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Edited by
William J. Brady, University of Virginia,Mark R. Sochor, University of Virginia,Paul E. Pepe, Metropolitan EMS Medical Directors Global Alliance, Florida,John C. Maino II, Michigan International Speedway, Brooklyn,K. Sophia Dyer, Boston University Chobanian and Avedisian School of Medicine, Massachusetts
Civil unrest or terrorism at mass gathering events can erupt with significant violence and multiple casualties. These are high-risk situations, not only because of physical casualties, but also because of ethical, political and psychological sequelae. Beyond specialized planning, multi-agency drills and proficient tactical medicine training, medical teams should co-create secured access and egress, alternative medical responses and rapidly-adapting coordination and secure communications with other agencies. Civil protests can escalate, especially when extremist groups infiltrate them. Multi-site violence and assaults can evolve, particularly in terroristic attacks. Key lessons include unrelenting vigilance until all participants have left the mass gathering scene in its entirety. Violence (bombs, shootings, vehicle attacks) will often erupt when mass gatherings are dispersing and considered over. Terrorists can also purposely target medical personnel or incite one event (fire, bomb, shooting) to create crushing stampedes or to herd crowds into more vulnerable areas where they can be further attacked more directly with other modern weapons. Terrorists often attack from elevated perches or generate “protracted suicide” incidents while holding hostages, including many severely-wounded. The resulting frustration, anger and guilt commonly can consume medical rescuers when beholding slaughtered innocents or simply because they were (appropriately) staged during containment of on-going violence.
Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, concerns have been raised regarding the threat of a radiological terrorist weapon. Although the probability of the employment of a nuclear device is remote, the potential of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb” is of concern. While it is unlikely that such a device would produce massive numbers of casualties, it is far more likely that it would result in pub- lic panic and perhaps even disable the local healthcare system. The utility of surveillance with radiation detectors in the healthcare setting has not been fully evaluated.
Objective:
The objective of this study was to characterize the prevalence of radioactive sources entering an urban emergency department (ED).
Methods:
A retrospective review of data obtained from a radiation detector positioned to detect radioactive people entering an ED of an urban academic hospital that serves 45,000 patients/year was performed. Graphical outputs of radioactivity were recorded in Microsoft ExcelTM (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, US) spreadsheets in microREM/hour. Data were collected continuous-ly from 22 December 2003 to 22 January 2004. An event was defined as any elevation in radiation levels >95% confidence interval from the mean level of background radiation over 72 hours (h).
Results:
A total of 215 events were observed over a 28-day period, with a mean value of 7.7 events/day, and a maximum of 15 events/day. During the 28-day period, the baseline mean level of background radiation was 2–4 microREM/h. Readings ranged from 2,148.28–17,292.25 microREM/h with a maximum sustained detector exposure of 684.37 microREM. Distinct signal patterns were seen at both detectors including tonic, phasic, dual, and short duration spikes.
Conclusion:
The number of radioactive signals detected from persons entering the ED was much higher than expected. While the vast majority of these signals pose no health threat, they may make routine screening for a radiological terrorist event difficult.Further study is needed to determine this correlation.
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