This conclusion elaborates three implications of the arguments of this book. First, it argues that the importance of exchange diplomacy in Sino-American rapprochement demonstrates the limits of Henry Kissinger’s understanding of rapprochement as dictated by geostrategic maneuvering and high-level diplomacy. We need, this conclusion posits, a more holistic account of Sino-American diplomacy to fully explain the development of that relationship through the 1970s. Second, this conclusion argues that the interconnection between Sino-American exchange and high diplomacy offers a case study of the value in connecting transnational and diplomatic history – an insight that has implications for both fields. Third and finally, the conclusion reflects on the lessons we can draw from the US-China exchange relationship of the 1970s in understanding the prospects for Sino-American cooperation in the twenty-first century.

Scientists had a distinctive part to play in the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign relations prior to it coming to power as well as during the early decades of the People’s Republic. The Conclusion considers the significance of this sustained party and party-state interest in scientists’ international activities for subsequent developments from the 1970s through China’s rise as a science and technology power by the early twenty-first century. These relations did not just spring out of nowhere, fully formed, and ready to go with the onset of rapprochement. Nor were they simply a product of long-term Americanisation. Consequently, the Conclusion explores notable areas of continuity and others of revived relevance when it comes to the party-state and the spectrum of international activities undertaken by scientists.

Compared to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, China presents an entirely new challenge to the democracies because it is closely intertwined with the latter economically and socially. The CCP’s increasingly dictatorial turn cannot be explained by Xi Jinping’s personality, but the CCP’s logical development. The only way for the democracies to effectively protect themselves from, and counter, the CCP’s expansion is to form an alliance and take collective actions to demand that the CCP make meaningful changes toward respecting human rights, the rule of law, and fair and open markets. To be effective, the democracies should adopt a “tit for tat, delink-ready” strategy in pushing the CCP to make desired changes. Collectively, the major democracies have more bargaining power than the CCP, and thus should stand firm on their demands from the CCP. For MNCs, the book offers several tips to help them in formulating China-related strategies based on the perspectives of China, Inc. and China’s reliance on the relation-based system. For management scholars, the book opens new research areas in the theory of the firm, institutional theory, and other theoretical issues.

African states have been and are subject to external interference. During the Cold War, the USA and the Soviet Union competed for influence, as did China and France. After the Cold War ended, a decade commenced in which there was fewer external influence but the promotion of a liberal-cosmopolitan order. The rise of China in Africa (and beyond), beginning roughly in 2000 as well as the 9/11 and other terrorist attacks ended that decade of relative calm. A phase of heightened interest in Africa began, particularly in the areas of security, migration, and economic policy, often labelled the “New Scramble for Africa” that continues to the present day.

The book concludes with a summary on how the environmental health crisis is undermining China’s international ascendance, as well as implications for China’s political development. It contends that the crisis and government response reveal a Chinese state whose political system is both resilient and fragile, and that the China model does not constitute a viable alternative to liberal democracy.