Prevented planting payments reimburse crop producers for losses from not being able to plant. These payments provide critical protection to producers; however, these payments, which are determined using a nationwide, crop-specific coverage factor, have been questioned to induce moral hazard. Depending on the region and crop insurance coverage, payments from this provision exceed producers’ losses. This paper estimates the prevented planting coverage factor by coverage level and region that would equitably reimburse corn and soybean producers for their losses. We find the prevented planting coverage factor has significant variation across coverage levels and location within our study region. The prevented planting coverage factor was found to decline as the policy coverage level increases. The further north in the study region the higher the coverage factor, likely due to increased land rent expenses. The results provide a unique perspective of how these coverage factors would vary to equitably compensate producers for losses, which addresses the moral hazard concerns with prevented planting.

The United States has a long history of providing ad hoc disaster assistance to agricultural producers. The latest version – the Emergency Relief Program (ERP) – follows five consecutive years of appropriations for disaster assistance. In response to ongoing appropriations, there is growing interest in establishing a permanent disaster program. However, with that comes concerns over the impact it could have on the existing farm safety net, particularly crop insurance. In this paper, we characterize the likely effects on crop insurance coverage levels of a permanent authorization of ERP. We assume that corn and soybean producers choose a coverage level based on the effects of that choice on the distribution of future ending wealth reflecting crop revenue, insurance indemnities, and ERP payments. We find very modest effects on crop insurance coverage level choices and crop insurance premiums collected.

This paper shows how econometric identification can be improved in studies making use of crop insurance participation as either an independent or dependent variable. The paper provides the reader with a succinct overview of how crop insurance contracts are priced and how to use publicly available data to derive a novel composite crop insurance design parameter that emulates existing crop insurance rating parameters using a procedure that is based on current actuarial practices. The derived design parameter performs well at predicting historic crop insurance loss-cost ratios and satisfies the requirements for an instrumental variable for a variety of empirical applications related to crop insurance. Representative empirical examples are presented where it is shown that the proposed instrument has favorable two-staged least squares diagnostic tests and is effective at eliminating endogeneity bias.

Crop insurance has been linked to changes in farm production decisions. In this study, we examine the effects of crop insurance participation and coverage on farm input use. Using a 1993–2016 panel of Kansas farms, evidence exists that insured farms apply more farm chemicals and seed per acre than uninsured farms. We use a fixed effects instrumental variable estimator to obtain the effects of change in crop insurance coverage on farm input use accounting farm-level heterogeneity. Empirical evidence suggests that changes in the levels of crop insurance coverage do not significantly affect farm chemical use. Thus, moral hazard effects from purchasing crop insurance are not large on a per acre basis but can lead to expenditures of $6,100 per farm.

This article evaluates Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Revenue Protection (RP) used in conjunction as an optimal risk management strategy for representative producers in the Corn Belt and Mississippi Delta. Using a simulation procedure to produce representative farm revenues, we find it is optimal under expected utility for producers to enroll in RP, despite having RP through ARC. Results are robust across alternative sampling methods and regions. These findings imply that ARC is better suited as a complementary program, and that it is optimal for a producer to enroll in higher coverage levels than we currently observe.

Farm-level data from the Farm Financial Management Database (FINBIN) are used to evaluate the effectiveness of Whole Farm Revenue Protection (WFRP) insurance in diverse farming operations. A panel of diverse Minnesota farms is used to establish actual production history and compute hypothetical performance over three years. This study characterizes the relative riskiness between organic and conventional farms and their comparative insurance performances by avoiding potential adverse selection issues in other studies. Empirical evidence is provided to dispute past empirical findings suggesting that organic farms are riskier than conventional farms, as measured by lower loss ratios.

In this research, we analyze the economic effects across various crop insurance subsidy and policy scenarios to determine producer insurance choice response, total premium and subsidy payments and study their economic implications on dryland corn, soybean, and winter wheat producers. We rely on the expected utility maximization framework to rank policy combination sets that are available to a typical producer to analyze the impacts of crop insurance subsidy changes and elimination of certain insurance policies across the three crops. Several scenarios were analyzed across subsidy and policy options and were found to have noticeably different farmer behavioral responses and economic implications.

The 2018 farm bill is the latest in a history that dates to 1933. Commodity assistance is the only program in all farm bills, but with evolutionary changes. Current farm commodity programs largely make payments to farms, a stark contrast to the 1930s when they limited supply, put a floor under market price, and dampened price increases via public stocks. Crop insurance, which began as an experimental pilot program in 1938, now has its own farm bill title. Almost all commodity and insurance programs have provided assistance based on a calculation specific to an individual commodity's price and/or yield. However, an evolutionary change to whole farm commodity programs may be in its infant stages. They provide assistance for variation in a farm's aggregate revenue across multiple crops. Whole farm experiments currently exist in both the commodity and crop insurance titles. Analysis of a whole farm commodity program finds that its payments differ by year from actual payments made by current commodity programs and are smaller in total.

Prevented planting provision in crop insurance protects producers from failure to plant attributable to natural causes. We determined the impact of this provision at various crop insurance coverage levels on prevented planting claims and ex post moral hazard. The moral hazard incentive in the prevented planting provision is stronger for corn than soybeans. Reducing the prevented planting coverage factor for corn could likely reduce moral hazard, but the degree of the reduction will likely depend on the revenue protection coverage level. Conversely, we found moral hazard is unlikely to occur for soybean production regardless of the revenue protection coverage level.

Unplowed native grasslands are among the most endangered ecosystems in the world, due in large part to their agricultural suitability and widespread conversion to cropland. Despite this, remaining locations of these species- and carbon-rich landscapes are neither well monitored nor effectively protected. A recent spike in US prices for corn (Zea mays) and soybeans (Glycine max) intensified incentives to bring new land into production, potentially hastening the conversion of grasslands to crops. We combined satellite-based land cover data with aerial photographs and a field-based inventory of remaining native grassland (hereafter prairie) in Minnesota to assess the areas, rates, and locations of prairie conversion since 2008. Our results reveal that during 2008–2012, prairie was converted at average annual rates more than four times greater than the previous decade and a half. Corn and soybeans were the initial crops planted on 73% of converted prairie, and more than 80% of conversion occurred in recently established conservation priority zones, thereby magnifying the urgency to protect these sites. Broader land-use trends in Minnesota suggest that expansion of both croplands and developed lands continues to threaten all grasslands, including the subset that is prairie, and that the growth of developed or built-up land may be amplifying the conversion pressure exerted by agriculture, though further research is needed. Despite the small total area of prairie lost, the multi-fold increase in conversion rates and the confirmation of native habitat clearing may have substantial conservation implications, especially given the very limited prairie that remains in the region. The overall results reveal challenges for federal policies, including a loophole in the crop insurance Sodsaver provision surrounding alfalfa hay and limitations in the current enforcement of the Renewable Fuel Standard.

The Agricultural Act of 2014 introduced new crop insurance policies to manage agricultural risk, especially to cotton farmers. A representative farm panel was used to elicit the yield distribution of the farm, county, and correlation. Results suggest that the optimal underlying insurance policy is Revenue Protection at a 75% coverage level for both high- and low-productivity farms even with a Yield Exclusion provision. The Stacked Income Protection Plan benefit is mostly attributable to a higher insurance premium subsidy. For any crop, efficient agricultural risk management can be achieved through understanding the guaranteed yield and its relation to the farm and county yield.

We develop a model for a representative risk-averse cotton farmer to analyze the impact of crop insurance policies (Revenue Protection [RP], Yield Protection, Stacked Income Protection Plan [STAX], and Supplemental Coverage Option [SCO]). The model is calibrated and numerically optimized to quantify the effects of different insurance policy combinations on input use (moral hazard), insurance coverage levels, premiums, and certainty equivalent. When the farmer elects only RP, the optimal coverage rate is 80%. Under RP and STAX, the optimal RP coverage rate is 70% and the STAX coverage rate is 90%. RP and STAX is the optimal policy combination based on certainty equivalents. The RP and SCO combination has the lowest impact of input use.

Fruit producers in the Eastern United States face a wide range of weather-related risks that have the capacity to largely impact yields and profitability. This research examines the economic implications associated with responding to these risks for sweet cherry production in three different systems: high tunnels, revenue insurance, and weather insurance. The analysis considers a distribution of revenue flows and costs using detailed price, yield, and weather data between 1984 and 2013. Our results show that the high tunnel system generates the largest net return if significant price premiums exist for earlier and larger fruit.

This article examines farmers’ preferences for various risk management information sources. Our results suggest that information from risk management experts, in-depth materials studied on their own, and popular press outlets tend to be preferred and are ranked highly by producers. Using a regression model to investigate farmer/farm attributes that affect preference for a particular risk management information source, we find that younger farmers with college education, higher leverage, assets greater than $1 million, risk-loving attitudes, and who have used professional services (marketing consultants) tend to prefer information from risk management experts, the Internet, and marketing clubs/other producers. On the other hand, producers who prefer self-study of educational materials and popular press information sources tend to be younger, with lower leverage levels, and have used fewer professional services.

This paper examines the factors influencing farmer participation in crop insurance schemes, but unlike previous studies that focus on total demand, participation is disaggregated into entrants and those exiting. Modeling entry and exit decisions separately illustrates that the effect of a given variable is often muted by aggregation. In addition, the approach in this paper distinguishes between price and yield variables rather than total returns and is consequently able to demonstrate that price variables are particularly important for farmers considering enrolling in crop insurance, while yield variables and other risk management opportunities are more important for farmers who have been in the program but are deciding to exit. The result suggests that moral hazard is reduced significantly by calculating the coverage yield level for an individual producer on the basis of a moving average of past yields for that farmer. While yield and its variance are particularly influential in the participation decision for farmers currently enrolled, its significant impact on the insurance decision for all farmers highlights the importance of crop insurance as a potential adaptation strategy to weather events.

This article examines the flexibility of the Johnson system of distributions by assessing its performance in terms of modeling crop yields for the purpose of setting actuarially fair crop insurance premiums. Using data from corn farms in Illinois coupled with Monte Carlo simulation procedures, we found that average crop insurance premiums computed on the basis of the Johnson system provide reasonably accurate estimates even when the data are normal or come from a non-normal distribution other than the Johnson system (i.e., a beta). These results suggest that there is potential for using the Johnson system to rate previously uninsured crops that do not have historical insurance performance data upon which to base premium calculations.

Actual Production History (APH) yields play a critical role in determining the coverage offered to producers by the Risk Management Agency's yield-based crop insurance products. Using both county and individual insured unit data, we examine the impact of APH yield trends for Texas cotton and Illinois com. Our findings indicate that biases due to using simple average APH yields when yields are trending upward reduce the expected indemnity and actuarially fair premium rate. The estimated welfare effect also varies significantly with different commonly used detrending approaches. This study demonstrates that producer welfare can be enhanced through proper treatment of yield trends in crop insurance programs.

This paper introduces a web-based computer program designed to evaluate weather risk management and weather insurance in the United States. The paper outlines the economics of weather risk in terms of agricultural production and household well-being; defines weather risk in terms of intensity, duration, and frequency; and illustrates the computer program use by comparing heat and precipitation risks at Ardmore, Oklahoma, and Ithaca, New York.

A primary change to crop insurance contained in the USDA's Farm Bill proposal is supplemental deductible coverage (SDC). SDC would allow farmers who purchase individual crop insurance coverage to purchase area-wide coverage in the amount of the individual policy deductible. This supplemental area-wide coverage would be similar to the existing Group Risk Plan policy, but with an accelerated indemnity schedule. Analysis indicates that SDC increases farmer certainty equivalents. The largest benefits are realized by farmers with high yield potential in counties with greater systemic risk. In general, optimal individual policy coverage levels modestly decrease when SDC is taken.

High tunnels are being used by specialty crop producers to enhance production yields and quality, extend growing seasons, and protect crops from extreme weather. The tunnels are unheated, plastic-covered structures under which crops are planted directly in the soil, and they provide greater environmental protection and control than open-field production. This study uses field-level experiments to evaluate high-tunnel production. The results suggest that investments in high tunnels can provide increased profits and superior protection against adverse risks relative to crop insurance.