By the early twentieth century, democracy was in the ascendant. Not all observers and practitioners were enthusiastic about this development. But, whether favourable towards it or not, they came to accept the predominance of the concept that the people were the ultimate source of political authority.1 An example of a grudging acknowledgement that confirms the strength of the conceptual transition that had occurred came from the constitutional historian, William Sharp McKechnie. He observed in his 1912 work of contemporary analysis The New Democracy and the Constitution that the public pronouncements of politicians suggested ‘the triumph of Democracy in Great Britain is now assured’ McKechnie noted a tendency as common to ‘Conservatives and Liberals as’ as it was among ‘Socialists and Labour leaders’ to display ‘[a] fervent and almost servile eagerness to interpret and to execute “the people’s will”’.2

The chapter intends to contribute to studies on material constitutionalism by applying Costantino Mortati’s concept of material constitution to discuss theories of constitutional change. In particular, it focusses on ‘constitutional maintenance’ doctrines elaborated in continental Europe to explain cases of limited and/or substantively guided constitutional changes, generally eluding the formal amending procedures. It argues that while constitutional maintenance doctrines catch one of the functions of the theory of the material constitution, namely, to guide constitutional changes, they fall into a logical contradiction by: (a) observing constitutional changes on the basis of mismatches between constitutional practice and the master-text constitution; and (b) supporting the need to minimise those mismatches. The argument is preceded by an analysis of doctrinal debates on constitutional change in selected jurisdictions. It is then developed by unpacking the material constitution theory in two logical steps. In particular, it will focus on the problem of the identification of the constitution and on the related need to reduce the substantive distance between the formal and the material constitution. Eventually, the chapter offers conclusions on how material constitutionalism can contribute to studies on constitutional change.

The concept of material constitution is helpful to understand how particular constitutional orders are created and operate, inviting observers to look beyond the formal constitution, showing the shortcomings of the exclusive focus on the formal constitution and offering tools to enquire into the underpinning materiality. While the material study of a particular constitution requires a detailed thorough research of the forces that condition a material constitutional order, we can show the usefulness of the enquiry through selected aspects of a constitutional order. This chapter aims to do that by explaining the military’s role in constitution-making in Turkey. While the military is a defining constitutional actor in Turkey, recognition of this in the formal constitution is very limited. Only through accounting for the constitutional role of the military can the materiality of the Turkish Constitution be grasped and a more accurate description of the Turkish constitutional order be provided. Through an overview of its role in the making and re-making of the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, the military is introduced as an ordering force in the Turkish Constitution, explaining the military’s constituent and ongoing authority over the constitutional order and its role in guaranteeing the fundamental political objectives of that order.

In this Introductory chapter to “Amending America’s Unwritten Constitution,” the editors invite readers to consider the puzzle presented in the book: How to amend America’s unwritten constitution? The editors undertake a systemic inquiry into each of the major themes raised by the puzzle: What is a “constitution,” what is “America’s” constitution, what does it mean to “amend” a constitution, and how might we identify an amendment to an “unwritten” constitution, specifically the unwritten constitution of the United States. As the editors set out to answer these questions, they survey the existing literature in the field to lay the foundation for the chapters to follow. They introduce the chapters as well as how each of them illuminates the answer to the major thematic questions raised and explored in the book. What results is ultimately both a proper introduction to this book and also an important scholarly resource to understand constitutional change in the United States.

A core function of constitutions, unwritten and written alike, is to constrain the actions of government officials. This chapter argues that a constitution cannot serve this function unless communities of “constitutional participants” pay attention to and engage with the constitution and its meaning. Participants are needed not only to develop shared understandings of ambiguous text but also to create a credible threat of sanctions, legal or otherwise, for unconstitutional actions. The chapter further suggests that American states may have, at least on certain issues, constitutional communities too sparse to activate constitutional constraint. Finally, the chapter briefly problematizes the creation of constitutional communities, asking whether and how they could be forged in the states without generating costs of capture or further polarization.

This chapter uses recent developments in Hungary to examine how the equivalent of political revolution can occur through changes that are, taken individually, in compliance in the constitution but collectively amount to wholesale transformation of the constitutional order. It confronts the question of what limits, if any, exist on constitutional revolutions of this type.

Recent scholarship has highlighted the theoretical possibility and examples of the tools of constitutional change being used “abusively,” in order to erode the democratic order. This chapter will explore the experience of constitutional backsliding in Colombia, and the response to those efforts by the Colombian Constitutional Court and other political actors. The chapter will explain the utility of a well-developed doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment as a response to potentially abusive amendments such as term limit extensions. However, it will also highlight the dependence of such a doctrinal response on particular political conditions that often do not hold throughout Latin America.

Comparative constitutional law has experienced a resurgence in recent decades. Whereas two decades ago the field was focused on the North Atlantic and the issue of rights adjudication, there now exists a vibrant literature on many different jurisdictions and issues, covering a wide field of global constitutional arrangements. This chapter will review the history and rapid progress of the field of Constitutionalism in Context. The most encouraging and visible manifestations of this progress include a shift away from Eurocentrism and the traditional focus on apex courts. It will also identify lacunae in the existing literature and questions that would benefit from further exploration. This essay will conclude by proposing a next-generation research agenda for the field.

The chapter introduces the UK constitution, focusing on its non-codified nature and the way in which the UK, unlike other constitutions, has no developed understanding of the state. It explains both the strengths and weaknesses of a fluid, evolving constitution. It also sets the stage for the theme of the impact of Brexit on the UK constitution, which runs through the book as a whole. It also explains and evaluates recent constitutional change - from the Coalition Government onwards - and sets out possible future constitutional change.

This volume explores a new topic in comparative constitutional law: towering judges. It covers nineteen judges (from fourteen jurisdictions) who made a significant impact on the trajectory and development of constitutional law in their societies. Some of these judges became well-known public figures, cultural icons, or political leaders. Some acted in crucial moments in their country's constitutional history or led their court in a new direction. Others acted in less fraught times and were known primarily within the legal profession for their intellectual brilliance and judicial craft. All of them, however, were able to shine individually to an uncommon degree in a profession where individualism is not always looked on favorably.