People often use personal stories to support and defend their views. But can a personal story be evidence? A story tells us that a certain event can happen and has already happened to someone, but it may not always help us understand what caused the event or predict how likely that event is to happen again in the future. Moreover, people confabulate. That is, when they tell stories about their past, they are likely to distort reality in some way. When people who lack access to what motivated past behaviour are asked why they made a choice, they tend to offer plausible considerations in support of that choice, even if those considerations could not have played a motivating role in bringing about their behaviour. When people experience impairments in autobiographical memory, they tend to fill the gaps in their own story by reconstructing significant events to match their interests, values, and conception of themselves. This means that people often offer a curated version of the events they describe. In this paper, we argue that the pervasiveness of confabulation does not rule out that personal stories can be used as evidence but invites us to reflect carefully about what they are evidence of. And this is especially important in the context of digital storytelling, because stories shared on online platforms can exert even greater influence on what people think and do.

In 1987, DSM-III introduced the term delusional disorder. In so doing they gave new life to a concept that had predated but was delineated in its modern form by Kraepelin and developed most notably in France in the second and third decades of this century. While the current concept of delusional disorder is defined in a manner that distinguishes it from schizophrenia, a consideration of the evolution of thinking about delusional syndromes in France suggests that current distinctions are based on descriptive convenience rather than any understanding of the mechanisms that might produce phenotypic variations. If the purpose of accurate descriptions is to assist research, this state of affairs would seem unsatisfactory.

Does it make sense for people to hold one another responsible for what they do, as happens in countless social interactions every day? One of the most unsettling lessons from recent psychological research is that people are routinely mistaken about the origins of their behavior. Yet philosophical orthodoxy holds that the exercise of morally responsible agency typically requires accurate self-awareness. If the orthodoxy is right, and the psychology is to be believed, people characteristically fail to meet the standards of morally responsible agency, and we are faced with the possibility of skepticism about agency. Unlike many philosophers, I accept the unsettling lesson from psychology. I insist, however, that we are not driven to skepticism. Instead, we should reject the requirement of accurate self-awareness for morally responsible agency. In Talking to Our Selves I develop a dialogic theory, where the exercise of morally responsible agency emerges through a collaborative conversational process by which human beings, although afflicted with a remarkable degree of self-ignorance, are able to realize their values in their lives.

Clinical and experimental observation have shown that patients who confabulate, especially but not exclusively when provoked by specific questions, retrieve personal habits, repeated events or over-learned information and mistake them for actually experienced, specific, unique events. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to characterize and quantify the relative contribution of this type of confabulation, which we refer to as Habits Confabulation (HC), to confabulations produced by 10 mild Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients and 8 confabulating amnesics (CA) of various etiologies. On the Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993a, Dalla Barba & Decaix, 2009), a set of questions involving the retrieval of various kinds of semantic and episodic information, patients produced a total of 424 confabulation. HC accounted for 42% and 62% of confabulations in AD patients and CA, respectively. This result indicates that, regardless the clinical diagnosis, the brain pathology or their lesion’s site, confabulation largely reflects the individuals’ tendency to consider habits, routines, and over-learned information as unique episodes. These results are discussed in the framework of the Memory Consciousness and Temporality Theory (Dalla Barba, 2002). (JINS, 2010, 16, 967–974.)

There is disagreement regarding the underlying basis of confabulation and, in particular, whether emotional mechanisms influence the presence or the content of confabulations. In this study, we have examined the emotional content of confabulations and “true” memories given by 24 memory-disordered patients on two autobiographical memory tasks. Two judges made pleasant/neutral/unpleasant ratings. Although many of the “memories” were evaluated as “neutral”, there was an enhanced level of statements rated as having affective content (either pleasant or unpleasant) amongst these patients’ confabulations, compared with their “true” memories. This affective bias was present irrespective of whether patients had suffered focal pathology extending to the ventro-medial frontal cortex (VMFC) or other pathology. There was also a correlation between participants’ self-evaluated mood-states and both true and false memories’ affective content, suggestive of a mood congruency effect in both types of memory. In summary, there was an enhanced tendency to produce memories with affective content (pleasant and unpleasant) amongst confabulations (whether or not there was VMFC pathology). The affective content of both confabulations and true memories produced may relate, in part, to an individual’s current mood-state. (JINS, 2010, 16, 975–983.)

Confabulation has been documented in schizophrenia, but its neuropsychological correlates appear to be different from those of confabulation in neurological disease states. Forty-five schizophrenic patients and 37 controls were administered a task requiring them to recall fables. They also underwent testing with a range of memory and executive tasks. The patients with schizophrenia produced significantly more confabulations than the controls. After correcting for multiple comparisons, confabulation was not significantly associated with memory impairment, and was associated with impairment on only one of eight executive measures, the Brixton Test. Confabulation scores were also associated with impairment on two semantic memory tests. Confabulation was correlated with intrusion errors in recall, but not false positive errors in a recognition task. The findings suggest that confabulation in schizophrenia is unrelated to the episodic memory impairment seen in the disorder. However, the association with a circumscribed deficit in executive function could be consistent with a defective strategic retrieval account of confabulation similar to that of Moscovitch and co-workers, interacting with defective semantic memory. (JINS, 2010, 16, 1018–1026.)

Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article introduces the four accounts. Section 2 develops the “mindreading is prior” model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection for perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g., imagistic) mental events while claiming that metacognitive access to our own attitudes always results from swift unconscious self-interpretation. This section also considers the model's relationship to the expression of attitudes in speech. Section 3 argues that the commonsense belief in the existence of introspection should be given no weight. Section 4 argues briefly that data from childhood development are of no help in resolving this debate. Section 5 considers the evolutionary claims to which the different accounts are committed, and argues that the three introspective views make predictions that are not borne out by the data. Section 6 examines the extensive evidence that people often confabulate when self-attributing attitudes. Section 7 considers “two systems” accounts of human thinking and reasoning, arguing that although there are introspectable events within System 2, there are no introspectable attitudes. Section 8 examines alleged evidence of “unsymbolized thinking”. Section 9 considers the claim that schizophrenia exhibits a dissociation between mindreading and metacognition. Finally, section 10 evaluates the claim that autism presents a dissociation in the opposite direction, of metacognition without mindreading.

Most patients with neglect demonstrate a crossover effect on line bisection. Crossover refers to a pattern of performance in which long lines (>10 cm) are bisected ipsilateral to brain injury and short lines (<2 cm) are bisected contralateral to brain injury. Crossover bisections on short lines are of interest because they are not predicted by contemporary theories concerning neglect. However, we propose that the effect depends on two independent factors that normally influence bisection performance but are merely exaggerated in neglect—a tendency to overestimate the length of short lines and underestimate long lines and a tendency to orient attention preferentially in one spatial direction. We predicted that both patients with unilateral left and right hemisphere injury would demonstrate crossover on line bisection and that they would overestimate short lines and underestimate long lines upon direct visual inspection. Further, the 2 groups were predicted to demonstrate crossover in opposite directions owing to different lesion-induced biases in attentional orientation. Testing 5 patients with right hemisphere injury and 7 patients with left hemisphere injury confirmed each prediction. Additionally, errors in length estimation were exaggerated among patients with right hemisphere injury, most of whom had neglect. It is concluded that while crossover is accentuated in cases of neglect, it is not a consequence of neglect per se. As such, crossover bisections are not at odds with contemporary neglect theory. (JINS, 2002, 8, 107–114.)