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This chapter empirically analyzes how portfolios of external finance impact aid agreements. The chapter integrates data on external debt and foreign aid to establish a comprehensive picture of developing countries' portfolios of external finance, demonstrating that these have become less reliant on traditional donors over time. The analysis tests if a greater share of finance from Chinese or private sources is associated with favorable terms from traditional donors, using measures of aid volume, infrastructure project share, and conditions attached to World Bank projects. The findings indicate that as countries draw a greater share of their external finance from nontraditional sources, they are more likely to receive aid on preferred terms. The relationship is stronger for countries of strategic significance to donors and, especially, those with higher donor trust.
Since limiting judicial independence in Hungary and Poland, the politics of the rule of law crisis have been examined by various scholars discussing conflicts within and between EU and domestic institutions. The rule of law is no longer a purely national affair – it is of high political salience both for the Member States and the EU polity. The question addressed here is: how has the rule of law crisis reshaped the EU’s modes of governance? We argue that to safeguard this common value, the EU is evolving into a regulatory polity (3.0). This development marks a shift from Majone’s EU regulatory state’s focus on regulating markets (1.0) and regulation in core state powers in times of crises (2.0) to regulation on the core values of the polity (3.0). The article shows that in a context of growing dissensus over the rule of law, EU institutional actors have sought to strengthen “rulemaking,” “rule monitoring” and “rule enforcement” through a regulatory approach anchored in a market logic. It also shows that shifting from the traditional regulatory state 1.0 to regulation in core state powers 2.0, the regulatory polity 3.0 strengthens the EU’s institutional capacity to act when the rule of law is under strain through depoliticised “rule monitoring” and politicised “rulemaking“ and “rule enforcement“ as illustrated in the cases of Hungary and Poland discussed in this article.
Work-related conditionality policy in the UK is built around the problematic assumption that people should commit to ‘full-time’ work and job search efforts as a condition of receiving benefits. This is potentially in conflict with the idea that what is required of people should be tailored to their circumstances in some way – ‘personalised conditionality’ – and implies a failure to recognise that conditionality is being applied to a diverse group of people and in a context where the paid work that is available is often temporary and insecure. Drawing on thirty-three qualitative interviews with people subject to intensive work-related conditionality whilst receiving Universal Credit or Jobseeker’s Allowance in Manchester, the paper explores the work-related time demands that people were facing and argues that these provide a lens for examining the rigidities and contradictions of conditionality policy. The findings indicate that expectations are often set in relation to an ideal of full-time hours and in a highly asymmetric context that is far from conducive to being able to negotiate a reasonable set of work-related expectations. Work search requirements affect people differently depending on their personal circumstances and demand-side factors, and can act to weaken the position of people entering, or already in, work.
The Covid-19 crisis provided an opportunity for the European Union to offer an alternative regulatory response to the crisis of values by systemically linking European funding to respect for the rule of law. A rule of law conditionality mechanism for spending was introduced in the Recovery and Resilience Facility and in Regulation 2020/2092. It is both positive – in that it encourages Member States to implement reforms and investments aimed at improving the rule of law – and negative – in that it takes the form of financial sanctions. However, the development of the rule of law conditionality is leading to an economisation of the concept of the rule of law, insofar as it mainly concerns those dimensions of the rule of law that are conducive to growth – such as justice systems and the fight against corruption. As a result, it could paradoxically exacerbate the very crisis it is designed to resolve.
This chapter provides an overview of the arguments for the stability of public opinion as well as the arguments of those who believe public opinion is unstable. We then explore conditionality, or the conditions under which public opinion appears to be more unstable. Concepts such as low information rationality, issue salience, and question wording are covered.
Why do we see large-scale labor protests and strikes under some IMF programs such as in Greece in 2010 and not in others such as in Ireland in the same year? This Element argues that extensive labor market reform conditions in an immobile labor market generate strong opposition to programs. Labor market reform conditions that decentralize and open up an immobile labor market cause workers either to lose in terms of rights and benefits, while being stuck in the same job or to fall into a less protected sector with fewer benefits. Conversely, in more mobile labor markets, wage and benefit differentials are low, and movement across sectors is easier. In such markets, labor groups do not mobilize to the same extent to block programs. The author tests this theory in a global sample and explores the causal mechanism in four case studies on Greece, Ireland, Latvia, and Portugal.
This chapter explores the role accorded to the principle of equality of Member States in the case law of the Court of Justice and national courts reviewing measures of financial assistance. At the same time, it investigates the extent to which the common interest, as the expression of the principle of solidarity, features as a consideration before those courts. The chapter opens with a brief description of financial assistance measures to gain a sense of how their versatile nature influenced judicial review. It then analyses judicial review of the European Stability Mechanism and the resulting Memoranda of Understanding at the national level in respect of access, remedies, and the interpretation of the principles of solidarity and equality. An analogous exercise is then conducted in respect of the EU courts. The chapter lastly reflects upon judicial interactions taking place between the EU and the national level and comments on the overall status of legal accountability in the EU judicial space.
Equality and equal treatment are the principal purpose of WTO law. However, that purpose is accomplished in varying conditions, which make it difficult to regularly attain the consistency and coherence that an egalitarian and obligatory conception of the law assumes. Consequently, this chapter proceeds to demonstrate how WTO law is focused secondarily on fairness and corrective justice and how this focus begets a subordinate emphasis in law on rights, which in turn gives rise to a contractual structure that is retrospectively oriented and reasoned inductively. It also demonstrates how various features of WTO law like the non-violation cause of action and implementation are consistent with such a rights-based ethos.
This chapter is an overview of central banking developments between 1919 and 1939, highlighting the establishment and operation of 28 new central banks, most in what are now called emerging markets and developing countries. Inspired by expert advice and underpinned by foreign lending, the new banks were designed to function independently from political interference, and to defend the gold standard as part an international, rules-based network of cooperating institutions. The Great Depression revealed the flaws in this setup. As capital flows dried up and international cooperation faltered, the gold standard disintegrated, and central banks were unable to head off macroeconomic and financial collapse. Designed to fight inflation, they were ill-prepared to address financial fragility. In the wake of their failure, a two-pronged reaction set in. Central bank autonomy was curtailed, while monetary policy was subordinated to new policy objectives, including the support of import substitution in Latin America and central planning in Eastern Europe. At the same time, central banks’ powers expanded, as they were transformed into agents of state-led development policy. Thus, the new central banks of the 1920s and 1930s were integrally involved not just in post-First World War reconstruction and the Great Depression, but also in the key economic developments of the mid-20th century.
The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) was restructured repeatedly between 1926 and 1935, but these restructurings were superficial and incoherent, producing contradictory outcomes. The liberal spirit of the initial 1926-8 reforms dissolved with the onset of the Great Depression. Subsequently, the BNB was endowed with new instruments and tasked with carrying out the interventionist policies adopted in the 1930s, thus paving the way for the bank’s eventual role in the communist planned economy. This chapter focuses on the significance of BNB’s state ownership and on the tight economic conditionality attached to 1926 and 1928 loans sponsored by the League of Nations. By contrasting policies followed in Bulgaria and Greece during the Depression, it challenges Eichengreen’s hypothesis that heavy defaulters and countries leaving the gold exchange standard performed better relative to those that sought to maintain their reputations as decent debtors.
Central banks were not always as ubiquitous as they are today. Their functions were circumscribed, their mandates ambiguous, and their allegiances once divided. The inter-war period saw the establishment of twenty-eight new central banks – most in what are now called emerging markets and developing economies. The Emergence of the Modern Central Bank and Global Cooperation provides a new account of their experience, explaining how these new institutions were established and how doctrinal knowledge was transferred. Combining synthetic analysis with national case studies, this book shows how institutional design and monetary practice were shaped by international organizations and leading central banks, which attached conditions to stabilization loans and dispatched 'money doctors.' It highlights how many of these arrangements fell through when central bank independence and the gold standard collapsed.
The article looks at how “systemic” irregularities or breaches of law imputable to EU Member States are defined in key legal documents relating to the protection of the EU budget – notably with regards to Agricultural, Structural and Recovery funds, and with regards to the Conditionality Regulation. It is argued that “system deficiencies” arise where the financial interests of the European Union are damaged or put at risk because the systems meant to protect these interests in a Member State are considered deficient themselves. The scope of these systems varies with documents: some systems are defined in sectoral legislation and only have relevance for specific funding programmes; other systems have a more constitutional character and are linked to the protection of the rule of law in EU member states. Moreover, the severity of system deficiencies can be graded on a scale. This has implications regarding the extent of the financial consequences which can be imposed on Member States for the protection of the EU budget – how much EU funding should be withheld from them. It is also argued that the rationales underlying the imposition of financial consequences – putting the EU budget out of harm’s way or incentivizing change to reduce risk? – have implications pertaining to the legal and constitutional relationship established between the EU and its Member States.
In liberal welfare systems, social security policy has been increasingly shifting towards conditionality and individualisation (Knotz, 2019). It is within this context that failure to meet the set conditions becomes personal rather than systemic. This has been enabled by policy discourses that construct poverty and unemployment as the result of personal failure and poor social behaviour. While this area of study over emphasises ‘the constraints imposed by discourse’ (Bacchi, 2000: 55), alternative discourses are often developed. This paper draws on ethnographic research investigating the development of self-reliant groups (SRGs) in Scotland. SRGs are small groups of women supporting each other in creating opportunities for personal development. We find that the process of involvement and sharing of experiences between women at the forefront of welfare reform led to the development of a counter public sphere. Yet, the experience doesn’t move fully towards actions for transformative social change.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development contains a broad set of goals requiring unprecedented global commitment and cooperation between countries (United Nations, 2015d, 2015e). From the human rights perspective, the agenda reflects elements of international human rights law and offers critical opportunities to further advance the realization of human rights for all people everywhere without discrimination (OHCHR, n.d.-c). The challenge posed is to ensure that strategies and policies to implement the 2030 Agenda are effectively based on the established human rights framework. Goal 17 of the Agenda refers to strengthening the means of implementation and “revitalizing the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development.” Several targets of Goal 17 aim at the full implementation of official development assistance by developed countries, reaching certain proportions of aid relative to gross national income.
The chapter begins by examining why the EU regulates, beginning with how the EU attempts to justify its regulatory power before exploring the main principles underlying EU regulation. We will then focus on who regulates in the EU, that is, the institutions, such as agencies and committees, that assist the EU in achieving its regulatory goals. The remaining sections will focus on the questions of how the EU regulates, distinguishing between the main legal and non-legal tools by which the EU regulates, and the judicial routes available to enforce or challenge the validity of such regulatory choices. Throughout, the focus will lie on the tension between efficiency and diversity that drives EU regulatory choices.
Introduced in the United Kingdom in 2012, Universal Credit (UC) is a welfare benefit that replaces six working-age ‘legacy’ benefits for out-of-work and low-income people. Designed with the aim of simplifying benefits and incentivising paid work, UC represents a deepening of conditionality in the British welfare state. Considering these developments, this paper quantitatively investigates the effect of UC on recipients’ life satisfaction. Data from the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study is analysed, primarily using a fixed-effects regression approach. Results reveal a significantly negative effect of UC recipience on life satisfaction. Robustness checks and alternative model specifications, including difference-in-differences and inverse probability weighting, confirm this finding. Additionally, mediation models give credence to the idea that UC also negatively affects life satisfaction indirectly by increasing psychological distress. Heterogeneity tests indicate that UC has a less negative effect on single parents’ life satisfaction compared to non-parents. Meanwhile, UC has a significantly more negative effect on the life satisfaction of people not in paid work (for reasons other than unemployment) than those in paid work. Discussion focuses on the potential effect of welfare conditionality specifically, and implications for future research and policy are explored.
In December 2020, the EU institutions finally approved the new Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation after a controversial legislative process. The new Regulation allows the Commission and the Council to suspend EU funds in case of breaches to the rule of law that have negative effects on the EU budget and financial interests. This article analyses the new Regulation against the background of the rise of conditionality as a tool of EU governance. It argues, in contrast to some of the first analyses of the new Regulation, that the amendments adopted during the legislative process cannot simply be seen as a watered-down compromise, but were crucial to ensure the legality of the new instrument. At the same time, the EU’s growing reliance on conditionality continues to raise profound constitutional questions that still needs to be adequately addressed in the institutional and academic debate.
The paper provides a comparative investigation into public attitudes to family policies. It shows that citizens’ support for family policies is diverse across different welfare regimes with respect to four countries belonging to distinct regimes: the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and Slovenia. Using qualitative data, we unpack the ways individuals view the need for family policies, the rationale they use to explain their support for family policies and for imposing restrictions on access to family policies – ie. why, for whom and under which conditions. We find that social rights narratives are common in Norway; a social investment logic is prevalent in Germany and Slovenia; while in the United Kingdom, the dominant view is closer to the work-central individualised responsibility narrative of neoliberalism. In addition, we find differences across regimes in which family policies should target. In the United Kingdom and Germany, the focus is much more on providing support to activate parents, while in Norway and partly Slovenia, the focus is on providing well-being for children. The findings show that despite some convergence in family policies across Europe in recent times, we still find clear diversity in what and for whom family policies are for, its rationale largely embedded in the larger institutional normative structures of the welfare state. The results not only contribute to the literature on the relationship between public attitudes and welfare institutions, but also point towards shifting ideas about the role of family policies in the context of societal change.
Drawing on the neo-republican theory of non-domination and a qualitative case study conducted in three Dutch municipalities, this article explores the extent to which external rules are able to prevent arbitrary power in relationships between welfare officers and work supervisors, on the one hand, and welfare recipients participating in mandatory work programmes, on the other hand. It concludes that external rules were insufficiently implemented in the three municipalities in question. In addition, it found that rules cease to be capable of constraining arbitrary power where institutional contexts themselves are unpredictable and insecure. Under these conditions, welfare recipients may seek to avoid risks and act in accordance with the preferences (or their expectation of the preferences) of the welfare officer or work supervisor by playing the role of the ‘good recipient’ instead of relying on available rules of a protective nature or rules that enable them to have a say in their participation in mandatory work programmes.
This chapter analyzes how competing notions of conditionality – primarily tensions between efficiency and solidarity – have played out in debates and discourses on development aid since the 1960s in one Scandinavian country and a small, yet highly profiled donor – Sweden. Repeated and shifting demands for accountability and transparency serve as a probe into the complex, competing, and often fluctuating aims, goals, and motives of international development aid. The chapter argues that current debates on “the end of aid” are informed by a historical and unresolved tension between “unconditional solidarity” on the one hand and “conditional efficiency” on the other: Demands for openness elucidate competing aims of aid, indicating a paradox in the transparency paradigm in contemporary development aid discourse, whereby efficient aid – as manifested in economic growth – eventually leads to the end of aid while its alleged inefficiency – as evidenced in social inequality – ensures its continued legitimacy.