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In Europe, the integration process has domesticated international relations, safeguarded member-states’ democracies, and enabled collective action and supranational problem-solving. It has brought about the European Union (EU) and a democratic ‘surplus’. How has this been possible when the binding effect of EU law is grounded neither in the sovereign’s monopoly on power at the European level nor in the final decision-making authority of the EU? An answer to this puzzle is found in the fact that a public coercive framework has been established, which aims at solving the indeterminacy and assurance problems facing international cooperation. The enabling condition of sovereignty is replaced by those of co-legislation and a binding judicial process. The latter creates reasons for deference to legitimate authority and hence a compliance condition. However, since the Union falls short of meeting certain democratic standards, oversteps competences, and is plagued with inertia, there is a call for constitutional reform.
Chapter 13 surveys and assesses the different ways in which election laws and practices impact racial equality in the political process and the distribution of resources and power that stems from those elections. Topics include voter ID laws, felon disenfranchisement, and racial redistricting, as well as immigrant political incorporation and language access. Themed boxes include recent court cases on voter ID, specific voting rights cases, and noncitizen voting.
Chapter 5 analyses the three challenges facing international tribunals considered in this book in investment treaty arbitration. Regarding the challenge of managing change, investment treaty arbitration displays similarities and differences with the inter-State tribunals studied. Using the example of the minimum standard of treatment, the chapter shows that like the inter-State tribunals studied, investment treaty tribunals contribute to broader processes of change in international legal norms. Yet differently from the other tribunals studied, investment treaty arbitration has an overriding focus on determining the permissible degree of change in host State regulation. In relation to scrutinising State conduct for compliance with international law, investment treaty arbitration raises comparable questions to the other international tribunals studied regarding the appropriate intensity of review and the methods of review used by adjudicators. Finally, the chapter considers why, unlike the inter-State tribunals studied, investment treaty tribunals rarely adjudicate in a facilitative, forward-looking manner that aims to complement post-adjudication cooperation between the parties.
Chapter 4 analyses the three selected challenges facing international tribunals – managing change, reviewing State conduct for compliance with international law, and dispute resolution – in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s environmental case law. The ICJ has repeatedly adapted aging treaty frameworks given relevant developments in international law and has also faced the problem of change in relevant facts. While the terminology of a standard of review is not firmly established in the ICJ’s case law, the underlying functional problem – concerning the intensity of an international tribunal’s scrutiny of determinations made by domestic authorities – is clearly present. Although three-step proportionality analysis is not entrenched in the ICJ’s case law, the Court has repeatedly used a reasonableness-based test that operates similarly to least restrictive means testing. Finally, the ICJ often adjudicates in a forward-looking, facilitative manner, seeking to assist the parties to manage their relationship after adjudication. Throughout, the chapter reflects on how the ICJ’s practices are shaped by its institutional features, such as its lack of any compulsory jurisdiction.
Chapter 1 introduces the questions the book focuses on and explains its key contributions to literature on international adjudication. It introduces the three challenges facing international tribunals analysed throughout the book: managing change in applicable law or relevant facts, determining the appropriate standard and method of review when scrutinising State conduct for compliance with international law, and contributing to broader processes of dispute resolution. The chapter explains why the book focuses on environmental disputes, as such disputes lack a dedicated tribunal and are litigated across various regimes, and how it defines such disputes. It also justifies the choice of the four adjudication contexts focused upon (adjudication in the World Trade Organization, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, and under investment treaties). The chapter also notes certain insights the book incorporates from methodological debates in comparative law, given its focus on identifying and explaining similarities and differences in how the three selected challenges are managed across the four adjudication contexts studied.
Chapter 3 analyses the three selected challenges facing international tribunals – managing change, reviewing State conduct for compliance with international law, and dispute resolution – in the environmental case law of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and arbitral tribunals constituted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS tribunals have often interpreted the Convention in a manner that takes account of relevant developments in international law. This is partly due to features of UNCLOS itself, including that it contains many generic or open-ended terms. The chapter demonstrates that the standard and method of review are significant issues in the environmental case law of UNCLOS tribunals, in the context of the Convention conferring on coastal States discretionary powers. These issues raise similar functional questions to those seen in the other adjudication contexts studied, for example regarding the rationales for some deference to domestic authorities. Finally, the chapter demonstrates that UNCLOS tribunals often adjudicate in a facilitative, forward-looking manner, aiming to assist the parties to rebuild their relationship.
Chapter 6 draws together and extends the comparative analysis that has unfolded across the prior chapters. It explains why tribunals’ practices differ across the regimes studied, focusing on contextual differences between the selected tribunals. It also assesses to what extent the practices of the selected tribunals provide insights into wider problems facing international adjudication and legal techniques that are potentially transferable across contexts. Structurally, the chapter discusses consecutively my findings in relation to the three challenges confronting international tribunals analysed throughout the book: managing changes in international law or relevant facts, calibrating the appropriate standard and method of review when scrutinising State conduct for compliance with international law, and contributing to broader processes of dispute resolution. The chapter finishes with some final remarks that close the book, concerning its contribution to our understanding of the role of international adjudication in contemporary international law and its implications for future studies in this field.
Questions of statutory interpretation form a significant portion of administrative law cases. Accordingly, judicial methodology in this area requires careful consideration by public law commentators. The core aim of this paper is to question the general orthodoxy that statutory interpretation is invariably a question for judges. In recent times, one prominent argument has been that between jurists arguing that interpretation should be the realisation of Parliament's intention (‘intentionalist’), and those who prefer the closely related but subtly distinct focus on its objective purpose (‘purposivist’). I contend that this argument, framed as a question over the inter-institutional relationship between Parliament and the courts, focuses on how interpretation is carried out without considering who is best placed to do the interpreting. Given, as I demonstrate with a series of case studies, that in hard cases the distinction between interpretation and discretion/policymaking can become obscure to the point of nullity, the debate fails to consider institutional arguments for judicial deference on questions of law. Moreover, and counterintuitively, the arguments of the intentionalists/purposivists can be used to bolster an argument for deference. My conclusion adopts a wider lens, setting out a broader constitutional argument for, and addressing objections against, cautious and context-sensitive deference.
The moral problem of authority can be expressed as follows: how can authority, and the deference it entails, be compatible with freedom and rationality? The pluralist approach separates political obligation from authority. For pluralists, authority is both unjustifiable and unnecessary, and so legitimate political obligation, including the duty to obey the law, does not entail deference. I argue that it is possible to retain the pluralist commitment to plural grounds of legitimacy, while rebutting the pluralist objections to authority. As a result, whenever authority does have legitimacy, the moral question of authority will demand an answer.
This chapter points to a dilemma at the heart of the judicial role. How can courts robustly review legislation for compliance with rights without exceeding the limits of the judicial role? And how can they pay respect to the democratically elected branches of government without ceding their obligations to uphold rights? Presenting courts as a form of constitutional ‘quality control’, this chapter argues they solve this dilemma by engaging in calibrated constitutional review. This requires judges to carefully calibrate the grounds and intensity of review depending on a complex analysis of legal and institutional concerns.
Chapter 7 examines both second-person pronouns and nominal terms of address (vocatives). In Middle English, the original singular and plural second-person pronouns came to distinguish differences between interlocutors, with the singular thou denoting lesser status/age power or increased solidarity, intimacy, or informality and the plural you denoting higher status/age/power or greater emotional distance or formality. In Early Modern English, the use of the pronouns for affective purposes was common, showing “retractability”. Loss of thou for various sociolinguistic reasons was complete by 1700, leaving English without an honorific form or a number distinction in the second person. Vocatives underwent less systematic change, but moved in the same general direction. The elaborate vocatives of Early Modern English, which delineated a person’s rank and status, were replaced by a more diffuse collection of vocatives, with preference increasingly given to first names, family names, “familiarizers,” and endearments, all of which served to increase rapport and create a sense of equality. They form part of the phenomenon of “camaraderie politeness” dominant in Present-day English.
Chapter 3 shows how we can intend language as a social tool. The first part focuses on language and interaction; the second part on how we outsource our knowledge benefiting from others’ knowledge. First, I show that the traditional separations between phonetics, phonology, syntax, and semantics and between production and comprehension do not hold. Rather, language is profoundly interactive. Then I overview innovative approaches that investigate real-time linguistic interactions, illustrating new methods, such as hyperscanning. In the second part , I contend that language is also a social tool because it allows us to strengthen our knowledge by relying on others. I introduce the notion of "community of knowledge," show that we outsource part of our knowledge, and illustrate how children develop the ability to defer toward experts in acquiring and mastering linguistic meaning. Finally, I discuss the possible theoretical consequences of outsourcing knowledge.
The Convention contains an inherent tension between, the one hand, the aim to provide effective protection of Convention rights and, on the other hand, the need for the ECtHR to allow sufficient freedom to the States and respect their special abilities and powers to make choices and decisions, also in light of the inherent indeterminacy of the Convention provisions. It is against this backdrop that the Court has developed its famous yet complex margin of appreciation doctrine, on which this chapter is focused. Insight is given into the development of this doctrine in the Court’s case law, its main rationale and functions, and the types of cases where the doctrine is (and is not) applied. In addition, the main factors determining the scope of the margin and their interaction are explained (common ground facter, better placed factor, nature and intensity of the interference). Finally, some attention is paid to the difference between doctrine and reality in the Court’s case law.
When do smaller states defer to and when do they defy stronger powers? How and why? This article traces and explains the changing patterns of deference and defiance in Malaysia's China policy. There are three findings. First, deference and defiance are essential elements in all inter-state relations, especially asymmetric ones. The greater the power asymmetry, the greater the inclination to defer and defy. Second, states often pursue defiance and deference concurrently and selectively, with approaches adapted in accordance with changing external and internal conditions. The concurrent adoption of the two behaviors often manifest in hedging, an insurance-seeking policy aimed at offsetting multiple risks by counteracting the effects of the other behavior: deference without defiance risks subservience and dependency; defiance without deference invites hostility and confrontation. Third, the specific patterns and proportions of the deference–defiance mix are attributable more to domestic than external determinants, i.e., the needs to balance security, prosperity, and autonomy, as necessitated by the prevailing pathways of elite legitimation. This explains why Malaysia's open deference vis-à-vis China has been accompanied by an indirect and quiet defiance especially in recent years, as best evidenced by the second Mahathir administration's dualistic approaches toward the Belt and Road, South China Sea, and Xinjiang.
This chapter focuses on grammatical resources for enacting social relations – mood. A basic distinction is drawn between the systems of formal mood and addressee deference on the one hand and the systems of informal mood, stance and politeness on the other. Subsequently the systems of polarity, modality, participant deference, highlight, comment and expletion are outlined. For each system the relevant choices for meaning are consolidated in system networks and their realisation in structure at clause, group/phrase and word ranks is specified.
This chapter introduces and discusses the approach of each body to deference and subsidiarity, and assesses how the differences may affect convergence and fragmentation. From the margin of appreciation (MoA), typical of the European Court, to the conventionality control (CC) of the Inter-American Court, the chapter investigates all the different shades of subsidiarity and deference and put them in a comparative perspective. Moreover, through specific examples, this chapter shows how different approaches may trigger fragmentation (such as in the headscarf cases) and how convergence on the level of deference and subsidiarity may, on the contrary, foster convergence (such as in defamation cases).
The idea of determinatio – first identified and analysed in natural law theory – is crucial for understanding international human rights adjudication. Human rights, as they appear formulated in international human rights treatises and declarations, require specification, implementation, concretisation, i.e., determinatio, at the domestic level. I argue that there are good reasons for this to be so. One such reason is that determinatio allows for the application of a norm to be sensitive to the particular circumstances in which it takes place. Determinatio entails deference in human rights adjudication, the latter being the legal consequence of the reasonable space for discretion granted to states which is entailed by determiatio in international human rights law. Close attention to determinatio allows us to see well-known doctrines of deference (such as the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, of regional consensus and of incrementalism) in a different light—not as concessions to state sovereignty, but as grounded on reasons internal to the legal practice of human rights law, of which determinatio is an integral part.
Finally, the checks and balances of sovereign debt restructuring by investment tribunals are also implemented as a matter of the interpretation of the substantive provisions. Given that investment arbitral jurisprudence has incorporated the doctrine of margin of appreciation, the study has concluded that a deferential review of policy decision-making by debtor sovereigns is available and appropriate for arbitral tribunals. Concretely, the arbitral jurisprudence on the provisions providing standards of protection and defence on merits may afford a balancing exercise that enables safeguarding the legitimate policy of debt restructuring without sacrificing bondholder protection.
dated conception of international law that refuses to die lies at the heart of today’s global refugee crisis. It posits states as sovereignly impervious and self-contained units and as the only apposite actors on the world stage. Efforts to incentivize countries generally to welcome more people seeking refuge and specifically to adopt fair standards of entry crash against this still entrenched outlook. Activists and practitioners must simultaneously debunk the prevailing standpoint and, against all odds, construct an alternative. The latter desperately needs definition and elaboration. As a whole, it must re-imagine the planet as inclusive of the traditionally excluded: such as nongovernmental organizations; non-organized groups; societal communities; persons of all races, ethnicities, genders, and religions; animals; plants; minerals; and so forth. As a most elemental part of this narrative, self-determining and solely partially sovereign nations may neither do as they please within or at their borders nor expect to be left alone in so doing. Instead, they must honor their responsibilities to a wide array of private and public parties, both at home and abroad, while acting autonomously and resisting heteronomy or domination.
Chapter 14 covers the provision on dispute settlement and consultations in the Agreement on Safeguards. This provision follows the general dispute settlement rules and procedures contained in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994. It is technically the legal basis for the handling of disputes on the application of the Agreement on Safeguards. Chapter 14 explains how the dispute settlement process operates at its different stages and the usual issues that arise in the conduct of safeguard disputes. The chapter also provides statistics on the performance of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in respect of safeguard investigations and safeguard measures. It provides practical considerations derived from the experience of the author as an active litigant in dispute settlement proceedings.