No cooperative scheme in EU law has displayed bigger tensions between mutual trust and fundamental rights protection than the EAW system. Despite the requirement developed by the CJEU for national courts to trust each other and recognise each other’s arrest warrants, the reality on the ground has shown high levels of distrust between national courts regarding Member States’ alignment with core EU values. In this contribution, we analyze how the CJEU has managed such tensions in the EAW system. To that effect, we first put the Court’s EAW case law into context by examining the broader language of mutual trust used by the Court in other fields of EU law. In doing so, we point out how the Court has espoused different levels of lawful distrust to be exercised in different circumstances under the scope of application of mutual trust. Given that broader context, it is contradictory for the Court to mainly view mutual trust as a requirement rather than a reality in need of permanent and continuing justification between national authorities. The latter conception of mutual trust is more apt to be the basis of EU horizontal cooperation, which must be value-based and sincere according to the Treaties. Therefore, we propose a bidimensional account of mutual trust as a legal principle, one that accommodates both trust and distrust as tools for managing the uncertainty and dynamic nature of trust-based cooperation. Finally, we explore how such account of mutual (dis)trust can be concretised by the Court and other political institutions.

The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) devices, as well as the Internet of Things phenomenon itself, are gaining a new group of customers every day, for whom it is almost a matter of course to use a wide range of devices, such as Internet-connected complex life support equipment or “smart” watches monitoring basic life parameters. With the growing popularity of such devices, however, questions about the safety of their users begin to arise, because almost in proportion to the number of benefits associated with the use of these products, the number of risks associated with them increases – eg improper functioning of Internet-connected life support equipment, in addition to threatening the life or health of its user, may affect the physical security of the product itself, the security of both personal and technical (eg non-personal) data processed by the specific product, or finally the cyber-security of the product. While the issues related to the protection of personal data and privacy, in general, have been discussed many times by the doctrine, the issues related to the protection of users of these devices under consumer law have not been considered much.

In this context, the question arises whether the current legal regulations provide an adequate and sufficient level of protection for IoMT users. In particular, whether the average IoMT user can actually exercise their rights under the provisions of consumer law and whether the protection afforded to him – both in terms of the scope of their rights and the scope of obligations and liability of manufacturers and suppliers of these devices – is not only illusory? In order to answer the above questions, the author will evaluate the prevailing market practices – still focused around the doctrine of “caveat emptor” or “let the buyer beware” – and compare them with these regulations and juxtapose them with relevant legal regulations. However, given the lack of geographical borders in the field of cyber security and privacy, the author will not only analyse EU cyber security legislation, but also US legislation in a comparative legal analysis. The choice of jurisdictions to be compared is also related to the size and importance of both the US and the EU for the global IoMT market. It should be noted that the United States has a dominant position in the IoMT, while the European Union is estimated to have the second largest IoMT market globally. At the same time, however, there are differences in legal systems between the two economic areas. An analysis carried out in this way will make it possible not only to answer the question posed above, but also to possibly identify those areas of regulation that need to be changed or adapted to the realities of IoMT.

This article offers a reconstruction and assessment of the emerging rebellion of European constitutional courts against the exceptionless supremacy of European Union (EU) law. It presents the ontological theories of supremacy and how the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) overcame the first two major challenges of its history: the existential challenge of canonizing the general doctrine of supremacy and the Solange challenge of national fundamental rights. It provides an account of the emerging ultra vires challenge, including its root cause and evolvement, and provides an assessment and sets out proposals. The article demonstrates that the crux of the matter is not the primacy of EU law but the interpretive primacy of the CJEU. It argues that the rebellion was triggered by the perception that the CJEU case law features a declining normative and an increasing policy character. The debate about the CJEU's evolutionary interpretation, in a certain sense, parallels US constitutional law's debate between originalism and the living constitution, with the difference that the EU is a pluralist legal order.

This article offers a reconstruction of how the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) justifies the territorial scope of application of EU law. Scholarship on this issue tends to advocate for an expansive projection of EU norms in the pursuit of global values, subject to the external limits of public international law. This article will develop a critique of this approach by pointing to its underlying assumptions as to the territorial dimension of the EU's rule, the insoluble practical issues that it leads to, and the need to consider differently the EU's spatial identity and relation to the wider world. It will also be argued that, in fact, other case law sometimes already reflects an alternative vision, by imagining the EU implicitly, not as a ‘global actor’ promoting universal values, but as a concretely situated and spatially bounded community. It will be shown that this is so with the methodological help of private international law, and in particular three doctrines that are traditional to this discipline—the localisation of cross-border relations, international imperativeness, and the public policy exception. This will ultimately allow for a more sophisticated understanding of the EU's territory to emerge—irreducible to the physical coordinates of its acts of intervention, or the mere sum of the physical spaces under Member State sovereignty, but as a distinct space of social relations, informed and delineated by the particular axiology and structure of the EU legal system.

This symposium analyses European Union (EU) law as a means for both perpetuating commodification processes and potentially mitigating their consequences. This issue framing essay traces the evolutionary trajectory of commodification as a conceptual framework in contemporary intellectual debates, zeroing in on the most prominent theoretical frameworks underpinning its usage. It then relates the evolution of these debates more concretely to the context of the EU as a major institutional forum for the concept’s actualisation. Lastly, it connects these narratives to current conversations on the law’s role in constituting capitalism and consolidating its attendant structural inequalities. In so doing, it also canvasses the contributions that make up this symposium, showing how each enhances the discussion of commodification in the EU context.

Reflexive sociology can contribute to a more holistic understanding of the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU/Court) as a relational actor. This article draws on the Bourdieusian concept of (legal) field as an analytical framework to trace the power relations between the Court and its interlocutors. The analysis develops around four distinct conceptualisations of the Court as a legal field, ranging from its institutional architecture to the three mainstream judicial routes for a case to reach its docket (preliminary reference procedure, action for annulment and infringement procedure). These showcase the varied interactions among the different actors that either shape the Court as an institution or engage with it in the course of its adjudicative function. According to field theory, these interactions take the form of power struggles between the actors comprising a legal field in order to take control of the determination of the law. The actors of a legal field enjoy different positions that formulate their objective relations, and which are contingent on their disposition and capital. Each of the conceptualisations of the Court as a legal field in this article points to distinct power struggles and relations among a similar set of actors. Consequently, using field theory can be a very useful tool to contextualise the role of the Court and to systematically study its judgments, modus operandi and position in the European legal field under a reflexive lens that accentuates the significance of social space and power relations, and pushes for socio-legal and empirical insights.

This article explores the meaning of solidarity in European Union (EU) law in the context of the energy sector and the ongoing energy crisis. Energy provides a powerful and topical sectoral example of the fundamental role and diverse functions of solidarity in EU law. In its OPAL ruling in 2021, the Court of Justice of the EU established that energy solidarity constitutes a legally binding principle of EU energy law that should inform EU institutions and the Member States in their energy decisions. This article adds to legal scholarship on solidarity in three ways. First, it further develops the understanding of the ambiguous solidarity concept in EU law through the lens of the energy sector. Secondly, it contributes to the emerging body of energy law scholarship that seeks to advance the discipline of energy law by focusing on its doctrine rather than on its substantive developments. Finally, it provides a timely and novel analysis of the EU's recent emergency responses to address the acute energy crisis from the point of view of solidarity.

The wish from 24 February 2022 onwards to help Ukraine defend against Russian aggression has led to the provision of unprecedented lethal European Union (EU) military assistance. As the ‘taboo’ of supplying lethal assistance into non-EU conflicts is swept aside, what is the role of international arms control law? The legal requirements of the EU Common Position on arms exports and the Arms Trade Treaty compel EU Member States to assess various short- and long-term risks associated with arms exports. But it is unclear how arms control norms are being taken into account by the EU Council in its rapidly evolving role as a peacemaker.

The standards that are being used to shape EU decision-making on Ukraine matter both for their precedent-setting as reflecting the trajectory of EU normative power, as well as on the long-term blowbacks of proliferation on illicit arms trafficking. While from the EU Council, there has been limited public articulation of these risks, greater consideration thereof would serve as a reminder of the reality of post-conflict arms proliferation, ie. illicit arms trafficking of weapons leached from the conflict, and their subsequent misuse by undesirable actors. Geostrategic precedent is being set, with implications that extend far beyond Ukraine, including to other conflicts where the EU is already intervening. The EU’s delivering of massive lethal military assistance alters also the reflexive perception of its institutions.

This article puts forward a cohesive narrative to explain the contribution of European social policy to the judicial making of Europe. By making a case for the inclusion of social policy as part of the discourse on the constitutional practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union, together with focusing on a socio-legal deconstruction of four seminal social policy judgments of the Court (Defrenne II, Von Colson, Harz and Francovich), the article undertakes a systematic approach to tracing the contribution of the field, and more specifically of its labour and non-discrimination law strands. To formulate its socio-legal analysis, the article adopts an explanatory framework, which draws on Bourdieu’s concepts of capital and field, the theory of legal mobilisation and Moscovici’s minority social influence, and which is applied to the selected judgments as a case-study. The framework enables the analysis to shed light on the dynamics between stakeholders in the social dimension of the European legal field and to persuasively showcase how social policy case-law, despite its sui generis dynamics, merits to have a place in the conversations surrounding the transformation of Europe.

The Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Slovenia v. Croatia marks the anticlimax of a long-running territorial dispute. It is also only the sixth time the CJEU has issued a judgment in a case instituted by one European Union member against another. Among these cases, it is the first to consider an arbitral award in a dispute between members, the first to consider a boundary dispute between members, and the first to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court found that it cannot rule on alleged infringements of European Union law when these arise from the breach of a treaty falling outside of the Union's subject-matter competence. Most directly, the Judgment may pose significant consequences for European Union internal affairs in the near term, such as Croatia's ambitions to join the Schengen Area and the Eurozone. More broadly, several of the Court's findings will be relevant beyond the European legal order, particular those concerning the meaning and effect of “ancillary” legal questions, and the bilateral or multilateral character of a dispute involving admission to an international organization.

The Willi Steiner Memorial Lecture 2019 was delivered at the British and Irish Association of Law Librarians’ Annual Conference by Brenda Hale, Baroness Hale of Richmond, DBE,1 the President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Lady Hale reflected upon some of the major changes in the law and access to justice since she was an undergraduate at the University of Cambridge and Willi Steiner was Law Librarian at the Squire Law Library. Her lecture coincided with BIALL's fiftieth anniversary year and focused on five significant developments: the explosion of judicial review of administrative action, the arrival of EU law, the growth of international human rights law, the recognition of gender and other equality, and devolution and the evolution of a new constitutional role for the courts.