Chapter 5 applies the argument of this book to the beginning of the Macron presidency. Initially, Macron implemented a series of liberalizing reforms, notably of taxation, collective bargaining, and the national railways, often over the opposition of strikers and demonstrators. However, after just eighteen months in office, simmering resentment erupted into the so-called yellow vest protests, a movement against higher gasoline taxes that spiraled into a broader contestation of the government itself. Chapter 5 shows that both the social anesthesia state and skinny politics contributed to the yellow vest movement. In a context of scarce fiscal resources due to the social anesthesia state, Macron’s desire to bolster French business through tax cuts while reducing France’s budget deficit necessarily entailed tax increases and cutbacks in public and social services for the general population. Further fueling contestation, Macron adopted an extreme form of skinny politics, disdaining negotiations with political elites and the social partners, and imposing reforms from above. The combination of unpopular reform, much of it liberal in nature, and skinny politics sparked the yellow vest protests. In the end, the yellow vests forced Macron to backtrack from his agenda, sent his approval ratings plummeting, and weakened his capacity to govern.

Chapter 6 analyzes Macron’s attempt to rebound from the yellow vest protests. On the one hand, signaling a shift in governance, Macron launched two initiatives, the Grand National Debate (GDN) and the Citizens’ Climate Convention (CCC), that offered an opportunity for ordinary citizens to voice their concerns and preferences. In the case of the CCC, 150 citizens were given the chance to craft legislative and regulatory reforms that Macron pledged to implement. Both initiatives were popular, revealing a strong desire among the French to be listened to and participate in key decisions affecting their lives. On the other hand, rather than serving as a template for a new agenda and mode of governance, the GDN and CCC remained isolated exceptions. In all other matters, Macron continued as before, pursuing an unpopular liberal economic agenda via top-down, skinny methods. Chapter 6 uses Macron’s two most important initiatives during this period, a tightening of unemployment benefits and eligibility conditions along with an overhaul of the pension system that included a controversial increase in the retirement age for many workers, to demonstrate the continuity of Macron’s agenda and approach to governing. Both reforms triggered significant contestation, and the pension reform was ultimately abandoned.

Chapter 4 analyzes the institutional factors fueling the contestation of economic liberalization. The dirigiste model was rooted in the premise that top-down governance, free of interference by interest groups, offered the best way to modernize the country. The institutions of the Fifth Republic reinforced this exclusionary orientation by centralizing power in the executive. While France’s top-down or “skinny” approach may be effective when governments are extending popular new benefits, it is problematic when they are trying to avoid blame for unpopular measures, as is generally the case with economic liberalization, since with concentrated power comes concentrated accountability. Despite this problem, Chapter 4 shows that French authorities have refused to break with skinny politics. In the late 1990s, the “social refoundation” tried to shift reform away from the contested political arena to negotiations among the social partners but was blocked by governments of left and right alike. Finally, through analyses of liberalizing initiatives during Chirac’s second presidency and the case of French pension reform, Chapter 4 shows that skinny politics almost invariably triggers popular contestation and, even when successful, tends to yield half-measures that antagonize the populace without fixing the fiscal and economic problems that motivated action in the first place.

This chapter is about the broad wave of support which the repression of Poland’s Solidarity trade union in December 1981 triggeredin France. It explains this outpouring of sympathy and political support by focusing on an alliance of intellectuals, including philosophers Michel Foucault and Claude Lefort, and the trade union CFDT and reconstructs the human rights language of these groups. This chapter demonstrates that French solidarité avec Solidarnosc was the culmination of almost a decade of French fascination with dissident activism in the Soviet bloc, a development in the course of which French intellectuals came to endorse the dissidents' focus on human rights. This chapter also shows that what seemed like a fascination with events in Eastern Europe was, in fact, enmeshed in intellectual and political debates on the French Left. Endorsing the dissidents' struggle allowed members of France's non-Communist and anti-etatist French Left to set themselves off from the two dominant forces in French Left-wing politics: the Communist party and the Socialists. In analyzing these debates, this chapter reconstructs the French Left's specific human rights language which did not focus on individual liberty but aimed at empowering people to join forces and shape their collective affairs through social self-organization.