britain’s commitments, and Churchill’s comment that the Chamberlain government did not neglect the navy is noted. In contrast, Churchill described the loss of Britain’s lead over Germany in air power as a disaster. Britain and Germany’s air power are compared in the context of technical developments. Britain’s limited capability to support France on land is explained, with particular reference to tanks, which Churchill had pioneered. Historians’ debates about the adequacy of Britain’s arms industry are discussed in relation to problems encountered by Germany in rearmament. It is argued that the principal reason why Britain lagged behind Germany was Chamberlain’s unwillingness to accept Churchill’s advice to divert industry from civil trade and industry to producing munitions. The possibilities of collective security through the League of Nations or Churchill’s concept of a grand alliance are explored and the importance of intelligence in influencing perceptions of power emphasized.
This article addresses one of the instances of the transnationalisation of state terrorism that took place at the end of the Cold War in Latin America. It examines the collaboration of the Argentine military dictatorship with the governments of Guatemala and Honduras in their ‘fight against subversion’ (1980–3) through previously unexplored archives. It presents the different degrees and forms of inter-governmental collaboration, the people responsible, the time frame, and the institutions, seeking to elaborate on the role of this collaboration in the repressive processes of each nation's historical experience. In general terms, this article contributes to transnational studies of the right wing during the recent history of the Latin American Cold War.
The need to rebuild the security infrastructure in a postconflict state is of paramount importance for ensuring a durable peace. This chapter examines the complicated tradeoffs parties face sharing and/or reestablishing the monopoly of force, including when sharing force with the international community; the questions of the consent of the state, and often the consent of the nonstate parties; the nature and configuration of the international forces, including the command structure of the international forces; and the mandate of those forces. The chapter also analyzes cases during which the state seeks to integrate nonstate armed actors into the national forces, when parties are faced with the questions of how best to provide for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of nonstate forces, coupled with security sector reform for the national forces. The chapter additionally examines the questions that arise when the state seeks to restore limited control over the monopoly of force by permitting nonstate actors to come under the umbrella command of the national forces, including to what extent to promote some degree of integration among special units of the state and nonstate forces, as well as a timeline for the eventual integration of forces.
This paper explains how South Korea's democracy has controlled the military since 1993. It reveals why the overpowered military has not faded even after the eradication of Hanahoe and the consolidation of democracy in South Korea in its aftermath. The democratic control over the military is examined focusing on: (1) budget, personnel, organization; (2) the judicial system; (3) security and defense policy; (4) personnel affairs, roles, and responsibilities; and an explanation based on laws and institutions, the strategy of key actors, and historical conditions of military confrontation. Under South Korea's democracy, the military budget, personnel, and organization are only partially controlled, leaving military commanders with jurisdiction over the military's judicial system. This is a result of legal and institutional limitations, as well as resistance from the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the military. In matters of security and defense policy, the president has taken the initiative to revitalize obsolete systems through political compromise with the military. The primary means for the president to control the military has been the personnel management of the MND and the military. The military is likely to pledge its allegiance to the regime instead of citizens because the former has control over personnel affairs, which has frequently led to unofficial private groups of military officers and their political interference. This case in South Korea shows that the way society controls the military sows the very seeds of risk and allows us to rethink the challenges in controlling the military in a democracy.
This article clarifies the ongoing confusion in doctrine and practice about both the actual and optimal interaction between international counterterrorism law (CTL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) in armed conflict. It discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the co-application of CTL with IHL, before considering a variety of techniques for mutually accommodating the interests of both regimes, particularly through partial exclusion clauses in counterterrorism instruments or laws. It concludes by identifying the optimal approach to the relationship between CTL and IHL, which recognizes the legitimate interests of both fields of law while minimizing the adverse impacts of each on the other.
This paper uses the principles of trauma-informed care – safety, collaboration, choice, trustworthiness, and respect – to reflect on the quality of veterans’ treatment within the UK social security system. Drawing upon new data from qualitative longitudinal research with veterans in four geographical locations across England, UK, it explores their experiences within the social security system, highlighting specific issues relating to their interactions with the Work Capability Assessment (WCA) but also the conditionality inherent within the UK benefits system. Overall, it is evident that there is a lack of understanding of the impact of trauma on people’s psychosocial functioning and, as a result, veterans are treated in ways which are variously perceived as disrespectful, unfair or disempowering and in some cases exacerbate existing mental health problems. We propose that the application of trauma-informed care principles to the UK social security system could improve interactions within this system and avoid re-traumatising those experiencing on-going or unresolved trauma. The paradigm of trauma-informed care has been used internationally to examine health, homelessness, prison and childcare services, but ours is the first exploration of its application to the delivery of social security.
During the Second World War some 600,000 women were absorbed into the Women's Auxiliary Air Force, the Auxiliary Territorial Service, and the Women's Royal Naval Service. These women performed important military functions for the armed forces, both at home and overseas, and the jobs they undertook ranged from cooking, typing and telephony to stripping down torpedoes, overhauling aircraft engines, and operating the fire control instruments in anti-aircraft gun batteries. In this wide-ranging study, which draws on a multitude of sources and combines organisational history with the personal experiences of servicewomen, Jeremy Crang traces the wartime history of the WAAF, ATS and WRNS and the integration of women into the British armed forces. Servicewomen came to play such an integral wartime role that the military authorities established permanent regular post-war women's services and, in so doing, opened up for the first time a military career for women.
The armed forces that fought against the Caste War rebels were a heterogeneous mix, including regular government units. The majority of those who fought against Caste War rebels, however, were drafted to the militia (or National Guard) battalions established in major Yucatecan towns. Furthermore, local vecino or Indian men waged their own war against the rebels. The coexistence of a variety of armed forces, the strong reliance on draftees, the presence of volunteers in military units and the participation of people who fought the rebels on their own led to several problems and became an obstacle to central strategic planning and the enforcement of military discipline. The role of Indians in the struggle against Caste War rebels has been consistently neglected or played down in much of the literature, possibly for its potential to question interpretations of the conflict as a racial or ethnic struggle. However, as the chapter shows, Indians, identified by their Maya surname, made up a substantial part of the army and National Guard units. Indian participation in the war was not limited to individual regions or a specific point in time.
Operating under responsible command is an essential requirement to qualify as a lawful combatant, and is also central to the doctrine of command responsibility. This reveals the inextricable link between the role of the commander and the effective implementation of the international humanitarian law (IHL). Understanding this linkage is vital to ensuring that commanders and other military leaders fulfil their obligation to prepare subordinates to navigate the chaos of mortal combat within the legal and by implication moral framework that IHL provides. Few commanders would question the proposition that responsible commanders prepare their military units to effectively perform their combat missions. However, operational effectiveness is only one aspect of developing a “responsible” command. Because this term is grounded in the expectation of IHL compliance, a truly responsible command exists only when the unit is prepared to execute its operational mission in a manner that fully complies with IHL obligations. This broader conception of a disciplined and effective military unit reflects the true nature of the concept of responsible command, as only military units built on this conception of discipline advance the complementary objectives of military effectiveness and humanitarian respect. Accordingly, the requirement that lawful combatants operate under responsible command is an admonition to all military leaders that truly effective military units are those capable of executing their missions with maximum operational effect within the framework of humanitarian constraint that defines the limits of justifiable violence during armed conflict.
In the scholarly debate on how to deal with hypercompetition, a dominant logic has become that investing in ‘sensing’, ‘seizing’, and ‘transforming’ dynamic capabilities offers organization’s the potential to repetitively initiate business innovations. Actual research into the micro-foundations of these dynamic capabilities has been limited. This study explores whether modular organizing and lateral coordination are typical processes that support an organization’s sensing function. Empirically the study investigates how these two variables help The Netherlands armed forces to deal with its volatile crisis response environment. The findings show that both predictors stimulate the development of a broad knowledge base from which the organization can operationally benefit. Yet, the study has also uncovered that, when modularity's demand of organizational autonomy is not sufficiently satisfied, the organization becomes preoccupied with its own internal functioning at the expense of its external lateral sensing capacity.
There is considerable interest in understanding further the factors that increase the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for military personnel. This study aimed to investigate the relative contribution of demographic variables; childhood adversity; the nature of exposure to traumatic events during deployment; appraisal of these experiences; and home-coming experiences in relation to the prevalence of PTSD ‘caseness’ as measured by a score of ⩾50 on the PTSD Checklist (PCL) in UK Armed Forces personnel who have been deployed in Iraq since 2003.
Method
Data were drawn from the first stage of a retrospective cohort study comparing UK military personnel who were deployed to the 2003 Iraq War with personnel serving in the UK Armed Forces on 31 March 2003 but who were not deployed to the initial phase of war fighting. Participants were randomly selected and invited to participate. The response rate was 61%. We have limited these analyses to 4762 regular service individuals who responded to the survey and who have been deployed in Iraq since 2003.
Results
Post-traumatic stress symptoms were associated with lower rank, being unmarried, having low educational attainment and a history of childhood adversity. Exposure to potentially traumatizing events, in particular being deployed to a ‘forward’ area in close contact with the enemy, was associated with post-traumatic stress symptoms. Appraisals of the experience as involving threat to one's own life and a perception that work in theatre was above an individual's trade and experience were strongly associated with post-traumatic stress symptoms. Low morale and poor social support within the unit and non-receipt of a home-coming brief (psycho-education) were associated with greater risk of post-traumatic stress symptoms.
Conclusions
Personal appraisal of threat to life during the trauma emerged as the most important predictor of post-traumatic stress symptoms. These results also raise the possibility that there are important modifiable occupational factors such as unit morale, leadership, preparing combatants for their role in theatre which may influence an individual's risk of post-traumatic stress symptoms. Therefore interventions focused on systematic preparation of personnel for the extreme stress of combat may help to lessen the psychological impact of deployment.
This essay, written in September 2006, considers the first months of the MAS government headed by Evo Morales in the light of the virtually constant political crisis in Bolivia since 2000. The first part asks why the turbulent course of public life in Bolivia has proved so difficult to explain. It seeks to show that the recent period has been depicted in rather narrow interpretations that stress institutional failings, poverty and oppression, or civic heroism, but do not try to find the linkages between these phenomena. The second section proposes an alternative approach, treating the recent experience of conflict as a revolutionary episode in which the idea of ‘Two Bolivias’ needs to be qualified by appreciation of past revolutionary experiences. The final sections suggest that the ardour and complexities of the current conflict might seem more comprehensible if the MAS and its supporters are viewed as essentially plebeian in both condition and ideological disposition. Such a classical and early modern allusion provides a fuller analytical palate for understanding the current conjuncture and the socio-political propositions being made in a ‘semi-modern’ environment.