The 1988 constitution has led to the introduction of ethno-legal categories grounded on the dual premises of exceptionality and territorial administration. This article offers an explanation of why mobilizations based on ethnicity have not petered out despite the evident disengagement of the state, suggesting that it is important to distinguish between two ways of envisioning the articulation of singularity with territory: while the state considers that differences between populations pre-exist prior to territorial delimitation, local populations are convinced that the intention to proceed with demarcation suffices in itself to demonstrate their specificity. Moreover, from their perspective, a territorial claim is important as a way of accessing other rights that they consider equally essential. Our second section examines not only recent declarations of identity but also the observed switching between ethno-legal categories, building on a comparison with religious conversion as a meandering, complex, sometimes paradoxical process. Ethnicity, like religious affiliation, can thus be seen as a language developed at the national level but reappropriated by various populations in the service of local issues and usages. A final section examines particularism, whether quilombola, traditional or Indian, as the currently dominant norm and form of expression for social protest, while reflecting on the role of outside actors as “institutional hosts” [Houtzager 2004]. It should be noted, moreover, that such standardization of the forms of political involvement no more precludes the replication of the social hierarchies between outsiders and natives, than it prevents social protest from being co-opted by the authorities.

Achieving consensus on a definition of “democracy” has proven elusive. Institutions that have been taken to be essential to democracy have changed radically since the word “democrat” began to be widely used toward the end of the eighteenth century. Democratic ideas and democratic practice engender conflict that transforms institutions rather than just reproduces them. Its transformative character rests on a half-dozen key attributes of democracy: it is an actor’s concept, as well as an analyst’s; it can arouse strong feelings; it combines not always compatible ideas; it empowers dissent; it involves a dynamic mixture of inclusion and exclusion; and the democratic histories of national states have been intertwined with global domination. Two processes combine to generate much social dynamism. First, democracy’s stirring inclusionary claims have been contradicted by a complex structure of exclusions, including distinctions in rights of full participation among citizens, distinctions in rights between citizens and non-citizens, and distinctions in resources among legally equal citizens. And second, democratic practice has been fertile soil for the development of social movements. Taken together, democracy is an invitation for movements to try to shift the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, and in so doing to expand or constrict democracy itself.

The article discusses three liberal arguments about freedom of movement: immigration as a remedy for global injustice in the distribution of opportunities, freedom of movement as an integral aspect of individual autonomy, and immigration control as implied in democratic self-determination and citizenship. The article shows how these apparently irreconcilable stances can be reconstructed as partially overlapping once we realize that liberal citizenship provides not only reasons for closure but entails a bundle of mobility rights and is open for access by migrant stakeholders.