This chapter analyses the regulatory framework of bankers’ remuneration in China. The framework is comprised of the CBRC Guidelines and the MOF Measures. The CBRC Guidelines are based on the FSB principles and standards, aiming to guide banks to apply modern remuneration incentives. The MOF Measures are special for SOCBs and SOE-controlled banks, which contain a series of compulsory rules on the level and structure of remuneration and a detailed system of performance assessment. In addition, the MOF imposed a temporary ban on equity-based remuneration, and the CPC issued a policy to reduce and cap the level of remuneration in these banks. These requirements are intrusive, which consolidate state intervention in the practice of bankers’ remuneration while contradictory to the objective of the regulation-led reform.

This chapter describes and analyses the traditional way adopted by Chinese banks to manage and incentivise bankers in the context of state ownership and intervention. It provides an overview of the modernisation reform of Chinese banks and argues that the essential factor that contributed to the successful reform was the predominant role of the state. The governance of banks was subject to state intervention, and bankers were identified and managed as state cadres. Therefore, bankers’ remuneration was administratively managed, and bankers were incentivised with the opportunity of political promotion. Reciprocally, the administration of remuneration and political incentives acted as a channel for state intervention in banks. However, this administrative and politicised approach was inconsistent with the principles of modern corporate governance, and reform to push forward the modernisation of bankers’ remuneration was considered necessary.

This chapter investigates the practices of remuneration and political incentives in major Chinese banks in recent years and the implementation of the regulatory initiatives. The investigation is split into two parts, focusing on SOCBs and listed JSCBs, respectively. Low remuneration level, weak pay-performance sensitivity, the lack of economic incentives, and the predominance of political incentives are the major features of the practices of SOCBs, which are consistent with the traditional administrative and politicised approach. It is found that the regulatory initiatives based on international principles are not effectively implemented; however, the requirements that enhance state intervention have been strictly followed. The majority of the listed JSCBs are connected to the central or local state through direct or indirect ownership. Political incentives also play an important role in these JSCBs. In contrast, remuneration incentives are effective in privately owned JSCBs.