This paper examines the dependence structure and risk spillovers between oil prices and exchange rates in both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Using a flexible dependence switching copula model, we analyze both positive and negative dependence and transitions between the dependence regimes. Additionally, we investigate the directional risk spillovers between oil and currency markets in both their downsides and upsides. Based on empirical data from 1999 to 2024 for major oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, we find that oil price-currency dependence is predominantly positive for oil-exporting countries, with infrequent transitions, but mainly negative for oil-importing countries, with frequent transitions between the two dependence regimes. These transitions often occur around crisis or war times. Furthermore, we observe that during downturns in the oil market, tail dependence between oil prices and currencies becomes more pronounced than during upturns. Our results indicate the presence of risk spillovers between oil and currency markets, with the downside spillover effects outweighing the upside ones. Moreover, we find that risk spillover is stronger from oil markets to currency markets than the reverse direction. These insights substantially enrich the existing literature and would offer valuable implications for effective risk management strategies and policymaking.

Intense debate surrounds the effects of trade on voting, yet less attention has been paid to how fluctuations in the real exchange rate may influence elections. A moderately overvalued currency enhances consumers’ purchasing power, yet extreme overvaluation threatens exports and economic growth. We therefore expect exchange rates to have a conditional effect on elections: when a currency is undervalued, voters will punish incumbents for further depreciations; yet when it is highly overvalued, they may reward incumbents for depreciation. We empirically explore our argument in three steps. First, we examine up to 412 elections in up to 59 democratic countries and show that voters generally punish depreciation in the real exchange rate when the currency is undervalued. We also find that at extremely high levels of currency overvaluation, voters sometimes reward incumbents for depreciation. A currency peg, especially in the eurozone, appears to insulate incumbents from these effects. In a second step, we explore the microfoundations of the election results through survey experiments in three advanced industrialized and two emerging market nations with different monetary and exchange rate policies and institutions. Respondents in countries with undervalued to mildly overvalued currencies disapprove of currency depreciations, whereas those facing a very highly overvalued currency favor depreciation. Third, we examine the mechanism of political competition in exchange rate policymaking and demonstrate that sustained undervaluation is rare in countries with strong political competition. Democratic governments have electoral incentives to avoid using undervalued currencies as a means of shielding workers from import competition.

I argue that exchange rates are an underappreciated explanation for the significant variation in the extent of female labor force participation in developing countries. Occupational segregation in developing countries is such that women working outside of the home tend to be segregated in labor-intensive export-oriented industries. Consequently, when an overvalued exchange rate increases export prices, it reduces commensurately the demand for female labor. This causes some women to drop out of the labor force. Data from over 150 low- and middle-income countries between 1990 and 2015 support this argument.

Unless the global financial system is radically reformed – and the necessary reforms are looking increasingly unlikely to occur – it will continue to be conducive to financial crises. Government rhetoric and actions can often influence in desirable ways both the speculative actions that now determine the exchange rate and the effect of exchange rate movements on the domestic economy. Managing the exchange rate should start with Australian support for measures such as the Tobin tax that dampen speculation. In 2008 and 2009, exchange rate changes were helpful in reducing the impact of the global financial crisis on Australia, largely because of a very clear commitment by the Australian government to make preservation of jobs its top priority. In 2009, a rapid rise in the exchange rate was unhelpful. In the short run, little can be done about this, but in the longer run, it is possible to offset the adverse effects.

The use of exchange rates based on Purchasing Power Parities to compare incomes across countries and over time has now become standard practice. But there are reasons to believe that this could lead to excessively inflated incomes for poorer countries and in some cases also inflate the extent of real changes over time. Estimates of gross domestic product growth in the Chinese and Indian economies in recent years provide examples of this.

Research on Africa’s monetary history has tended to focus on the imposition of colonial currencies while neglecting the monetary upheavals which faced the colonial powers after the collapse of the gold standard during World War I. Gardner profiles three crises—in The Gambia, Kenya, and Liberia—resulting from shifting exchange rates between European currencies during the 1920s and 1930s. These three cases illustrate the degree to which colonial policies struggled to keep up with the economic turmoil affecting metropolitan states and bring Africa into the story of global monetary instability during the interwar period, which is often told only from a European perspective.

Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-rate subsidy to underwrite hundreds of billions of dollars of imports. Whereas estimates from traditional models would make Chávez look like a welfare maximizer, our results indicate that he implemented distortionary commercial policy to the benefit of special interests. Our analysis underscores the importance of tailoring workhorse models to account for differences in interest group configuration. The politics of trade policy is not reducible to the politics of protectionism.

With the future of liberal internationalism in question, how will China's growing power and influence reshape world politics? We argue that views of the Liberal International Order (LIO) as integrative and resilient have been too optimistic for two reasons. First, China's ability to profit from within the system has shaken the domestic consensus in the United States on preserving the existing LIO. Second, features of Chinese Communist Party rule chafe against many of the fundamental principles of the LIO, but could coexist with a return to Westphalian principles and markets that are embedded in domestic systems of control. How, then, do authoritarian states like China pick and choose how to engage with key institutions and norms within the LIO? We propose a framework that highlights two domestic variables—centrality and heterogeneity—and their implications for China's international behavior. We illustrate the framework with examples from China's approach to climate change, trade and exchange rates, Internet governance, territorial sovereignty, arms control, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, we conclude by considering what alternative versions of international order might emerge as China's influence grows.