Children add more information to their utterances by packing more material into a single clause. They can specify roles, modify nouns with adjectives and verbs with added locatives and adverbs. They can add demonstratives (those) and quantifiers (many) to nouns, and make clearer what they are referring to. Young children’s early constructions tend to mirror parental usage, just as their lexical choices do. They follow preferred argument structure and place given information in the Agent slot of transitive verbs, and keep the Object slot of transitives and the Subject slot of intransitives for new information. They may omit given information at this stage and only later add the relevant pronoun subjects. In both questions and negations, they take time to master the use of auxiliary verbs and rely on fixed “frames” for some time as they learn the meaning of each wh- question word. Children also take time in learning how different perspectives can be marked within the clause, with choices of causative, location, or voice alternations. Here children must learn the options verb by verb.

This chapter attempts to build on chapter 2, which dealt with the two building blocks necessary for the formation of contracts, namely offer and acceptance. Here, we examine the remaining two requirements: the intention (nīyya) to be bound and the existence of good cause or causa. Unlike English law where so-called consideration is additionally required, this is not entertained in the CC, even if in places the language seems to suggest consideration. This is in fact not true. The chapter goes on to show how the parties’ intention to be bound may be expressed and how the courts can make sense of such intent when the parties disagree about what it is they had offered or accepted. Intent has been a significant aspect of Islamic law. A significant part of this chapter will deal with the legal nature of promises, as unilateral acts, and whether they are enforceable under any circumstances. As will be demonstrated, Qatari law is generally reluctant to enforce promises.

Chapter 5 details the emergence of machinery and organizational order through industrialization. No longer mere prostheses that allow humans to reach further, lift higher, hit harder or handle materials that would slice or burn skin, machine complexes and industrial installations no longer rely on the human body’s provision of labour force, but can instead conjure immeasurable forces from nature itself. Heidegger’s notion of the Gestell (enframing) characterizes these changes in terms of a gradual displacement of the human. No longer in control (or even in the picture), existence becomes wrapped up in continuously unfolding cycles of unlocking new resources, extracting, storing, distributing and switching over, in which whatever is made is always and only ‘there’ in potential service to what is to come: everything is a means for further progress, and progress is nothing more than the tightening and quickening of cycles of unlocking extracting, storing, distributing and switching. What is lost in this technological condition is the intimacy of the human being with their world; the care and concern that might be had for things understood as things in and of themselves, not merely input or output variables (and this includes fellow humans and the self).

In this chapter, I present Aristotle’s arguments in his books on Physics defending the claim that there is purposiveness in nature independent of thinking, foresight and deliberation. Hegel’s arguments for objective purposiveness are correctly understood only in light of those of Aristotle. In fact, I argue that the sense in which teleology is for Hegel the truth of mechanism (and, ultimately, of causality) is the sense in which, for Aristotle, final causes are the cause of ‘that which comes to be by nature’ and the cause of other kinds of causes (matter, efficient causes and even form) being where they are and having the effects that they eventually have. The chapter revises Aristotle’s understanding of this connection.

Responsibility is a key moral concept but it is often used ambiguously, such as a firm being considered a responsible part of the community, having corporate social responsibility, or being responsible for harms. This chapter provides a clear framework that distinguishes between the different ways the term is used and shows how it can be applied in practical terms. It starts with an exposition of the Volkswagen diesel scandal to illustrate the various meanings of the term, contrasting notions of legal liability from moral wrongs. The relationship of cause, blame, and fault to moral responsibility is evaluated. It is noted that people may adopt institutional values when working in a role, and whether that approach remains valid even when someone else takes responsibility. The nature of company and institutional codes and compliance issues are discussed, and positive acts are contrasted to deliberate avoidance. The doctrine of double effect is evaluated, where an outcome is foreseeable but unintended. The concluding case deals with the tragic loss of Boeing 737 MAX airplanes and the attempt to shift blame from the company to individuals, especially foreign pilots.

In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates calls things like justice, piety, and largeness “forms.” In several of these dialogues, he makes clear that forms are very different from familiar objects like tables and trees. Why, exactly, does he think that they differ and how are they supposed to do so? This chapter argues that in the Phaedo Socrates does not assume that they are different, but rather, over five stages of the dialogue, provides an account of how and why they do so. To fully understand the claims made in the first stage, one must look to the next stage, and so on until the final stage. Socrates' ultimate reason for distinguishing forms from ordinary objects does not depend on our intuitions about things like justice and largeness, nor on the distinction between universals and particulars. Ultimately, forms cannot be ordinary objects because the form of f-ness must cause every f-thing to be f, but no ordinary object could serve as such a cause. They cannot do so because they have multiple parts and are receptive of opposites; by contrast, the form of f-ness must be simple and unchanging, since it causes every f-thing to be f.

I explore different understandings of cause, the extent to which it is a feature of the world or an artifact of our imagination, and the consequences for knowledge that flows from these different assumptions.

I present an overview of On the Soul, Aristotle’s investigation into how psuchē (soul) explains biological phenomena in a unified way. This principle serves as a final, formal, and efficient cause of living activities. Soul needs specific consideration because it is a unique sort of form. It is responsible not just for giving living things their capacities, but also for when and how they exercise these capacities. Soul orders the ways in which living things grow, reproduce, move, and cognize the world. It accounts for all the more specific capacities and activities of the living thing. Studying soul thus gives Aristotle the opportunity to make some of his most subtle distinctions about kinds of capacity and activity. Aristotle’s discussion of soul as cause also prepares the way for considering how it works together with body, as Aristotle does in the Parva Naturalia and biological works. I then present synopses of the chapters in this guide and discuss how they relate to one another.

Chapter 1 examines war’s place in a universal paradigm of order and chaos, balance and imbalance; explores war’s origins and relationship to human nature; and concludes by formally defining war. After relating Aristotle’s “four causes” model (material, formal, efficient, and final) to war as an organizing concept, the chapter articulates war’s alignment within a universal theme of balance and characterizes war as an amalgam of twenty “dialectics,” including order-chaos and creation-destruction. It highlights how political imbalances can spark war and how dialectical disparities undermine war theory and strategy. Next, the chapter marshals multidisciplinary evidence to argue that evolutionary processes have imbued humanity with warlike and peaceful attributes and that war ultimately reflects human choices arising from various motives including Thucydides’s fear, honor, and interest. Finally, the chapter concludes by defining war as the nexus of a new trinity – humanity, politics, and combat – evaluating the boundaries between war and peace, and taking a first look at the question of war’s inevitability as a human activity.

Delirium is a state of global disturbance of cerebral function, and is common, affecting over 30% of inpatients. Readers are invited to explore the causes of delirium, how to assess patients with this condition and its initial management, including both pharmacological and nonpharmacological measures. The chapter includes advice on prescribing antipsychotics and benzodiazepines in this vulnerable group of patients.

Constipation in the adult patient is common. Before prescribing, readers are reminded of the importance of diagnosis, identifying a cause and prompting the patient to pursue nonpharmacological measures before electing to prescribe a laxative. Different classes of laxative, from bulk forming to stimulant and osmotic laxatives, are described. Finally, the authors remind new prescribers of the importance of regular review.

Kafka and Mann’s challenge to the concepts of reason and cause.

Reason and cause are historically and culturally specific concepts and not universal. They must be understood as responses to psychological challenges arising from changes in society.

An analysis of Hume’s understanding of reason and cause that stresses his psychological vs. philosophical approach to these concepts and challenges his reading as a realist.

A typology of reframings of the concepts of reason and cause in response to changes in society that make cause more important for people but also less accessible. A critique of social science based on this analysis.

An analysis of how concepts of reason and causes evolved in classical Greece.

Weber’s understanding of reason and cause.

An analysis of Victorian conceptions of reason and cause and the literary challenge to Mill and positivism.

An analysis of how concepts of reason and causes evolved in classical Greece.