This paper tests the pollution emissions and institutional quality nexus in Africa. Specifically, we analyze the effect of the political regime and the quality of political governance on CO2 emissions. To control for endogeneity, we apply the system generalized method of moments on a dynamic panel of African countries over the period 1996–2020. The key finding suggests that better institutions have a negative and significant effect on pollution in Africa. The findings also validate the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis. Moreover, the results support the pollution haven hypothesis. Finally, if digitalization significantly curbs pollution, then industrialization, natural resources, as well as the intensive use of energy, are considered as positive predictors. All the sensitivity and robustness tests globally validate the strength of the negative association between the good quality of institutions and the level of polluting emissions in Africa. The results call for some policy recommendations in environmental regulation for African economies.

This paper highlights scholarly neglect of political legitimacy, the idea of a state's use of power in ways acceptable to its citizens. We argue that political legitimacy affects a state's ability to formulate and implement its policies, thus affecting governance. Our paper provides the first empirical evidence of the positive relationship between political legitimacy and governance. We combine novel cross-sectional data on political legitimacy and several governance indicators from 66 countries. Our results show that a one-standard-deviation increase in the legitimacy score increases the rule of law indicator by about one-third standard deviation. These results are robust across OLS, an instrumental variable method, and several other governance indicators. Moreover, our results reveal that in the presence of greater trust, political legitimacy has an enhanced impact on governance.

The part played by unemployment in the rise to power of Hitler weighed on the minds of leaders in Western democracies. There was a determination to create a world in which large-scale unemployment was abnormal and at worst only a temporary phenomenon. The war had shown that this was possible in a community united to pursue a common goal and the aim was to create such a community in a world free from the horrors of war, by creating communities in which the welfare of every person was important. Australia was remarkably successful in achieving this for 30 years. Its success depended on governments responding to any sustained increase in unemployment by undertaking large increases in public sector expenditure supported by accommodating monetary policy and tax cuts if desirable. In bad times as well as good, there was a determination to ensure that both the incomes and prices paid for necessities by the less well-off did not force anyone to live in poverty. The biggest obstacle to achieving this today is the growth of neoliberalism with its emphasis on ‘freedom’ or giving individuals the ability to act as they please with minimal constraints and an ideological commitment to small government.

This essay examines a significant event in Australia’s economic and labour relations history in which an industrial relations court acted against government policy but in line with the advice of professional economists to impose a general wage reduction. This determination, unique during the period of central wage fixation, was made as the country fell into deep depression in 1930–1931. Arguments that a reduction in purchasing power would exacerbate the depression did not prevail over expert economic advice that wage reduction would lessen the structural consequences of reduced rural export income. The Court determined that the loss of real national income had to be accommodated without a wider package of measures such as exchange rate depreciation or expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. The impressive endeavours of the Court to understand and respond to a difficult economic reality represented a significant elevation of the status of wages policy in macroeconomic management – one that was to last for 60 years.

Does inequality affect outcomes? To answer, we use the microcosm of Olympic competitions by asking whether a country's level of inequality diminishes its performance. If it does, is it conditional on institutional factors? We argue that the ability of economically free societies to win medals will not be affected by inequality. In these societies, institutions generate incentives to invest in the talents of individuals at the bottom of the income distribution (potential athletes otherwise constrained in the ability to expend resources on training). These effects mitigate those of inequality. The incentives that promote investments in skills across the income distribution are weaker in unfree societies and they cannot mitigate the effects of inequality. Using the Olympics of 2016 in combination with the Economic Freedom data, we find that inequality only matters in determining medal numbers for unfree countries. We link these results to inequality and its effects on economic outcomes.

Corruption is widely believed to have an adverse effect on the economic performance of a country. However, many East-and-Southeast-Asian countries either achieved or currently are achieving impressively rapid economic growth despite widespread corruption – the so-called East-Asian-Paradox. A common feature of these countries was that they were autocracies. We re-examine the corruption-growth relationship, in light of the East-Asian-Paradox. We examine the role of political regimes, in mediating corruption–growth relationship using panel data over 100 countries for the period 1984–2016. We find clear evidence that corruption–growth relationship differs by the type of political regime, and the growth-enhancing effect of corruption is more likely in autocracies than in democracies. The marginal effect analysis shows that in strongly autocratic countries, higher corruption may lead to significantly higher growth, while this is not the case in democracies. Alternatively, democracy is not good for growth if there is a high level of perceived corruption. We provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism by which corruption is growth-enhancing in autocracies is through the perceived credibility of the commitment of ruling political elites to economic freedom, thereby providing confidence to the firms to invest, leading to long-term growth.

This paper examines the outcomes for changes introduced by the UK Coalition government in 2010. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) is generally regarded as a success, and should become a permanent part of fiscal policymaking. The form of the primary fiscal mandate, involving a five-year rolling target, appears to be a sensible way to shape fiscal decisions when monetary policy is able to stabilise the economy. Unfortunately it was introduced, along with a five-year programme of severe fiscal consolidation (austerity), while the economy was in a liquidity trap. The OBR estimates austerity reduced GDP growth by 1 per cent in both 2010–11 and 2011–12, and monetary policy was unable to offset this. For the Liberal Democrats a misreading of the Eurozone crisis may have been responsible for this mistake, but for the Conservatives this mistake appears to derive from an unconventional view that the liquidity trap is unimportant.

This paper presents a multidimensional indicator of institutional quality in Argentina for the period 1862-2008. Initially, it describes a set of variables that aim to measure issues related to the legal framework prevailing in Argentina and its implementation, such as changes in the Constitution and the provincial Constitutions, declarations of state of siege and federal interventions, freedom of press, central bank independence. The indicator is then constructed through the principal component analysis.

The results suggest that periods of high institutional quality in Argentina coincided with the most expansion and relative progress. In other words, poor institutional quality would not only be reflected in lower growth rates but also compromises the ability to follow those countries with the best performace.

The lack of fiscal discipline is a natural and pervasive implication of the perceived separation between the benefits from public spending and the taxes that individuals and interest groups receive and pay, respectively. The implication is that budget preparation, decision and execution must be constrained. The challenge is that the policymakers who need to be constrained are those who must decide the constraints. Two broad classes of solutions are possible: institutions that shape the budgetary process and quantitative rules that set limits. The mounting experience with both institutions and rules is disappointing, for reasons that are often complementary. Examining the reasons for this state of affairs, this article argues that institutions and rules ought to be combined and associated with advisory fiscal councils.