The adoption of fungus-resistant grapevines may be a key strategy for substantially reducing fungicide use in pesticide-intensive viticulture. In a representative survey conducted among 436 grapevine growers in Switzerland, we elicited growers’ expected share of land devoted to fungus-resistant varieties in ten years. More specifically, using regression analyses, we explore the main predictors behind the stated adoption intentions. We find that one-third of new plantings in the next decade will be fungus-resistant varieties. As a result, the expected share of land devoted to fungus-resistant varieties in ten years is 27.4% (compared to 10.2% in 2022), thus increasing by 169%. Farmer- and farm characteristics explain most of the adoption dynamics, especially growers’ beneficial health perceptions about fungus-resistant varieties, which correlate positively with their expected land share devoted to these varieties. Moreover, non-organic grapevine growers are particularly likely to increase their land devoted to these varieties. These findings have important implications for agricultural policy and industry in Europe and elsewhere, facilitating the expected plantation increase using a policy mix tailored to farmer- and farm-level characteristics.

Although new information technologies and social networks make a wide variety of opinions and advice easily accessible, one can never be sure to get support on a focal judgment task. Nevertheless, participants in traditional advice taking studies are by default informed in advance about the opportunity to revise their judgment in the light of advice. The expectation of advice, however, may affect the weight assigned to it. The present research therefore investigates whether the advice taking process depends on the expectation of advice in the judge-advisor system (JAS). Five preregistered experiments (total N = 2019) compared low and high levels of advice expectation. While there was no evidence for expectation effects in three experiments with block-wise structure, we obtained support for a positive influence of advice expectation on advice weighting in two experiments implementing sequential advice taking. The paradigmatic disclosure of the full procedure to participants thus constitutes an important boundary condition for the ecological study of advice taking behavior. The results suggest that the conventional JAS procedure fails to capture a class of judgment processes where advice is unexpected and therefore weighted less.

We argue that people choosing prosocial distribution of goods (e.g., in dictator games) make this choice because they do not want to disappoint their partner rather than because of a direct preference for the chosen prosocial distribution. The chosen distribution is a means to fulfil one’s partner’s expectations. We review the economic experiments that corroborate this hypothesis and the experiments that deny that beliefs about others’ expectations motivate prosocial choice. We then formulate hypotheses about what types of expectation motivate someone to do what is expected: these are justifiable hopeful expectations that are clearly about his own choices. We experimentally investigate how people modulate their prosociality when they face low or unreasonably high expectations. In a version of a dictator game, we provide dictators with the opportunity to modulate their transfer as a function of their partner’s expectations. We observe that a significant portion of the population is willing to fulfil their partner’s expectation provided that this expectation expresses a reasonable hope. We conclude that people are averse to disappointing and we discuss what models of social preferences can account for the role of expectations in determining prosocial choice, with a special attention to models of guilt aversion and social esteem.

How accurate are laypeople’s intuitions about probability distributions of events? The economic and psychological literatures provide opposing answers. A classical economic view assumes that ordinary decision makers consult perfect expectations, while recent psychological research has emphasized biases in perceptions. In this work, we test laypeople’s intuitions about probability distributions. To establish a ground truth against which accuracy can be assessed, we control the information seen by each subject to establish unambiguous normative answers. We find that laypeople’s statistical intuitions can be highly accurate, and depend strongly upon the elicitation method used. In particular, we find that eliciting an entire distribution from a respondent using a graphical interface, and then computing simple statistics (such as means, fractiles, and confidence intervals) on this distribution, leads to greater accuracy, on both the individual and aggregate level, than the standard method of asking about the same statistics directly.

Maximizing is characterized by aspirations for the highest standards. The current study explored the relationship between maximizing and risk-taking tendencies in decisions subject to risk. We propose that people first refer to expectation (i.e., the overall utility expected from an alternative) when taking risky decisions. If expectation clearly identifies the best option, maximizing will not be correlated with risk-taking tendencies. If not, people refer to maximizing to reach a decision. Maximizing will be positively associated with risk-taking tendencies because the “upper bound” of risky options helps achieve the goal of seeking the best. Four studies showed that risk-taking tendencies increased with maximizing when the options had similar expectations (Studies 1 to 3). When expectations between options were clearly different (vs. similar), the positive relationship between maximizing and risk-taking tendencies was reduced (Study 4). These findings provide an insight into how maximizing is related to risk seeking.

Investors, like any decision maker, feel regret when they compare the outcome of an investment with what the outcome would have been had they invested differently. We argue and show that this counterfactual comparison process is most likely to take place when the decision maker’s expectations are violated. Across five scenario experiments we found that decision makers were influenced only by forgone investment outcomes when the realized investment fell short of the expected result. However, when their investments exceeded prior expectations, the effect of foregone investment on regret disappeared. In addition, Experiment 4 found that individual differences in the need to maximize further moderated the effects of their expectations, such that maximizers always take into account the forgone investment. The final experiment found that when probed to make counterfactual comparisons, also investments that exceed expectations may lead to regret. Together these experiments reveal insights into the comparative processes leading to decision regret.

We introduce a family of norms on the $n \times n$ complex matrices. These norms arise from a probabilistic framework, and their construction and validation involve probability theory, partition combinatorics, and trace polynomials in noncommuting variables. As a consequence, we obtain a generalization of Hunter’s positivity theorem for the complete homogeneous symmetric polynomials.

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental disorder, comprised of heterogeneous psychological and neurobiological pathologies. Here, we propose a predictive processing (PP) account of BPD to integrate these seemingly unrelated pathologies. In particular, we argue that the experience of childhood maltreatment, which is highly prevalent in BPD, leaves a developmental legacy with two facets: first, a coarse-grained, alexithymic model of self and others – leading to a rigidity and inflexibility concerning beliefs about self and others. Second, this developmental legacy leads to a loss of confidence or precision afforded beliefs about the consequences of social behavior. This results in an over reliance on sensory evidence and social feedback, with concomitant lability, impulsivity and hypersensitivity. In terms of PP, people with BPD show a distorted belief updating in response to new information with two opposing manifestations: rapid changes in beliefs and a lack of belief updating despite disconfirmatory evidence. This account of distorted information processing has the potential to explain both the instability (of affect, self-image, and interpersonal relationships) and the rigidity (of beliefs about self and others) which is typical of BPD. At the neurobiological level, we propose that enhanced levels of dopamine are associated with the increased integration of negative social feedback, and we also discuss the hypothesis of an impaired inhibitory control of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of negative social information. Our account may provide a new understanding not only of the clinical aspects of BPD, but also a unifying theory of the corresponding neurobiological pathologies. We conclude by outlining some directions for future research on the behavioral, neurobiological, and computational underpinnings of this model, and point to some clinical implications of it.