Rapid, unpredictable ecological changes and the resulting instability that are characteristic of the Anthropocene call for a re-examination of the role of law in governing interactions between humans and ecosystems and facilitating adaptation to ecological change. The scope and scale of environmental change we are experiencing seem to call for a regulatory approach, namely forms of law that are designed to pursue well-defined material objectives, often through instruction rules designed to guide behavior to line up with those objectives. Such forms of law have a crucial role to play. However, the negligence principle at the heart of civil liability law is also capable of absorbing and circulating information about environmental risk and means of addressing it, and of translating that information from empirical to normative terms. The grounding of negligence in domestic civil liability law could be a serious obstacle to its effectiveness given the global, Earth system-wide nature of environmental degradation. However, the negligence principle increasingly operates through networks that traverse jurisdictional boundaries, as well as the boundaries between social systems. I propose such a network approach to analyze interactions between the negligence principle and corporate due diligence obligations embedded in domestic legislation and international texts such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). One important result would be the imposition of expanded epistemic obligations on firms, which would in turn require their serious engagement with domestic, international, and transnational environmental and sustainability norms.

The concept of a ‘safe harbour’ has been mentioned in several contexts during ongoing discussions around regulatory developments towards mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence (mHREDD) which continue at international, European and national levels. This article analyses the concept of a ‘safe harbour’ and how it relates to human rights due diligence (HRDD) as described in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). It discusses examples of other types of safe harbours which were recognized in legislation and case law; considers that a safe harbour could result in a ‘tick-box’ approach; highlights the implications for access to remedy; and distinguishes a safe harbour exemption from a defence of having undertaken HRDD in accordance with an expected standard of conduct.

This paper focuses on Internet intermediaries’ civil liabilities for contents produced by third parties. By comparing Chinese law with the laws of the US and EU, it argues that the US law grants broad civil immunity to Internet intermediaries, and the EU and China restrict civil immunity to intermediaries but in different ways. This is on account of how, in the US, Internet intermediaries enjoy civil immunity as long as they do not become content providers. In the EU, aside from mere conduit intermediaries, all other intermediaries are subject to the notice-and-take-down mechanism before enjoying civil immunity. In contrast, in China, even after an intermediary properly follows the notice-and-take-down mechanism, it may still be subject to civil liability under the Chinese Consumer Law. Further, this paper argues that the policy priority for the law for Internet intermediaries varies fundamentally in the three jurisdictions. The US law for intermediaries’ liability focuses on protecting freedom of speech. The EU emphasizes the protection of personal information as a fundamental human right. Contrastingly, Chinese policy priority is unclear. Consumer protection has boomed in public popularity and increasingly attracted the attentions of the legislature and judiciary in China. However, it is doubtable that the protection of consumers can provide a prevailing policy support for Chinese law in the same way as freedom of speech and the protection of personal information do under the laws of the US and the EU, respectively.

This article proposes a model of treaty-based veil piercing for civil liability claims by victims of human rights harm inflicted by businesses. The primary inspiration for this model comes from investment treaty provisions dealing with corporate investors. Our examination of investment law for this purpose exposes the double standard in the treatment of the corporate veil between these two remedy regimes, and offers a way to address this. The test we propose for lifting the veil in order to allow victims to claim against the parent company in a corporate group is one of ‘legal control’. It aims to capture cases where the parent did not necessarily take an active role in the subsidiary's business, but it is still treated as being in control of the subsidiary by virtue of its direct or indirect ownership or ability to appoint management.

The European capital markets law imposes no precise requirements as to its enforcement. The four Framework Directives only state that Member States are to ensure that appropriate sanctions are imposed. This article analyses the different approaches to supervision of stock markets in Europe and the enforcement through private law.

L’article R. 4456-1 du code du travail fait obligation au chef d’établissement de désigner au moins une personne compétente en radioprotection (PCR). Bien que les prérogatives de celle-ci soient exercées sous la responsabilité du chef d’établissement, les règles traditionnelles de mise en cause de la responsabilité s’appliquent aussi bien au chef d’établissement qu’à la PCR. Qu’il s’agisse de la responsabilité civile, dont l’objet est de garantir la réparation d’un dommage par son auteur, ou de la responsabilité pénale, qui vise à sanctionner un comportement répréhensible, la PCR n’échappe pas à ces règles de droit commun qui, toutefois, s’appliquent de manière particulière compte tenu de ses missions quotidiennes. Si la responsabilité de l’employeur est davantage mise en cause, notamment du fait de l’autorité qu’il exerce sur son employé, la PCR ne doit pas être considérée comme irresponsable sur les plans civil et pénal puisqu’elle est susceptible d’être mise en cause par un salarié victime d’un dommage. L’activité de la PCR – et donc les cas permettant l’engagement de sa responsabilité – repose largement sur les moyens dont elle dispose et le contexte dans lequel elle exerce sa mission. Le juge tient d’ailleurs largement compte des ressources dont dispose un agent pour juger de sa responsabilité. Dès lors, les relations de la PCR avec les autres acteurs de la radioprotection, internes ou externes à l’établissement, sont déterminantes.

It is unlikely that anyone would seriously reject the notion that the prohibition on torture has reached the status of a jus cogens norm in international law. On the contrary, the weight of authority in favour of this status is overwhelming. However, the effect in international law of a jus cogens norm, and of the norm which prohibits torture in particular, has yet to be fully worked out. The differences between the majority and minority judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom are urgent reminders of the uncertainty of litigation in areas of human rights law whose norms are the subject of seemingly overwhelming moral imperatives.