I argue that “The Rotation of Crops” represents one of two culminations of the aesthete’s (i.e., “A’s”) position in Either/Or. Under the guise of his bantering remarks, A sketches a theory of the modern self as specifically constituted in relation to the problem of boredom: To be modern is to be bored and to be motivated by the desire not to be bored. A’s boredom is thus in some sense an experience of ultimate significance, a religious experience imminent within the terms of the secular life itself. A’s solution to the problem of boredom turns out therefore to require a wholesale conversion; the cure is nothing short of a totalizing spiritual practice that one must make the center of one’s life, if one hopes to keep things interesting. A’s position amounts at once to a transcendental critique and to a theology of boredom.

Time, and how we relate to it, is a persistent theme throughout Kierkegaard’s writings. Particularly striking is the way in which Kierkegaard depicts various pathologies of temporal experience, showing how various strategies for dealing with time are ultimately self-defeating. Either/Or is perhaps the single best example of a text in which Kierkegaard problematizes time and our responses to it. The book is famously presented as staging a clash between two views of life, the aesthetic and the ethical. But it can also be understood as presenting and critiquing two different ways of relating to time: one that tries to evade the responsibility entailed by living in time and one that tries to anchor itself in an eternity that is ultimately a denial of finitude. The text suggests both approaches to time are doomed, and that a different, specifically religious relation to time is required.

This chapter explores Judge William’s argument that ethical marriage is superior to aesthetic ways of living. William’s argument serves as a response to the method A sketches out in his essay on crop rotation, by explaining how the various concerns that motivate A’s program for avoiding boredom are more fully addressed by the marriage relationship. And yet, deeper examination of William’s argument reveals how this view of marriage is itself incomplete. Incidentally, it is A’s review essay on “The First Love” that demonstrates how a proper appreciation for “the occasion” helps protect romantic partners, in both aesthetic and ethical relationships, from falling into delusion about the status of their relationship. William’s account of marriage seems to ignore this problem, but with the importance of the occasion in mind we can understand what a fuller, more meaningful romantic relationship could be like.

Session 5 focuses on the sensations that comprise low-arousal emotions such as sadness, guilt, and boredom. The pit of dread in your gut when you have done something wrong (Ricky the Rock), the feeling of being weighted down with sand that can happen when one is sad (Bertha Blah), or when your mind and body feel like you are utterly empty but still eager for something to do (Empty Eliza) are some friends we meet this session. Seeing what happens to feelings of heaviness when you snuggle with someone or something and challenging an empty mind to come up with 50 things to do are some of the adventures in this session.

This chapter is concerned with the moral significance of boredom. Boredom is a problematic mood state that is causally correlated with several troublesome behaviors. While omnipresent in schools, boredom is seldom addressed explicitly. Schools do, however, offer a latent curriculum vis-à-vis boredom. Confronted with boredom, students are conditioned to do one of two things: first, escape boring circumstances, as much as possible, or second, resign themselves to boredom as an inevitable part of life. Both responses are problematic and avoid meaningful reflection on and engagement with this troubling mood state. In the chapter, I explore the nature of boredom (both situational and existential). I then turn to Albert Borgmann’s notion of a focal practice as a promising antidote to boredom. In Borgmann’s phenomenology of focal practices, I find resources for a pedagogy that begins to constructively address the perilous mood state of boredom.

This chapter examines the nihilistic dimension in the first volume of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation. It begins with an account of the philosopher’s theory of the will as the fundamental metaphysical principle of the universe. Schopenhauer describes the will as a never-ending inward discord in every living thing that is the result of the constant drive to satiate one’s needs for food, drink, sex, sleep, and so on. This striving is what Schopenhauer calls “suffering,” and he claims that all life is suffering. He emphasizes the nature of human beings as finite and always on the way to death. He argues that time and space are infinite, in comparison to which the human being is a tiny, insignificant thing that occupies only a small space and a short period of time. Schopenhauer recommends the disposition of asceticism as the solution of the constant suffering and striving of the human condition. With asceticism one tries to break the never-ending circle of the will by renunciation, resignation, and denial of the will-to-live. Schopenhauer seems to concede that it is impossible to escape nihilism (even with the strictest ascetic discipline), and in the end everything dies and disappears into nothingness.

After unpacking the sense in which Heidegger uses the term "contradiction," the chapter reviews his use of it in the strictly logical, “injunctive” sense as the “principle of non-contradiction” (PNC) and “law of thinking,” particularly as he wields it in the course of exposing what otherwise appear to be cases of vagueness or ambiguity. It then reviews his tendency in some contexts to align the PNC with a metaphysics that restricts being to being on hand (vorhanden) and the dilemma that this ontological interpretation presents, given his apparent adherence to the principle, even as he proposes a broader understanding of being. The chapter then suggests that his analysis of attunement in the 1929/30 lectures introduces a more expansive reading of the PNC and that this reading is corroborated by his existential interpretation of the principle in the Winter Semester of 1933/34. The interpretation is a ringing endorsement of the PNC and the sameness of reference it enjoins as a condition for being-with-one-another. The chapter concludes by probing the implications of this ontologically broader – or post-ontological – interpretation of the PNC for thinking and speaking of being itself, riddled with “nothingness” as it is.

In the epilogue, I offer a coda on the pursuit of leisure. While schools (teachers and administrators) can make strides toward cultivating leisure in students, the art of leisure is fundamentally a subjective task. It is learning how to be a person – how to live with and contend with the angels and demons that plague human existence.

Life extension consists in slowing, halting, or even reversing human ageing. I will briefly review why many reputable geroscientists believe this is possible. This raises three areas of ethical concern. First, some people argue that extended life is not desirable, and that we are better off without it. I explain why these are mostly bad arguments, and why, for most people, the advantages of extended life will outweigh whatever disadvantages it may have. The second concern is that widespread use of life extension will cause overpopulation. The third concern is that life extension will be so expensive that not everyone will be able to get it, and this is unjust. These are legitimate concerns, but not insurmountable. After reviewing the ethical issues behind these concerns, I argue that we should develop life extension and make it available provided that we take steps to avoid overpopulation and to distribute life extension fairly.

In the spate of scholarship on boredom over the past two decades, the moral character of boredom has received little attention (Elpidorou, ). This is striking because boredom’s ancient precursor, acedia, was considered to be one of the deadliest vices and the source of several other destructive vices, including gluttony, lust, and anger (Bunge, ). In this respect, modern boredom arguably parallels acedia, as it is also casually linked to numerous problematic, arguably immoral behaviors. The state of boredom is morally significant because it adversely impacts both moral reasoning and the vision of flourishing that guides moral reasoning. Boredom is not simply a mood we must endure but a state of mind (certainly impacted by circumstances) that we need not be captive to. Its moral significance also needs to be underscored because there is something at stake: We can do something about what we find to be boring (boredom assessment) and how we contend with this mood state (boredom endurance).

In this book, I make a case that schools should graduate students who know how to engage boredom productively when it arises. Rather than simply avoiding boredom or helplessly blaming boredom on something or someone else, such students take responsibility for their boredom. They develop internal resources for contending with boredom; they are adept and diplomatic at challenging boring circumstances, and they are equipped at finding worthwhile activities and practices that alleviate boredom. Such students acquire a capacity to discern a creative middle way between boredom avoidance, on the one hand, and stultifying boredom endurance, on the other hand. This middle way, I will argue, is the practice of leisure.

People are susceptible to boredom and seek an optimal level of arousal. Psychopathic individuals appear to be low on arousal, and they try to elevate this by seeking novelty and taking risks. Ways to achieve the optimal level by sensation-seeking include transgressions such as violence, arson and theft. These can have sexual associations and are sometimes accompanied by masturbation. Dopamine activation is at the basis of elevations in arousal. Serial lust killers commonly have a history of committing non-sexual crimes and arson. The internal organs of the body are under the control of the autonomic nervous system, high arousal being associated with dominance of the sympathetic branch and low arousal with the parasympathetic branch. Arousal is largely non-specific, and it takes a positive or negative value according to context. Switches can be made from negative to positive, which appears to lie at the basis of some lust killing.