The notes in this appendix provide a brief and limited overview of R syntax, semantics, and the R package system, as background for working with the R code included in the text. It is intended for use alongside R help pages and the wealth of tutorial material that is available online.

We give a discussion of some basic mathematical concepts and terminologies connected with sets, numbers, functions and graphs.

This part of the book develops a full positive epistemology: an account of the epistemic normativity of evidence resistance, in conjunction with novel accounts of epistemic oughts, evidence, defeat, and permissible suspension. This first chapter argues that resistance to evidence is an instance of epistemic malfunction. It first puts forth a normative picture according to which the epistemic function of our cognitive systems is generating knowledge, and epistemic norms drop right out of this function. Second, it shows how this picture accommodates epistemic obligations, which, in turn, explain the normative failure instantiated in cases of resistance to evidence. According to this view, cognitive systems that fail to take up easily available evidence and defeat instantiate input-level malfunctioning. Input-level malfunctioning is a common phenomenon in traits the proper functioning of which is input dependent, such as our respiratory systems. Since our cognitive systems, I argue, are systems the proper functioning of which is input dependent, we should expect the failure at stake in resistance cases.

Chapter 4 argues that those material objects that, in the Categories, would fall under the category of substance qualify as hylomorphic compounds (i.e. they have matter and form). It presents three arguments in defence of the thesis that artefacts have forms. The first argument is that artefacts undergo genuine unqualified coming-to-be (or substantial change), as opposed to the mere acquisition of a property by a substrate. Related to this argument is the crucial Aristotelian distinction between per se unity and accidental unity. The second argument is based on Aristotle’s application of the ekeininon-rule to artefacts, which reveals that the identity of an artificial object cannot be reduced to its matter. The third argument is that Aristotle’s application of the synonymy principle to artefacts shows that the form in the mind of the artisan is identical to the form present in the actual artefact, insofar as it is thought, and that the artisan’s use of tools represents the stage at which the artefact’s form is in potentiality.

The depositary keeps custody of the original text of the treaty, prepares certified texts and performs a number of other important functions relating to the verification and notification of acts relating to the treaty. The principal functions are listed in Article 77 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but treaties may include specific provisions on the role of the depositary. Under Article 78, unless a treaty otherwise provides, states shall make notifications to the depositary or, if there is none, direct to the states to which they are intended. The depositary has a duty to act impartially. Often, bilateral treaties will not have a depositary but, if they do, the duties will be confined to custody or provision of certified texts. Multilateral treaties will almost always have a depositary, since they play an essential role in ensuring that the necessary formalities and procedures are performed. The depositary for many multilateral treaties is the UN Secretary-General or the chief administrative officer of a relevant international organisation. If a state is the depositary, the functions should be performed by its foreign ministry. The function in respect of correction of errors is examined in more detail.

The chapter examines the nature and the main characteristics of arbitral institutions and describes the main features of institutional arbitration. It then illustrates several categories of institutions, distinguishing them on the basis of various criteria. The chapter further describes the functions performed by arbitral institutions with respect to the specific cases submitted to them, their contribution to the making of arbitration law and their role in promoting the knowledge and culture of arbitration. The chapter further examines the notion of "mandatory institutional rules", i.e. rules that institutions do not accept derogations from, and illustrates the conditions for institutions' liability vis à vis the parties and the scope of their immunity in relation to acts and omissions in the performance of their functions under the rules The author concludes that, despite the importance of the functions carried out by institutions, their role does not entail any involvement in adjudicating disputes. The impact of institutions’ decisions on the outcome of cases is indirect, limited to procedural issues or limited to recommendations to arbitrators.

This chapter considers the various functions of States in international commercial and investment arbitration, which are essentially twofold.First, States are legislators and the creators of the system, and they also assist its development through their conduct which informs the interpretation of relevant treaties, such as BITs.Secondly, States are also parties to such proceedings, usually as the respondent to a claim, but also possibly also as the claimant, as a counter-claimant, and as a non-party intervener.This chapter then considers issues faced by States when acting as the respondent, and discusses how States might best prepare for and handle such disputes, and it also identifies various procedural issues which are likely to arise in such arbitral proceedings.It concludes that States have a complex combination of roles in international arbitration, and that the challenges in responding to claims can be managed if States are willing to learn from the decades of experience which States now have of participating in international arbitration proceedings.

This chapter introduces clichés and discusses their uses and contemporary debates in academic and public domains. It argues for a functional approach to the study of clichés and outlines the scope of the book.

Verbal silence is examined and illustrated in light of the communicative functions it serves and the cooperative maxims it fulfils. Our starting point is Jakobson’s (1960) model. Each of Jakobson’s six functions (the referential function, emotive, conative, phatic, poetic and metalinguistic) is considered here in terms of the manner in which it is served by verbal silence in general, and particularly by iconic depictions of absences and presences (such as trauma or the shortage of words) as well as communicative events in which verbal silence is the unmarked means fulfilling the communicative function (such as in turn switching and the expression of threats). In addition to illuminating the functions served by verbal silence, this examination also contributes to the discovery of the circumstantial function overlooked by Jakobson and to the refinement of broadly studied linguistic issues such as the distinction between questions cooperatively answered in silence and rhetorical questions and the fundamental difference in terms of the function of silence between silence as consent and the right to silence. The unique pragmatic quality of verbal silence to activate the addressee moving hem to the addresser’s position is discussed and illustrated throughout our discussion of the communicative functions played by verbal silence.

Chapter 3 first discusses separately and in an analytical way the main properties of the institutions identified by the different approaches reviewed in Chapter 2. The property space of the term ‘institution’ is unpacked in the following set of analytical properties: stability, normativity, sanctionability, enforcement, layering, intentionality, endogeneity and efficiency. In the second part of the chapter, I propose a typology of different institutions based on the values these properties have. This exercise allows inherent and constitutive difficulties in institutional analysis to emerge. It is necessary to take a clear stand on these problems and to try to disentangle the definitional maze. The chapter concludes by discussing the fundamental difference between ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ and suggests a line along which this can be established.

Chapter 13 provides an overview of the institutional framework provided by the Committee on Safeguards, and a description of its multiple functions. Some of these functions ensure that Members exert real surveillance over safeguard actions, and others provide a rather adjudicating function to the Committee, which may collide with the exclusive jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system to adjudicate safeguard-related claims of infringement.

This chapter is concerned with Germany’s perspective on the foundations and functions of international law. It is structured in two parts: international law in general and sources of international law. The first part deals with the notion of ‘rules-based order’ as brought forward by Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas. The term is understood to be broader than ‘international law’. It is argued that the same is putting at risk the principle of sovereign equality, while ultimately undermining the credibility of international law. Secondly, the first part focuses on Germany’s criticism of the United States’ approach to international law with respect to Israel’s occupation of certain Palestinian territories. The third topic addressed in the first part is Germany’s concept of an ‘Alliance for Multilateralism’, which is assessed as a rather loose and incoherent network of primarily European States. The second part discusses a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning the state of necessity as a general principle of international law. The decision is grounded in the context of Argentina’s debt crisis. It is argued that the German Constitutional Court did not seize the opportunity to offer a substantive contribution to the question of State bankruptcy.

The House of Commons is the repository for elected legitimacy in the UK’s national system of governance. Over the course of the twentieth century, this political fact relegated the House of Lords to the status of a subordinate chamber. This chapter examines the reason why the House of Commons came to dominate the UK Parliament by considering the problems with the composition of the House of Lords (it is a largely appointed House which still retains some hereditary membership) and the process by which the Commons came to strip the Lords of its equal role in the UK’s law-making process (replacing the Lords’ veto over legislation with a mere delaying power). This chapter also considers the role that this subordinate chamber continues to play in the legislative process. Today, the work of the House of Lords is dominated by scrutinising and, where necessary, revising legislation produced by the Commons. The unelected nature of the UK’s second chamber remains a contentious constitutional issue, one which has not been solved despite frequent reform proposals in the last two decades.

This chapter assessed sustainability and resilience of eleven farming systems in their current situation, as well as in hypothetical future systems, using qualitative and quantitative methods. The assessment shows that current farming systems address sustainability dimensions in an unbalanced way and are characterized by poor resilience. Future resilient systems are imagined to promote environmental and social functions in the long term.

Chapter 4 introduces the first part of the functionalist account of assertion. We introduce the account of e-functions and their normative import. We then argue for our thesis concerning the e-function of assertion and derive our preferred account of good assertion. We show that our account compares favourably with its standard rule first rival.