Studying the likelihood that individuals cheat requires a valid statistical measure of dishonesty. We develop an easy empirical method to measure and compare lying behavior within and across studies to correct for sampling errors. This method estimates the full distribution of lying when agents privately observe the outcome of a random process (e.g., die roll) and can misreport what they observed. It provides a precise estimate of the mean and confidence interval (offering lower and upper bounds on the proportion of people lying) over the full distribution, allowing for a vast range of statistical inferences not generally available with the existing methods.

If being asked to give to charity stimulates an emotional response, like empathy, that makes giving difficult to resist, a natural self-control mechanism might be to avoid being asked in the first place. We replicate a result from a field experiment that points to the role of empathy in giving. We conduct an experiment in a large superstore in which we solicit donations to charity and randomly allow shoppers the opportunity to avoid solicitation by using the other door. We find the rate of avoidance by store entrants to be 8.9 %. However, we also find that the avoidance effect disappears in very cold weather, suggesting that avoidance behavior is sensitive to its cost.

We report data on the experimental articles published from 2000 to 2021 in seven leading general-interest economics journals. We also look at time trends in the characteristics of the published experimental articles, including citations and the nationality of the authors. We find an overall increasing trend in the publication of non-lab experiments in all journals. By contrast, the share of lab experiments has more than halved in the AER and remained low in other Top five journals. The diverging trends for non-lab and lab experiments are not universal as the shares of both have increased in two other high-ranking economics journals (JEEA and EJ). We also observe some heterogeneities in publication, citations, rankings, and locations of authors' affiliations across journals and types of experiments.

Accurately estimating risk preferences is of critical importance when evaluating data from many economic experiments or strategic interactions. I use a simulation model to conduct power analyses over two lottery batteries designed to classify individual subjects as being best explained by one of a number of alternative specifications of risk preference models. I propose a case in which there are only two possible alternatives for classification and find that the statistical methods used to classify subjects result in type I and type II errors at rates far beyond traditionally acceptable levels. These results suggest that subjects in experiments must make significantly more choices, or that traditional lottery pair batteries need to be substantially redesigned to make accurate inferences about the risk preference models that characterize a subject’s choices.

We perform an experimental investigation using a dictator game in which individuals must make a moral decision — to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire in which the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision shows that, at least in this case, moral motivations carry a heavy weight in the decision: the majority of dictators give the money for reasons of a consequentialist nature. Based on the results presented here and of other analogous experiments, we conclude that dicator behavior can be understood in terms of moral distance rather than social distance and that it systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic models and game theory.

Economics games such as the Dictator and Public Goods Games have been widely used to measure ethnic bias in political science and economics. Yet these tools may fail to measure bias as intended because they are vulnerable to self-presentational concerns and/or fail to capture bias rooted in more automatic associative and affective reactions. We examine a set of misattribution-based approaches, adapted from social psychology, that may sidestep these concerns. Participants in Nairobi, Kenya completed a series of common economics games alongside versions of these misattribution tasks adapted for this setting, each designed to detect bias toward noncoethnics relative to coethnics. Several of the misattribution tasks show clear evidence of (expected) bias, arguably reflecting differences in positive/negative affect and heightened threat perception toward noncoethnics. The Dictator and Public Goods Games, by contrast, are unable to detect any bias in behavior toward noncoethnics versus coethnics. We conclude that researchers of ethnic and other biases may benefit from including misattribution-based procedures in their tool kits to widen the set of biases to which their investigations are sensitive.

This article presents a new experimental protocol for estimating consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for products involved in a reshuffle of geographical indications (GIs), e.g., a change of hierarchical levels within a restricted area. Although the collective reputation of a given GI depends on its temporal stability, reshuffling a GI area could make it better aligned with product quality or consumers’ perception. We first provide a simple theoretical model in which consumers put a negative value on within-GI quality variance, thereby showing that reshuffling the GI designation scheme may increase WTP without any change in product quality. Using the experimental protocol, we evaluate consumer perceptions of different reshuffling scenarios for the vineyards of Marsannay, Burgundy, France. The results reveal a significant increase in WTP for the current distribution of products’ quality. Elicited WTP values are then used to simulate the optimal GI reshuffle. (JEL Classifications: L66, Q18, Q28)

We use experimental methods to investigate subsidy incidence, the transfer of subsidy payments from intended recipients to other economic agents, in privately negotiated spot markets. Our results show that market outcomes in treatments with a subsidy given to either buyers or sellers are significantly different from both a no-subsidy treatment and the competitive prediction of a 50% subsidy incidence. The disparity in incidence across treatments relative to predicted levels suggests that incidence equivalence does not hold in this market setting. Moreover, we find no statistical difference in market outcomes when benefits are framed as a “subsidy” versus a schedule shift.

Whereas many others have scrutinized the Allais paradox from a theoretical angle, we study the paradox from an historical perspective and link our findings to a suggestion as to how decision theory could make use of it today. We emphasize that Allais proposed the paradox as a normative argument, concerned with ‘the rational man’ and not the ‘real man’, to use his words. Moreover, and more subtly, we argue that Allais had an unusual sense of the normative, being concerned not so much with the rationality of choices as with the rationality of the agent as a person. These two claims are buttressed by a detailed investigation – the first of its kind – of the 1952 Paris conference on risk, which set the context for the invention of the paradox, and a detailed reconstruction – also the first of its kind – of Allais’s specific normative argument from his numerous but allusive writings. The paper contrasts these interpretations of what the paradox historically represented, with how it generally came to function within decision theory from the late 1970s onwards: that is, as an empirical refutation of the expected utility hypothesis, and more specifically of the condition of von Neumann–Morgenstern independence that underlies that hypothesis. While not denying that this use of the paradox was fruitful in many ways, we propose another use that turns out also to be compatible with an experimental perspective. Following Allais’s hints on ‘the experimental definition of rationality’, this new use consists in letting the experiment itself speak of the rationality or otherwise of the subjects. In the 1970s, a short sequence of papers inspired by Allais implemented original ways of eliciting the reasons guiding the subjects’ choices, and claimed to be able to draw relevant normative consequences from this information. We end by reviewing this forgotten experimental avenue not simply historically, but with a view to recommending it for possible use by decision theorists today.

This study provides an overview, categorization, and integration of what has been achieved in the niche of cross-culture experimental economics (CCEE) so far, aiming to inspire indigenous management researchers to extend their methodological toolbox by including experimental methods. As a result of the review, I find that most of the early studies lack depth and contextualization as well as detailed explanation about why human behavior differs. Hence, a better understanding about the influence of culture on economic decision-making is rather limited if it cannot be explained in more detail. In contrast, deep contextualization is a principle in indigenous management research (IMR). Both have so far not benefited from each other in the study of how culture affects human behavior, as both currently develop in parallel. Following the call for high-quality IMR (Tsui, 2004), this paper argues that an experimental methodology can make a contribution to IMR in the future by drawing on the strengths of both IMR (i.e., contextualization) and CCEE (i.e., methodology).

We investigate in an economic experiment how people choose sides in disputes. In an eight-player side-taking game, two disputants at a time fight over an indivisible resource and other group members choose sides. The player with more supporters wins the resource, which is worth real money. Conflicts occur spontaneously between any two individuals in the group. Players choose sides by ranking their loyalties to everyone else in the group, and they automatically support the disputant they ranked higher. We manipulate participants’ information about other players’ loyalties and also their ability to communicate with public chat messages. We find that participants spontaneously and quickly formed alliances, and more information about loyalties caused more alliance-building. Without communication, we observe little evidence of bandwagon or egalitarian strategies, but with communication, some groups invented rank rotation schemes to equalize payoffs while choosing the same side to avoid fighting costs.

This study examines the impacts of two types of advertising content—healthy eating and anti-obesity advertising—on the demand for healthy and unhealthy food and beverage items. We show that differentiating consumers by weight is crucial in fully understanding the effects of advertising content on food and beverage demand. We find that among overweight individuals, anti-obesity advertisements are more effective than healthy eating advertisements at reducing the demand for unhealthy items and increasing the demand for healthy items. Furthermore, the magnitude of this effect increases with BMI. We discuss possible explanations and policy implications based on our results.

In this essay we provide a brief account and interpretation of The Theory of Moral Sentiments showing that it departs fundamentally from contemporary patterns of thought in economics that are believed to govern individual behavior in small groups, and contains strong testable propositions governing the expression of that behavior. We also state a formal representation of the model for individual choice of action, apply the propositions to the prediction of actions in trust games, report two experiments testing these predictions, and interpret the results in terms directly related to the model. In short, we argue that the system of sociability developed by Adam Smith provides a coherent non-utilitarian model that is consistent with the pattern of results in trust games, and leads to testable new predictions, some of which we test.

Conservation programs faced with limited budgets often use a competitive enrollment mechanism. Goals of enrollment might include minimizing program expenditures, encouraging broad participation, and inducing adoption of enhanced environmental practices. We use experimental methods to evaluate an auction mechanism that incorporates bid maximums and quality adjustments. We examine this mechanism's performance characteristics when opportunity costs are heterogeneous across potential participants, and when costs are only approximately known by the purchaser. We find that overly stringent maximums can increase overall expenditures, and that when quality of offers is important, substantial increases in offer maximums can yield a better quality-adjusted result.

The introduction of a centralized institution for trading production rights in quota-regulated agricultural sectors can dramatically improve the flow of information among market participants and increase efficiency. On the other hand, prevailing conditions in these small markets can provide sellers with a market advantage, yielding high quota prices that impose important financial costs on quota holders and limit the entry of new producers into the industry. In this paper, we modify the normal allocation rule of the k-double auction (kDA) to counter thin market conditions and to favor buyers who bid low prices. In laboratory experiments, we test the “truncated” kDA (T-kDA) against a regular kDA for its ability to affect buyer and seller behavior and decrease equilibrium prices, and assess how it impacts efficiency. The results show that the T-kDA significantly lowers the equilibrium price and results in moderate efficiency losses. Most importantly, the T-kDA effectively counters the market power of oligopolists when demand far outstrips supply.

This paper describes a novel experiment designed to examine how rent dissipation may occur in fisheries in which the right to participate is limited and fishermen compete amongst themselves for shares of an exogenous total allowable catch. We demonstrate that rent dissipation may occur through multiple mechanisms, and that the heterogeneity of fishermen has important implications for how rent dissipation occurs and the extent to which different individuals may benefit from the implementation of rights-based management. We apply this approach to investigate the concept of voluntary rights-based management under which managers divide the total allowable catch between two separate fisheries, and fishermen may choose between fishing for a guaranteed individual harvest quota and competing for a share of the total catch in a competitive fishery.

Matching grants are a prevalent mechanism for funding environmental, conservation, and natural resource projects. However, economists have largely been silent regarding the potential benefits of these mechanisms at increasing voluntary contributions. To examine the behavioral responses to different match levels, this research uses controlled laboratory experiments with generically framed instructions and introduces a general-form matching-grant mechanism, referred to as the proportional contribution mechanism (PCM). Results show that contributions are positively correlated with both the match and the induced value of the public good even when a dominant strategy is free-riding. An implication of this partial demand revelation result is that manifestations of this type of “helping hand” social preference should be counted in benefit-cost analysis.