This article examines the fiscal transformation of Spain's trade with Spanish America during the 17th century. It analyses the taxation of trade combined with the evolution of the Hispanic Monarchy's long-term domestic debt. To this end, the author looks at the almojarifazgo de Indias (main customs duty), its juro (annuity) obligations and the evolution of the transatlantic trade. He argues that the fall in customs revenue and the increasing non-payment of the juros issued against the almojarifazgo were neither a consequence of the alleged crisis of the Carrera de Indias nor of the higher incidence of fraud. The Crown was not interested in exerting greater fiscal pressure on the trade or fighting fraud at the customs houses of Seville and Cadiz as the increased tax revenue would have gone entirely to service the unpaid juros. Instead, the fiscal burden shifted towards extraordinary contributions that were free of juro obligations.

Traditional historical literature has stressed a generalised crisis throughout the world in the 17th century. First proposed for Europe with its numerous dynastic, religious and state conflicts, it has now been expanded to include Asia and the Middle East as well. It was also assumed that there was a significant crisis in the Americas, a theme which until recently has dominated the traditional literature. The claim that there was such a crisis was based on a series of classic studies by Earl J. Hamilton, Chaunu and Borah, among others. But new research has challenged this hypothesis and we will examine both these new studies as well as offering our own research findings on this subject.

This article tries to establish the chronology and dynamics of the 17th century economic depression in the region of Evora, in Southern Portugal. By examining a set of key variables –vital statistics, prices of foodstuffs and farm rents– the onset of the depression is located in the last decade of 16th century, and its continuation up to 1660 is attested. A number of attempts to recovery are detected, but all of them were checked by poor harvests, sometimes joined by plague and war. On the whole, high prices of foodstuffs appear to be associated with signals of depression in the behaviour of other variables. This seems to indicate that these price increases were supply-driven, rather than demand-driven, weighting heavily on the incomes of most families, whereas small farmers were unable to take advantage of these seemingly favourable conjunctures.