We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
A proof of a theorem can be said to be pure if it draws only on what is 'close' or 'intrinsic' to that theorem. In this Element we will investigate the apparent preference for pure proofs that has persisted in mathematics since antiquity, alongside a competing preference for impurity. In Section 1, we present two examples of purity, from geometry and number theory. In Section 2, we give a brief history of purity in mathematics. In Section 3, we discuss several different types of purity, based on different measures of distance between theorem and proof. In Section 4 we discuss reasons for preferring pure proofs, for the varieties of purity constraints presented in Section 3. In Section 5 we conclude by reflecting briefly on purity as a preference for the local and how issues of translation intersect with the considerations we have raised throughout this work.
In this Introduction, I distinguish between two a posteriori views with respect to mathematical knowledge. According to the epistemological a posteriori position, mathematical knowledge is acquired empirically. According to the methodological a posteriori approach, empirical research is important for understanding what mathematical knowledge is like. I emphasise the need for the latter in the epistemology of arithmetic, while also accepting the importance of a priori methodology. However, empirical researchers and philosophers of mathematics do not share a common conceptual framework, which makes successful interdisciplinary research difficult. After pointing out some of the key problems, I provide a coherent conceptual framework and consistent terminology.
In Chapter 8, I deal with the threat that the present account strips arithmetical knowledge of all the important characteristics traditionally associated with it: apriority, objectivity, necessity and universality. I argue that apriority can be saved in the strong sense of arithmetical knowledge being contextually a priori in the context set by our cognitive and physical capacities. Objectivity can be saved in the sense of maximal inter-subjectivity, while necessity can be saved in the sense of arithmetical theorems being true in all possible worlds where cognitive agents with proto-arithmetical abilities have developed. Finally, universality of arithmetical truths is saved through arithmetic being universally applicable and shared by all members of cultures that develop arithmetic based on proto-arithmetical abilities.
This Element looks at the contemporary debate on the nature of mathematical rigour and informal proofs as found in mathematical practice. The central argument is for rigour pluralism: that multiple different models of informal proof are good at accounting for different features and functions of the concept of rigour. To illustrate this pluralism, the Element surveys some of the main options in the literature: the 'standard view' that rigour is just formal, logical rigour; the models of proofs as arguments and dialogues; the recipe model of proofs as guiding actions and activities; and the idea of mathematical rigour as an intellectual virtue. The strengths and weaknesses of each are assessed, thereby providing an accessible and empirically-informed introduction to the key issues and ideas found in the current discussion.
A proof ${\cal P}$ of a theorem T is transferable when it's possible for a typical expert to become convinced of T solely on the basis of their prior knowledge and the information contained in ${\cal P}$. Easwaran has argued that transferability is a constraint on acceptable proof. Meanwhile, a proof ${\cal P}$ is fixable when it's possible for other experts to correct any mistakes ${\cal P}$ contains without having to develop significant new mathematics. Habgood-Coote and Tanswell have observed that some acceptable proofs are both fixable and in need of fixing, in the sense that they contain non-trivial mistakes. The claim that acceptable proofs must be transferable seems quite plausible. The claim that some acceptable proofs need fixing seems plausible too. Unfortunately, these attractive suggestions stand in tension with one another. I argue that the transferability requirement is the problem. Acceptable proofs need to only satisfy a weaker requirement I call “corrigibility.” I explain why, despite appearances, the corrigibility standard is preferable to stricter alternatives.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.