User models that can directly use and learn how to do tasks with unmodified interfaces would be helpful in system design to compare task knowledge and times between interfaces. Including user errors can be helpful because users will always make mistakes and generate errors. We compare three user models: an existing validated model that simulates users’ behavior in the Dismal spreadsheet in Emacs, a newly developed model that interacts with an Excel spreadsheet, and a new model that generates and fixes user errors. These models are implemented using a set of simulated eyes and hands extensions. All the models completed a 14-step task without modifying the system that participants used. These models predict that the task in Excel is approximately 20% faster than in Dismal, including suggesting why, where, and how much Excel is a better design. The Excel model predictions were compared to newly collected human data (N = 23). The model’s predictions of subtask times correlate well with the human data (r2 = .71). We also present a preliminary model of human error and correction based on user keypress errors, including 25 slips. The predictions to data comparison suggest that this interactive model that includes errors moves us closer to having a complete user model that can directly test interface design by predicting human behavior and performing the task on the same interface as users. The errors from the model’s hands also allow further exploration of error detection, error correction, and different knowledge types in user models.

Decision research in psychology has traditionally been influenced by the homo oeconomicus metaphor with its emphasis on normative models and deviations from the predictions of those models. In contrast, the principal metaphor of cognitive psychology conceptualizes humans as ‘information processors’, employing processes of perception, memory, categorization, problem solving and so on. Many of the processes described in cognitive theories are similar to those involved in decision making, and thus increasing cross-fertilization between the two areas is an important endeavour. A wide range of models and metaphors has been proposed to explain and describe ‘information processing’ and many models have been applied to decision making in ingenious ways. This special issue encourages cross-fertilization between cognitive psychology and decision research by providing an overview of current perspectives in one area that continues to highlight the benefits of the synergistic approach: cognitive modeling of multi-attribute decision making. In this introduction we discuss aspects of the cognitive system that need to be considered when modeling multi-attribute decision making (e.g., automatic versus controlled processing, learning and memory constraints, metacognition) and illustrate how such aspects are incorporated into the approaches proposed by contributors to the special issue. We end by discussing the challenges posed by the contrasting and sometimes incompatible assumptions of the models and metaphors.

Motivational processes underlie behaviors that enrich the human experience, and impairments in motivation are commonly observed in psychiatric illness. While motivated behavior is often examined with respect to extrinsic reinforcers, not all actions are driven by reactions to external stimuli; some are driven by ‘intrinsic’ motivation. Intrinsically motivated behaviors are computationally similar to extrinsically motivated behaviors, in that they strive to maximize reward value and minimize punishment. However, our understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie intrinsically motivated behavior remains limited. Dysfunction in intrinsic motivation represents an important trans-diagnostic facet of psychiatric symptomology, but due to a lack of clear consensus, the contribution of intrinsic motivation to psychopathology remains poorly understood. This review aims to provide an overview of the conceptualization, measurement, and neurobiology of intrinsic motivation, providing a framework for understanding its potential contributions to psychopathology and its treatment. Distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are discussed, including divergence in the types of associated rewards or outcomes that drive behavioral action and choice. A useful framework for understanding intrinsic motivation, and thus separating it from extrinsic motivation, is developed and suggestions for optimization of paradigms to measure intrinsic motivation are proposed.

Dynamical models of cognition have played a central role in recent cognitive science. In this paper, we consider a common strategy by which dynamical models describe their target systems neither as purely static nor as purely dynamic, but rather using a hybrid approach. This hybridity reveals how dynamical models involve representational choices that are important for understanding the relationship between dynamical and non-dynamical representations of a system.

Why are some institutional designs perceived as more legitimate than others, and why is the same institutional design sometimes perceived as legitimacy-enhancing in one setting and not in another? In a world in which most international organisations (IOs) do not fully embody societal values and norms, such as democratic participation and equal treatment, why do legitimacy deficits in some organisations lead to pressure for institutional change while in others they are tolerated? These are important questions given that many analysts have diagnosed a ‘legitimacy crisis’ of IOs, but we argue that existing approaches are ill equipped to answer them. We show that the existing legitimacy literature has an implicit model of institutional change – the congruence model – but that this model has difficulty accounting for important patterns of change and non-change because it lacks microfoundations. We argue that attributions of legitimacy rest on perceptions and this implies the need to investigate the cognitive bases of legitimacy. We introduce a cognitive model of legitimacy and deduce a set of testable propositions to explain the conditions under which legitimacy judgments change and, in turn, produce pressures for institutional change in IOs.

Background: Despite literature establishing a relationship between maladaptive beliefs and symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), there are few studies addressing how these beliefs develop. Salkovskis and colleagues (1999) proposed specific domains of childhood experiences leading to heightened beliefs regarding responsibility. Prior studies in students and individuals who just completed treatment for OCD have found support for this theory. However, we are not aware of published data from individuals with current OCD. Aims: This paper presents initial data from adults currently meeting criteria for OCD as well as both anxious and non-anxious controls. Method: Recollections of childhood experiences, current OCD-related beliefs, and OCD symptoms were assessed using self-report measures in 39 individuals seeking treatment for OCD, 36 anxious controls and 39 healthy controls. Results: Initial data suggested that in individuals with OCD, increased reports of childhood exposure to overprotection and experiences where one's actions caused or influenced misfortune were associated with stronger OCD-related beliefs. Further, compared to community controls, individuals with OCD reported more childhood experiences where one's actions caused or influenced misfortune, though they did not differ from anxious controls in childhood responsibility experiences. Conclusions: These initial findings provide minimal support for the proposed model of the development of inflated responsibility beliefs, and highlight the need for research examining the etiology of OCD related beliefs with updated models, larger samples, and ultimately using prospective methods.

Cognitive models of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) have been influential in understanding and treating the disorder in adults. Cognitive models may also be applicable to children and adolescents and would have important implications for treatment. The aim of this systematic review was to evaluate research that examined the applicability of the cognitive model of OCD to children and adolescents. Inclusion criteria were set broadly but most studies identified included data regarding responsibility appraisals, thought-action fusion or meta-cognitive models of OCD in children or adolescents. Eleven studies were identified in a systematic literature search. Seven studies were with non clinical samples, and 10 studies were cross-sectional. Only one study did not support cognitive models of OCD in children and adolescents and this was with a clinical sample and was the only experimental study. Overall, the results strongly supported the applicability of cognitive models of OCD to children and young people. There were, however, clear gaps in the literature. Future research should include experimental studies, clinical groups, and should test which of the different models provide more explanatory power.

Design by analogy is a powerful part of the design process across the wide variety of modalities used by designers such as linguistic descriptions, sketches, and diagrams. We need tools to support people's ability to find and use analogies. A deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying design and analogy is a crucial step in developing these tools. This paper presents an experiment that explores the effects of representation within the modality of sketching, the effects of functional models, and the retrieval and use of analogies. We find that the level of abstraction for the representation of prior knowledge and the representation of a current design problem both affect people's ability to retrieve and use analogous solutions. A general semantic description in memory facilitates retrieval of that prior knowledge. The ability to find and use an analogy is also facilitated by having an appropriate functional model of the problem. These studies result in a number of important implications for the development of tools to support design by analogy. Foremost among these implications is the ability to provide multiple representations of design problems by which designers may reason across, where the verb construct in the English language is a preferred mode for these representations.

Three influential theoretical models of OCD focus upon the cognitive factors of inflated responsibility (Salkovskis, 1985), thought-action fusion (Rachman, 1993) and meta-cognitive beliefs (Wells and Matthews, 1994). Little is known about the relevance of these models in adolescents or about the nature of any direct or mediating relationships between these variables and OCD symptoms. This was a cross-sectional correlational design with 223 non-clinical adolescents aged 13 to 16 years. All participants completed questionnaires measuring inflated responsibility, thought-action fusion, meta-cognitive beliefs and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Inflated responsibility, thought-action fusion and meta-cognitive beliefs were significantly associated with higher levels of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. These variables accounted for 35% of the variance in obsessive-compulsive symptoms, with inflated responsibility and meta-cognitive beliefs both emerging as significant independent predictors. Inflated responsibility completely mediated the effect of thought-action fusion and partially mediated the effect of meta-cognitive beliefs. Support for the downward extension of cognitive models to understanding OCD in a younger population was shown. Findings suggest that inflated responsibility and meta-cognitive beliefs may be particularly important cognitive concepts in OCD. Methodological limitations must be borne in mind and future research is needed to replicate and extend findings in clinical samples.