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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 June 2018
A solely legalistic analysis of China’s South China Sea claims has given way to speculation regarding their exact nature. Scholars and the tribunal in Philippines v China have collectively described China’s position as “ambiguous” and “vague.” For others, China’s regulatory framework sets dangerous new precedents in the areas of effective occupation, historic rights, and exclusive economic zones. This article seeks to nuance these assessments. Contextualizing China’s framework within a broader geopolitical project reveals a China exploiting historic legal precedents in a manner reminiscent of imperial America. This should cast doubt on those too quick to see China as a rule-breaking new power eager to upset international norms. Rather, China’s “Caribbean” is a microcosm for a new great power coming into its own following an existing model.
Une analyse strictement juridique des revendications chinoises en mer de Chine méridionale a provoqué des spéculations quant à la nature précise de ces revendications. Des juristes et même la Cour permanente d’arbitrage dans Philippines c Chine ont qualifié la position chinoise d’“ambigüe” et de “vague.” D’autres estiment que le cadre de réglementation de la Chine établit de dangereux précédents en matière d’occupation effective, de droits historiques et de zones économiques exclusives. Cet article cherche à nuancer ces analyses. Lorsqu’évalué en lumière des plus grands objectifs géopolitiques de la Chine, ce cadre de réglementation révèle que la Chine tente d’exploiter quelques précédents historiques juridiques d’une façon qui rappelle la politique impériale des États-Unis. Ceci devrait remettre en question les qualifications hâtives décrivant la Chine en tant que nouvelle puissance voulant per- turber les normes internationales. En effet, la mer de Chine méridionale est plutôt un microcosme d’une nouvelle grande puissance suivant un modèle déjà existant.
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18 See notes 124–26 below.
19 This is particularly true of the South China Sea dispute where China has failed to provide a clear legal basis for its claims; see section “China’s Legal Claims” below.
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27 Ibid at 269; in the South China Sea dispute, see Kline, supra note 13 at 168. China’s embrace of realism may explain the predominance of the neo-realist approach in security studies of the region, see Weissmann, Mikael, “The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A Study in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building” (2010) 34:3 Asian Perspective 35 at 36.Google Scholar
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29 Dunlap, Charles J, “Lawfare Today: A Perspective” (2008) 3 Yale Journal of International Affairs 146 at 146;Google Scholar various definitions of lawfare exist, see e.g. Kittrie, Orde, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 5–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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33 Kittrie, supra note 29 at 162 cites three examples (Analysis of 100 Cases of Legal Warfare (2004); Legal Warfare in Modern War (2005); and Under Informatized Conditions: Legal Warfare (2007)).
34 DeLisle, supra note 20 at 269.
35 Cheng, supra note 6 at 2.
36 Kittrie, supra note 29 at 3.
37 Eckhardt, William, “Lawyering for Uncle Sam When He Draws His Sword” (2003) 4 Chicago J Intl L 431 at 444;Google Scholar David, supra note 14 at 12–14.
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40 E.g. Dupuy, Florian & Dupuy, Pierre-Marie “A Legal Analysis of China’s Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea” (2013) 107:1 AJIL 124 at 128;Google Scholar Zhang, Jian, “China’s South China Sea Policy: Evolution, Claims and Challenges” in Buszynski, Leszek & Roberts, Christopher B, eds, The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal and Regional Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2014) at 60;Google Scholar Keyuan, Zou, “China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited” (2012) 43:1 Ocean Dev & Intl L 18 at 29;Google Scholar although some commentators have argued that China claims full sovereignty over the entirety of the South China Sea, rather than over certain features of the Sea, see Park, Choon-ho, “The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources?” (1978) 5:1 Ocean Dev & Intl L 27 at 54.Google Scholar
41 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v People’s Republic of China), PCA Case no 2013-19, Award on Merits (12 July 2016) at para 692 [South China Sea (Merits)].
42 Varying divisions have been presented in the academic literature. See e.g. Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 129–31, who prefer to divide the South China Sea dispute timeline into three periods: 1958–96, 1998, 2009–11.
43 Roque, Harry H, “China’s Claim to the Spratlys Islands under International Law” (1997) 15:3 J Energy & Natural Resources L 189 at 192.Google Scholar
44 Shen, Jianming, “China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective” (2002) 1 Chinese Intl L J 94 at 138.Google Scholar
45 Art 2(f) reads: “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.” Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco, 8 September 1951, 136 UNTS 45 (1952) (entered into force 28 April 1952).
46 Shen, supra note 44 at 99.
47 Fravel, supra note 10 at 298.
48 Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 126.
49 Larson, David L, Roth, Michael W & Selig, Todd I, “An Analysis of the Ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea” (1995) 26:3 Ocean Dev & Intl L 287 at 288–89.Google Scholar
50 Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the Approval of the Declaration of the Government on China’s Territorial Sea (4 September 1958), an English translation is available online: <http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rotscotnpcotaotdotgocts1338/>.
51 Ibid at para 1.
52 In addition to the Penghu Islands, Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratlys, the law added the Diaoyu Islands found in the East China Sea to its sovereign claim. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, National People’s Congress, 25 February 1992, an English translation is available online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf> [1992 Law].
53 Ibid.
54 UNCLOS, supra note 15.
55 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Declarations Made upon Signature, Ratification, Accession or Succession or Anytime Thereafter (29 October 2013), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm>.
56 Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress, 26 June 1998, an English translation is available online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/chn_1998_eez_act.pdf> [1998 Law].
57 Ibid, art 1.
58 Ibid.
59 Keyuan, Zou, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice” (2001) 32 Ocean Dev & Intl L 149 at 162.Google Scholar
60 Ibid at 160; 1998 Law, supra note 56.
61 Dupuy and Dupuy, supra note 40 at 129;
62 For a review of the historical evidence, see Shen, supra note 44; Shen, Jianming, “International Law Rules and Historical Evidences Supporting China’s Title to the South China Sea Islands” (1997) 21 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 1;Google Scholar Shen’s review of this historical evidence and his assessment of Admiral Zheng He’s activities should be nuanced, as scholars have pointed out that several non-Chinese dynasties had a presence in these waters and that China’s historical interest in the Sea may be a recent phenomenon. See e.g. Hayton, Bill, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014) at 11–28.Google Scholar
63 Thao, Nguyen Hong, “China’s Maritime Moves Raise Neighbors’ Hackles” (1998) 4:47 Vietnam L & Legal Forum 1 at 21–22;Google Scholar Thao, Nguyen Hong, “Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea” (2001) 32:2 Ocean Dev & Intl L 105 at 107.Google Scholar
64 Keyuan, supra note 59 at 162; UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 57.
65 United Nations, “Vietnam: Dispute Regarding the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic of China Which Was Passed on 26 June 1998” (1998) 38 UN Law of the Sea Bulletin 54 at 55.
66 The ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. See ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (4 November 2002), online: <http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2> [2002 Declaration].
67 Ibid, preamble.
68 Duong, Wendy, “Following the Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or Realpoltik — What Good Does Law Do in the South China Sea Territorial Conflicts Chinese Law in the Global Context” 30 Fordham Intl LJ 1098 at 1110;Google Scholar in retrospect, 2002 Declaration seems to be a part of ASEAN’s approach to regional integration that may be described as “long on rhetoric and short on implementation.” David Martin Jones & Michael LR Smith, “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order” (2007) 32:1 International Security 148 at 175; see also Quang Minh Pham, “The South China Sea Security Problem: towards Regional Cooperation” (2010) 8 Asia Europe Journal 427 at 429–30.
69 Duong, supra note 68 at 1174–80; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Oil Companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam Signed Agreement on South China Sea Cooperation (15 March 2005), online: <http://ph.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/nhwt/t187333.htm>.
70 Act no 9522 to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act no 3046, as Amended by Republic Act no 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines and for Other Purposes, Fourteenth Congress Second Regular Session, The Philippines (10 March 2009), online: <http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9522_2009.html>.
71 Ibid, s 1.
72 Ibid, s 2; UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 121.
73 The Philippines “expressly reserves its right to make other submissions for such other areas of the continental shelf beyond 200 M at a future time in conformity with the provisions of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.” Philippines, A Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf of the Republic of the Philippines Pursuant to Article 76(8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (21 April 2009) at 12, online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/phl22_09/phl_esummary.pdf>.
74 Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (6 May 2009), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm>.
75 Note Verbale no CML/17/2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General (7 May 2009), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf>.
76 Ibid at para 2 [emphasis added].
77 See Note Verbale no CML/17/2009, supra note 75; see also Note Verbale no. CML/18/2009 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General (7 May 2009), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf>.
78 For a more detailed discussion of the map’s probative and legal value and for varying perspectives on the map, see e.g. Dupuy and Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131–36; Gao, Zhiguo & Jia, Bing Bing, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status and Implications” (2013) 107:1 AJIL 98;Google Scholar Jinming, Li & Dexia, Li, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note” (2003) 34:3–4 Ocean Dev & Intl L 287 at 291–93.Google Scholar
79 For historical reasons, various terms have been used to describe the line, such as the U-shaped line and the eleven-dotted line; for a more detailed explanation of these terms, see Sheng-Ti Gau, Michael, “The U-Shaped Line and a Categorization of the Ocean Disputes in the South China Sea” (2012) 43:1 Ocean Dev & Intl L 57.Google Scholar
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81 Some believe the map was published in either 1947 or 1948 (Dupuy and Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131); others believe the map was published in 1946 or earlier (Shen, supra note 44 at 128–30; Keyuan, Zou, “The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and Its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands’’ (1999) 14 Intl J Mar & Coast L 27 at 32–33).Google Scholar
82 Beckman, supra note 80 at 154.
83 Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 134.
84 Beckman, supra note 80 at 154.
85 Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131–34; Fravel, supra note 10 at 294–95; Dutton, supra note 10 at 50.
86 Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 132.
87 Beckman, supra note 80 at 153; Shen, supra note 44 at 129.
88 Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 132; for a sceptical assessment of its probative value and other legal uncertainties, see Erik Franckx and Marco Benatar, “Dots and Lines in the South China Sea: Insights from the Law of Map Evidence” (2012) 2 Asian J Intl L 89 at 103–16.
89 Jinming & Dexia, supra note 78 at 291.
90 Song, Yann-Huei & Kien-hong Yu, Peter, “China’s ‘Historic Waters’ in the South China Sea: An Analysis from Taiwan, ROC” (1994) 12:4 American Asian Review 83.Google Scholar
91 Jinming & Dexia, supra note 78 at 290 observe “[u]pon the declaration of the nine-dotted line, the international community at no time expressed dissent. None of the adjacent states presented a diplomatic protest. This silence in the face of a public declaration may be said to amount to acquiescence, and it can be asserted that the dotted line has been recognized for half a century”; also in support of the estoppel view, see Shen, supra note 62 at 57.
92 Note Verbale no CML/8/2011 from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General (14 April 2011), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf>.
93 Ibid at para 2.
94 Ibid at para 4.
95 Nguyen-Dang Thang & Nguyen Hong Thao, “China’s Nine Dotted Lines in the South China Sea: The 2011 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes between the Philippines and China” (2012) 43:1 Ocean Dev & Intl L 35 at 46; Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131.
96 Admittedly, China’s reference to “publicity” since the 1930s could include the various iterations of the map, although such an interpretation would still minimize the relative importance of the map.
97 The tensions were provoked on 8 April 2012 when the Philippine navy apprehended eight mainland Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal. Hong Zhao, “Sino-Philippines Relations: Moving beyond South China Sea Dispute?” 26:2 Journal of East Asian Affairs 57 at 60–61.
98 Hsiao, supra note 21 at 9; UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 287: “When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention: … (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII.”
99 In conformity with Annex VII of UNCLOS, supra note 15.
100 South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41. China did present arguments on the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the case; China essentially argued that the subject matter of the case was beyond UNCLOS and that China’s declaration in connection with UNCLOS ratification and the process goes against the negotiation process. Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (7 December 2014), online: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml>; Duncan French, “In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration: Republic of Philippines v People’s Republic of China, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, Case No. 2013–19, Award of 12 July 2016” (2017) 19:1 Envtl L Rev 48 at 50; this arbitration could be a part of a larger trend of scepticism regarding UNCLOS’s compulsory and binding dispute settlement regime. Jensen, Øystein & Bankes, Nigel, “Compulsory and Binding Dispute Resolution under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Introduction” (2017) Ocean Dev & Intl L 1 at 5.Google Scholar
101 South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 116.
102 Ibid at para 34.
103 Ibid at paras 7–10.
104 Torode, Greg & Collett-White, Mike, “Ahead of Key Court Ruling, Beijing in Propaganda Overdrive,” Reuters (3 July 2016), online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-idUSKCN0ZJ117>.Google Scholar
105 A comprehensive analysis of its reasoning and ramifications is beyond the scope of this article.
106 South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 278.
107 Ibid at paras 643–47.
108 The tribunal found that archipelagic baselines can only apply to archipelagic states (such as the Philippines). See South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 573; pursuant to art 47.1 of UNCLOS, supra note 15.
109 South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at paras 571–76.
110 Ibid at paras 716, 757, 814.
111 Ibid at paras 992–93.
112 Pemmaraju, Sreenivasa Rao, “The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. China): Assessment of the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility” (2016) 15 Chinese J Intl L 265 at 306–07.Google Scholar
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114 Kopela, Sophia, “Historic Titles and Historic Rights in the Law of the Sea in the Light of the South China Sea Arbitration” (2017) 48:2 Ocean Dev & Intl L 181 at 198;Google Scholar past arbitrations have held that arbitral tribunals do not have jurisdiction in cases where issues of sovereignty over land territories is more than ancillary to the dispute. Keyuan Zou and Qiang Ye, “Interpretation and Application of Article 298 of the Law of the Sea Convention in Recent Annex VII Arbitrations: An Appraisal” (2017) Ocean Dev & Intl L 1 at 8–9.
115 South China Sea (Jurisdiction), supra note 113 at para 168.
116 French, supra note 100 at 50.
117 Kopela, supra note 114 at 184, 197–98.
118 E.g. Yu, Minyou & Xie, Qiong, “Why the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the South China Sea Arbitration Is Null and Void-Taking Article 283 of the UNCLOS as an Example” (2017) China Oceans L Rev 45.Google Scholar Noting that the tribunal spent relatively little space on elaborating its reasoning, see Talmon, Stefan, “The South China Sea Arbitration: Observations on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility” (2016) 15:2 Chinese J Intl L 309 at 391.Google Scholar
119 Makinen, Julie, “China’s Claims in South China Sea Are Invalid, Tribunal Rules, in Victory for the Philippines,” LA Times (12 July 2016), online: <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-ruling-20160712-snap-story.html>.Google Scholar
120 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on Statement by Spokesperson of US State Department on South China Sea Arbitration Ruling (13 July 2016), online: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1380409.shtml>.
121 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 296 reads: “1. Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute. 2. Any such decision shall have no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular dispute.” For a more detailed discussion on the finality of the award and the role of state practice in accepting the award, see Stefan Talmon, “The South China Sea Arbitration and the Finality of ‘Final’ Awards” (2017) 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 388 at 398–401.
122 Hsiao, supra note 21 at 14.
123 In South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 573, the tribunal noted: “China, however, is constituted principally by territory on the mainland of Asia and cannot meet the definition of an archipelagic State.” Julian Ku & Christopher Mirasola, “The South China Sea and China’s ‘Four Sha’ Claim: New Legal Theory, Same Bad Argument,” Lawfare (25 September 2017), online: <www.lawfareblog.com/south-china-sea-and-chinas-four-sha-claim-new-legal-theory-same-bad-argument>.
124 Beckman, supra note 80 at 155; Dutton, supra note 10 at 45, 53; Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131; Duong, supra note 68 at 1111; Swe, Lim Kheng, Hailong, Ju, & Mingjiang, Li, “China’s Revisionist Aspirations in Southeast Asia and the Curse of the South China Sea Disputes” (2017) 15:1 China: An International Journal 187 at 208–09;Google Scholar Lee, Wei-chin, “Taiwan, the South China Sea Dispute, and the 2016 Arbitration Decision” (2017) 22:2 Journal of Chinese Political Science 229 at 231.Google Scholar
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128 Kline, supra note 13 at 147–48; Pham, supra note 11 at 5–6; Dupuy & Dupuy, supra note 40 at 131.
129 This would include the territories defined in the 1992 Law, supra note 52, art 2(2): “Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the People’s Republic of China.” The 1992 Law, art 2(3) further defines China’s territorial sea as the “waters adjacent to its territorial land” and China’s territorial waters as “the waters along the baseline of the territorial sea facing the land.”
130 Ibid art 6 reads: “Non-military foreign ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China according to law. To enter the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China, foreign military ships must obtain permission from the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”
131 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 17; Shao Jin, “The Question of Innocent Passage of Warships- after UNCLOS Ill” (1989) 13:1 Marine Policy 56 at 58.
132 1992 Law, supra note 52, arts 8–13. These are areas where a State may regulate under UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts 19, 21.
133 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Management of Foreign-Related Marine Scientific Research (promulgated 18 June 1996 and effective as of 1 October 1996), online: <http://www.soa.gov.cn/bmzz/jgbmzz2/gjhzsgatbgs/201211/t20121109_14902.html>; Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress, Surveying and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order of the President no 75 (adopted 29 August 2002; effective as of 1 December 2002), online: <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383865.htm>.
134 1998 Law, supra note 56, arts 3, 4, 7.
135 Ibid, arts 4–5.
136 UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts 19, 21 for research, survey, and fishing activities; UNCLOS, arts 60, 76–78, 80–81 for natural resources.
137 1998 Law, supra note 56, arts 3–4.
138 1992 Law, supra note 52.
139 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art 33(1).
140 1992 Law, supra note 52, art 13 reads: “The People’s Republic of China has the authority to exercise powers within its contiguous zone for the purpose of preventing or punishing infringement of its security, customs, fiscal sanitary laws and regulations or entry-exit control within its land territories, internal waters or territorial sea” [emphasis added].
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147 See e.g. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Marine Environmental Protection, Revised (adopted on 25 December 1999 and came into force on 1 April 2000), online: <http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329.htm>, where the notion of jurisdiction (rather than sovereignty) is mentioned, it is provided that “the Law shall apply to internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf of the People’s Republic of China and other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China” (art 2).
148 Some regard China’s claim as a full sovereignty claim over all of the features in the Sea, despite China’s actions suggesting a tempered sovereignty claim. See e.g. Kline, supra note 13 at 126.
149 Fravel, supra note 10 at 303–07.
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163 Pedrozo, supra note 141 at 102.
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166 Ibid.
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172 Buszynski, supra note 4 at 141–42; Cheng & Paladini, supra note 6 at 195.
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177 Six states outright oppose the ruling, and 147 states remain neutral as to the award. “Who Is Taking Sides After the South China Sea Ruling?” Asia Maritime Transparency Institute (15 August 2016), online: <https://amti.csis.org/sides-in-south-china-sea/>.
178 Ku, Julian, “Assessing the South China Sea Arbitral Award after One Year: Why China Won and the U.S. Is Losing,” Lawfare (12 July 2017), online: <https://lawfareblog.com/assessing-south-china-sea-arbitral-award-after-one-year-why-china-won-and-us-losing>.Google Scholar
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184 Griffiths, James, “UK Wants to Send ‘Colossal’ Warships to Test Beijing’s Claims in S. China Sea,” CNN (28 July 2017), online: <http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/28/asia/south-china-sea-uk-johnson/index.html>.Google Scholar
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193 Ibid at 81–82.
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201 Dutton, supra note 10 at 56–58; Eric Hyer, “The South China Sea Dispute: Implications of China’s Earlier Settlements” (1995) 68:1 Pacific Affairs 34 at 34.
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207 South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 13.
208 Ibid at para 160.
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249 South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41 at para 278; similar reasoning is also found in the South China Sea (Jurisdiction), supra note 113 at para 168.
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283 South China Sea (Merits), supra note 41, para 278.
284 Beckman, supra note 80 at 153.
285 David, supra note 14 at 6–8.
286 Beckman, supra note 80 at 163; David, supra note 14 at 9–11.
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288 Regarding its broader approach to international law, see Congyan Cai, “New Great Powers and International Law in the 21st Century” (2013) 24:3 EJIL 755 at 795 argues that China’s latest legal practice has been marked by a struggle “to carry out its declared international legal policy.”
289 DeLisle, supra note 20 at 274.
290 Duong, supra note 68 at 1149.
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