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Prevalence of Radioactive Signals from Surveillance of an Emergency Department

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 June 2012

Frank Guyette ,
Joe Suyama ,
Jerry Rosen  and
Michael Allswede
Frank Guyette
Affiliation:
Department of Emergency Medicine, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
Joe Suyama*
Affiliation:
Department of Emergency Medicine, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
Jerry Rosen
Affiliation:
Environmental and Occupational Health, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Presbyterian Hospital, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
Michael Allswede
Affiliation:
Department of Emergency Medicine, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
*
Joe Suyama, MD Department of Emergency Medicine University of Pittsburgh, 230 Mckee Place Suite 500, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA E-mail: suyamaj@upmc.edu
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Abstract

Introduction:

Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, concerns have been raised regarding the threat of a radiological terrorist weapon. Although the probability of the employment of a nuclear device is remote, the potential of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb” is of concern. While it is unlikely that such a device would produce massive numbers of casualties, it is far more likely that it would result in pub- lic panic and perhaps even disable the local healthcare system. The utility of surveillance with radiation detectors in the healthcare setting has not been fully evaluated.

Objective:

The objective of this study was to characterize the prevalence of radioactive sources entering an urban emergency department (ED).

Methods:

A retrospective review of data obtained from a radiation detector positioned to detect radioactive people entering an ED of an urban academic hospital that serves 45,000 patients/year was performed. Graphical outputs of radioactivity were recorded in Microsoft ExcelTM (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, US) spreadsheets in microREM/hour. Data were collected continuous-ly from 22 December 2003 to 22 January 2004. An event was defined as any elevation in radiation levels >95% confidence interval from the mean level of background radiation over 72 hours (h).

Results:

A total of 215 events were observed over a 28-day period, with a mean value of 7.7 events/day, and a maximum of 15 events/day. During the 28-day period, the baseline mean level of background radiation was 2–4 microREM/h. Readings ranged from 2,148.28–17,292.25 microREM/h with a maximum sustained detector exposure of 684.37 microREM. Distinct signal patterns were seen at both detectors including tonic, phasic, dual, and short duration spikes.

Conclusion:

The number of radioactive signals detected from persons entering the ED was much higher than expected. While the vast majority of these signals pose no health threat, they may make routine screening for a radiological terrorist event difficult.Further study is needed to determine this correlation.

Keywords

contaminationdetectordirty bombemergency departmentradiationweapons of mass destruction
Type
Brief Report
Information
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine , Volume 21 , Issue 4 , August 2006 , pp. 276 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine 2006

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