The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in 2014 ruled in Digital Rights Ireland that the Data Retention Directive was invalid for exceeding the limits of proportionality in light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). Subsequently, preliminary references from the England and Wales Court of Appeal and the Swedish Administrative Court of Appeal sought clarification from the ECJ as to whether EU law permitted a general obligation to retain traffic data covering all persons, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any distinctions, limitations or exceptions for the purpose of combating crime. The ECJ in Tele2 and Watson ruled that in light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter, EU Member States were precluded from adopting national measures which provided general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication. The ECJ also ruled that Member States were only permitted to adopt data retention measures for the purpose of fighting serious crime, and only when access to retained data was subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body.

In 2018, the issue of the UK's data retention regime envisaged in Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 came before the England and Wales High Court. The High Court ruled that Part 4 was incompatible with EU law because access to retained communications data was not limited to the purpose of fighting serious crime, and it was not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body. This judgment was regarded by the claimants, Liberty, as a ‘landmark victory for privacy rights’. However, this paper questions whether certain aspects of the High Court ruling are indeed a victory, by assessing its compatibility with EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The EU’s limited powers do not enable its institutions to effectively intervene in cases where Member State actions threaten fundamental values. The recent controversies emerging from some Member States’ human rights and rule of law backsliding turned this question to one of the core issues of the European project, calling for effective fundamental rights protection in the EU without suppressing national constitutional identities. Though EU law’s approach, at least at first glance, might appear to be idiosyncratic, it is far from unprecedented and, as far as multilevel constitutionalism is concerned, EU law may draw on the experiences of various regimes where centralized human rights protection and national or state constitutional identities coexist. This Article analyzes the current European approach as to the application of the federal bill of rights to states from a comparative perspective and explores the constitutional and jurisprudential patterns addressing the question of inquiry in a multilevel constitutional architecture. The Article analyzes the subject from a doctrinal, ontological, textual-conceptual, and institutional perspective with the aim of contributing to the current European debate with a new comparative perspective and fostering EU constitutional development with structural patterns. It submits that the currently prevailing paradigm of “scope” should be replaced or complemented with the paradigm of “core standards” and proposes a doctrine of European incorporation, arguing that the diagonally applicable rule of law and human rights requirements should be incorporated via Article 2 TEU to make them judicially applicable.

This article offers a perspective on how the objective of a strong and coherent European protection standard pursued by the fundamental rights amendments of the Lisbon Treaty can be achieved, as it proposes a discursive pluralistic framework to understand and guide the relationship between the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. It is argued that this framework – which is suggested as an alternative to the EU law approach to the Strasbourg system applied by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 and its Charter-based case law – has a firm doctrinal, case law and normative basis. The article ends by addressing three of the most pertinent challenges to European fundamental rights protection through the prism of the proposed framework.

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU – Multiple sources of fundamental rights in the EU legal system – Non-hierarchical, pluralistic understanding of their interrelationship – Case study: the right to good administration – Difficulties in defining the scope of the right to good administration under the Charter and that of the right to good administration as a general principle of EU law – Adoption of a pluralistic understanding of the EU fundamental rights’ sources allows for a clarification and improved understanding of the individual's rights in the EU legal system

Scope of application of Charter – What does ‘implementing Union law’ mean? – Application of v. derogation from EU law – Asylum cases, N.S. – Familiapress, Schmidberger, Viking – Implementing to include derogation – Annibaldi and Dereci – Interpretation of the Charter – ‘Provided for by law’ – The ‘essence’ of a right or freedom – Legitimate objectives and proportionality – Rights both in EU Treaties and in Charter: citizenship – Charter and ECHR – Constitutional Traditions, level of protection and deference – Article 53 not according to Solange, but like Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein – Principles and Rights

You may not have noticed, but 2006 was the European Year of Workers' Mobility. The symbolism was prompted by concerns that a genuine European ‘mobility culture’ still does not exist. As the Commission has observed, rates of mobility remain extremely low despite initiatives to promote the free movement of workers: ‘Many obstacles of a legal or administrative nature, but also of a linguistic or socio-cultural nature, continue to hamper workers’ freedom of movement and to discourage them from taking advantage of the opportunities for mobility.

When thinking about the integration of the European sovereign states in the European Union, one does not need to be a euro-sceptic to perceive a big fish devouring little fish. Of course, the individuality of the different countries is assured in the European Union. Article I-5(1) of the European Constitution establishes that the Union shall respect their national identities inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, and their essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. Europe is to be ‘United in diversity’. Yet, however considerate the Union may be of the various European countries, unity can exist only by the grace of all member states' loyally fulfilling their European obligations.

Area of freedom, security and justice. One of the most significant developments in European Integration. Assessment of the contribution of the Constitutional Treaty to further development. Formal abolition of pillar structure partially undermined by special provisions. Relevance of Charter of Fundamental Rights. Union powers strengthened, but likelihood of restrictive interpretation. Revised policy objectives: few new openings, but possibly important implications. Solidarity as a new integration principle. Is majority voting justified in particularly sensitive areas such as police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters? Monstrosity of the emergency-brake procedure. Strengthening of European Parliament and Court of Justice, but not overall. Perspective of enhanced co-operation.

The only real surprise of the recent decision of the French Conseil constitutionnel [constitutional Council] concerning the compatibility between the European and the French Constitutions was the timing of it. According to Article 54 of the French Constitution, a treaty may be submitted for constitutional review at any time before ratification. In this instance, Jacques Chirac acted with unusual promptness, submitting his request on the very day the Treaty was signed, 29 October 2004. The Conseil itself reacted with equal speed, issuing its decision exactly three weeks later on 19 November 2004. Behind both courses of action lies the shadow of political concern related to the Socialist Party referendum on the European Constitution.