When the Charter of Fundamental Rights was published in 2000, it was the first time that an international human rights instrument had recognised the freedom to conduct a business. To understand how conducting a business came to occupy the status of a fundamental right, I undertake an examination of the drafting process of Article 16 in Section 2. Early drafts protected the freedom to pursue an occupation, before the freedom to conduct a business eventually became a freestanding entitlement. This was thanks to the influence of Convention members associated with the European People’s Party who were instrumental in ensuring Article 16 was added to the draft Charter. In Section 3, I critically assess the claim contained in the Explanations to the Charter that Article 16 was simply a codification of pre-existing entitlements deriving from the case law of the Court of Justice. In Section 4, I examine the impact of Article 16 Many of the limitations that constrain the scope of Article 16 have been weakened, or have not proved to be the limitations that were originally envisaged. The Court of Justice’s defence of select areas, such as consumer protection, has shielded the deregulatory potential of Article 16 from view. Yet Article 16 has had a real and damaging impact on workers’ rights across the Union. Protecting the freedom to conduct a business in Article 16 means that a remarkably broad range of actions taken in the course of running a business are now accepted as the exercise of a fundamental right.

Pluralism is a defining feature of European human rights law and of the European constitution. Contestability and conditional deference determine how participating states eventually calibrate their relation to international and supranational authority. This structure gives rise to differences of opinion that reverberate throughout a public sphere that is composed of a growing number of scholars. They increasingly rely on digital media to exchange their ideas. A major role has come to be played by blogs such as the Verfassungsblog. Since its inception, its focus has rested on defending the values of constitutionalism vis-à-vis ‘backsliding’ Member States. The constitutional culture that results from this is somewhat reminiscent of Germany during the period of the Weimar Republic (1919–1933). While the rise of authoritarianism is a major issue, public law scholarship appears to become increasingly partisan. As European constitutional law emerges against the backdrop of an expanding public sphere, scholarly interventions are drawn into the vortex of politics. Unsurprisingly, scholarship begins to face up to its politicisation by reflecting on its proper task.

This work aims to investigate the stance of the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) on ECHR and CFREU and their respective Courts, ECtHR and CJEU. The aim is to verify if the attitude of the ItCC could be described in terms of openness or closedness, understanding openness as an effort to practise loyal cooperation through procedural means and, substantively, as greater attention for the norms of supranational orders, and closedness as the setting aside of all forms of procedural ties with the supranational Courts and the voluntary dissociation from their outcome, with the purpose of prioritising domestic constitutional provisions. To conduct the analysis, the article refers to the theory of interlegality, questioning whether ItCC, operating ‘on the borders between several normative orders’, has a broader accountability to these different orders. The first part of the paper is devoted to some elements drawn from the case law indicating openness, such as the language use by the ItCC, the procedures, the legal reasoning, and the effects of judgements. Attention is given to the contextual reference to the recognition norms of both the Italian Constitution and European Union (EU) Treaties and to the increasing use of preliminary rulings to the CJEU. The second part of the paper discusses a substantive criterion created by the ItCC, the ‘greatest extension of guarantees’, demonstrating that it does not refer to the level of protection of individual rights, but to the balance of the entire constitutional system. Our conclusion is that the ItCC trends concerning supranational rights express a deferent and operational, but vigilant cooperation, retaining a margin to ensure the vitality of the domestic Constitution.

Now that the EU Constitution has been adopted, one might be inclined to think that the debate on the position of human rights in the legal order of the European Union has come to an end. For more than 25 years academics and politicians have discussed the desirability of EC/EU accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and have argued for or against a separate bill of fundamental rights. That is all over now: Article I-7 of the Constitution provides for Union accession to the European Convention, whereas part II incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

It would seem, therefore, that a solid framework for the protection of human rights in the EU legal order has been put in place. The rest will be a matter of implementation: taking fundamental rights into account when drafting and executing European legislation; invoking these rights before the Court of Justice; lodging complaints with the European Court of Human Rights when the EU institutions, despite everything, failed to secure these rights. All very important, albeit that some may find the daily application of human rights not as sexy as the large constitutional questions of the past.

So is this the ‘end of history’ for human rights? Quite the opposite. The best is yet to come!

While the Union's powers and responsibilities are ever on the increase and co-operation deepens as the Union begins to take positions more easily in the areas of freedom, security, justice and defense, it is seeking to keep the Member States and the Union together via the duties of loyalty. These are spelled out in general terms in Article I-5, and in more specific terms in specific contexts, such as those of the Common Foreign and Security Policy [Article I-15(2)]. Article I-5 is entitled ‘Relations between the Union and the Member States’, but it is also central to the relations between the Member States themselves in terms, for example, of the exercise of their voting rights in the Council of Ministers. The Article consolidates provisions that are currently scattered over various Treaties but not without adding some novelties.

Both the EU- and the EC-Treaties refer in prominent places to the establishment of economic and monetary union (Articles 2 EU and EC). This union is mentioned as one of the principal means of achieving the Union's and the Community's economic and social objectives. Such a prominent place is not allotted it in the Constitution. In its effort to separate the basic provisions from the other provisions in the treaties, the Convention decided to retain only the European Union's objectives in the actual constitutional part. The concrete activities pertaining to the economic and monetary union, as well as its ‘guiding principles’ of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments were relegated to Part III that deals with the Union's policies.

In a text which claims constitutional rank the principle of citizenship, in all meanings of the term, is fundamental. If a treaty has as its first reference the State, a constitution naturally has as a reference also the citizen. Indeed in the European Constitution provisions abound referring to the citizen. In Part I they are to be found in Titles II and VI; in Part II there is the whole Title V and in Part III there is Title II. As citizenship is everywhere in the Draft, this would deserve it the rank of Constitution that it claims.

This first impression, however, is not supported by reading the different actual provisions in the Draft Constitution concerning citizenship. They fall short on three grounds.

Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the principle of subsidiarity is to govern the exercise of powers between the European Community and the Member States in areas that do not fall within the exclusive competence of the Community. According to the treaty provision, the principle means that the Community can only take action if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. A similar provision is now part of the draft ‘European Constitution’ 2003; it merely adds that Member State action can be taken at the national, the regional and the local level. Even without this useless supplement, the definition of subsidiarity looks fairly complicated.

As it is obviously impossible for the modern ‘demos’ to assemble in order to take political decisions, democratic representation is an inevitable tool in large democracies. Representatives have to stand for and to act for the people as a whole. Accordingly, the principle of representative or parliamentary democracy is a fundamental constitutional principle shared by all the Member States of the Union. Democracy doubtlessly works on the national level; the Member States' decisional powers, however, are fading with the constant transfer of competences towards the European level. This leads to a system of European ‘multi-level governance’ with wide consequences for the linkage between the represented peoples of the Member States and their representatives on both national and European levels.

A powerful development by the European Constitution exists in the rationalisation of the instruments through which the Union may exercise the competences conferred upon it. This has constituted a particularly sensitive issue for the Convention. Under the EC and EU Treaties, the Union uses no less than 15 different instruments, some having the same appellation but entailing different legal effects, others being rarely used. This diversity has contributed to the development of an obscure patchwork of norms with ill-defined scope, legal effects and institutional origin. That situation consequently limits democratic control over governance at the European level.

Between 11 March and 29 October 2004, between Madrid and Rome, the European Constitution has turned from an uncertain possibility into a certain (albeit not full) reality. The day of the Madrid train bombs killing 190 and wounding 1500 is as inseparable from the history of the Constitution as the date of its signature, 29 October. Those events of 11 March (and the ensuing government blunders) moved the Spanish people to end the reign of Aznar's Popular Party. This in turn unblocked the Constitution talks that had got gripped, among other things, due to Spanish intransigence in December.

In several ways the particular sequence or succession of events from 11 March to 29 October can also be seen as symbolic for this particular European Constitution. Let us select three angles: an historic, a formal and a substantive one.

The provision relating to the adoption, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe is probably one of the most difficult ones, both in legal and political terms. It is supposed to define the legal nature and quality of the entire EU process in its present and future phase. There is an inherent ambiguity about the legal nature of the treaty, which is already apparent in the title, and there are profound political implications as well. Is the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe a treaty or a constitution? Can it be both or neither? These are hard questions indeed.

While the Nice Treaty cast a shadow over the Convention's work on the institutions and led to the project's first failure in the Brussels Summit, the war in Iraq cast shadows over the common foreign and security agenda. On the one hand, it proved the extent to which Europe is divided over substantive positions and over the means to act, particularly the resort to war. On the other hand, there is an increased popular sense that Europe should play a role (reflected in Eurobarometer polls, including one especially commissioned by Giscard). Article I-40 of the Draft Constitution on defence reflects that ambition. It remains to be seen whether this facilitates Europe to unite when it comes to giving foreign policy teeth in the form of a real and effective common ‘defence’ policy.

As with most other provisions of the Constitution, Article I-40 in the main builds on and consolidates the texts as we already have them in the existing Treaties, but at the same time, it innovates.

The European citizens' initiative (ECI) is a new device of participatory democracy, which has its own characteristics, unknown to date at any level of national or trans-national government. It is designed to allow the citizens to take an active role within the law-making process of the EU. The specific features of this process affect the legal nature as well as the functioning of the new participatory device. Both will depend strongly on the European law, which shall determine the procedures and conditions required for the ECI.

The challenges for the system of judicial protection of the EU spring from two main developments: first, the enlargement of the EU, which inevitably affects all institutions of the Union, most notably their organisational structure and modus operandi, second, the deepening and widening of the areas falling within the scope of competences of the EU. Article I-28 Draft Constitution states that the Court of Justice of the EU shall include the ECJ, the High Court and specialised courts. These courts, together with the national courts of all levels, constitute the intricate nexus offering judicial protection in the EU. The issues that dominated debates on the reform of the system of judicial protection varied from the amendment of Article 230.4 EC on the locus standi of applicants, to the impact of the incorporation of the Charter of Human Rights and to the competences of the ECJ in the areas of the second and third pillar. They all relate to the deepening and widening of the Union through this Draft Constitution.

The inter-institutional balance of power within the EU is central to the new constitutional order. It is not therefore surprising that this topic, which is dealt with in Title IV of Part 1 of the Constitution, was contentious. This was evident in the process employed at the Convention. The Convention's general three-stage methodology of listening, examination, and proposal was not applied to the deliberations about institutions. There was no Working Group. The Convention discussions about institutions only began formally in January 2003. The Praesidium submitted its proposals to the Convention in April 2003. Full discussion of the draft articles concerned with institutions only occurred in the plenary session on 15-16 May 2003. There was no second reading in plenary about these articles. The Praesidium opted instead for consultations with the four constituent groups, governments, MEPs, National MPs, and the Commission, which took place on 4 June 2003. Formal text of the revised articles on the institutions only became available on 10 June, a mere three days before the concluding session on 13 June.

This short piece cannot deal in detail with the many issues concerning the institutional provisions of the Constitutional Treaty. It is designed to be a brief guide to the relevant issues

In federal systems public authority is established by the people and exercised for the people at two levels. The treaties establishing the European Union may be conceptualised as the constitution of a supranational public authority, part of a federal system. And what the European Convention has submitted to the European Council to agree upon is an attempt to give this constitution a more coherent, more complete and more appealing form. The new ‘Constitution for Europe’ will be concluded, formally, by an international treaty. But governments and national parliaments will do this on behalf of the citizens of the Union, and insofar as national Constitutions provide for a referendum, the citizens will directly be involved. This Constitution will, therefore, like national constitutions, draw its legitimacy from the people, citizens of the polity, through their constitutional representatives. Legitimacy obtained is similar to that sought for a regular treaty but specific due to the contents and the explicit constitutional claim of the instrument.

One of the legal cornerstones of ‘formal federalism’ is the capacity of any rule of EC Law to override any rule, including those of constitutional rank, of the Member States. The primacy doctrine has been introduced by the Court of Justice in Costa v. ENEL (1964). It can be read in two ways. In the first place it may be held to imply the supremacy of Community law, i.e., the idea that Community law has a higher rank than even the national constitutions and is hierarchically superior to it, as the Court itself sometimes has expressed it (Simmenthal, 1978). This may be called the existential reading. Alternatively, there is a more modest interpretation implying mere practical priority or precedence, as in traffic rules. For this practical interpretation there are equally arguments to be found in the Court's case-law: the aims of the EC-treaty cannot be accomplished if domestic law were to prevail over Community law.

Since the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the ‘democratic deficit’ is used as a term to describe the democratic deficiencies of the European integration process. What is the influence of the citizens on the process of governmental and constitutional decision-making? Due to the distance between the powers of the Community and the nation state, the power of the executive over parliamentary bodies and the fact that a lot of decision-making takes place behind closed doors, greater democracy and transparency is needed.

It is a popular misunderstanding that European citizens' lack of interest in the European Union has to do with the powers of the European Parliament. These powers have been constantly strengthened over the years, but that did not enhance voters' interest in European affairs. Even with the granting of European citizenship and the introduction of the euro, voters did not get interested, as the low turnout at the elections of members of the European Parliament on June 2004 (less than 45 %) attests. These elections even saw the rise of anti-European parties in several Member States, like the Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom. These elections, however, dealt more with national issues and the confidence in national governments than with European issues.