7 - The Recent Practice of Bankers’ Remuneration and Incentives in China

Summary

This chapter investigates the practices of remuneration and political incentives in major Chinese banks in recent years and the implementation of the regulatory initiatives. The investigation is split into two parts, focusing on SOCBs and listed JSCBs, respectively. Low remuneration level, weak pay-performance sensitivity, the lack of economic incentives, and the predominance of political incentives are the major features of the practices of SOCBs, which are consistent with the traditional administrative and politicised approach. It is found that the regulatory initiatives based on international principles are not effectively implemented; however, the requirements that enhance state intervention have been strictly followed. The majority of the listed JSCBs are connected to the central or local state through direct or indirect ownership. Political incentives also play an important role in these JSCBs. In contrast, remuneration incentives are effective in privately owned JSCBs.