This article studies a previously unknown asset market in eighteenth-century Sweden. It emerged as a result of a partial default in 1719, when large amounts of recently released fiat coins were converted into government liabilities. These could only be redeemed as a customs duty on international trade, the licent. As merchants had to acquire such assets to conduct their trade, tens of thousands of transactions were carried out on a secondary market over a period of more than 45 years. Networks of local merchants bought assets from initial holders and sold them on to intermediaries or merchants, who deposited the liabilities with a newly established government agency, the Debt Office. Here, hundreds of account holders could transfer the value of their deposits between them. When a licent payment was due, the amount was deducted from the merchant's account. Prices on the liabilities were low and sometimes volatile, but the long-term trend was rising. We have distinguished three types of market participants: a small group of very active users, most of them professional dealers or brokers; merchants who traded on a regular basis as they needed to pay the licent, or when a favorable opportunity appeared; and finally, those who traded sporadically. The emergence of this market was part of a financial expansion that occurred in many European countries at the same time, the closest equivalent being the segmented default in France after the abolition of John Law's system. This study aims to broaden our understanding of eighteenth-century financial developments, which have rarely been studied in a semi-peripheral European economy.

Financial markets derive their political and societal legitimacy from their ability to produce fair and accurate prices. However, reviewing the literature on how stock exchanges price securities, we find an inherent tension between market organization and price disclosure, which is borne out by this special issue's historical case studies.

Global financial crises and potential sovereign defaults provide an opportunity for financial regulators and analysts to revise assumptions in their risk models. These conditions are also an opportunity for regulators and analysts to distinguish the ‘hyper-real’ economy, represented by derivatives, from the real economy, which requires assessment through an analysis of human as well as financial capital. Regulators are required to demonstrate that they are skilled in conducting the most thorough analysis of all elements of the finance system in order to help the investing public to manage risk as much as possible. The contribution of this article is to overview the limitations inherent in regulators’ traditional focus on financial analysis, as well as in financial analysts’ failure to consider the relevance of people management data when evaluating the potential performance of knowledge-intensive, service-based organisations. The article argues for a stronger focus on analysis of non-financial capital, including human capital, to provide a more effective ‘early warning’ of potential financial distress.

For most of its history Amsterdam securities trading was entirely unregulated and spread over various venues frequented by different social groups, handicapping price transparency. A public price current emerged only in 1796 and then with wide bid-ask spreads to protect margins. To combat the confusion a curious pricing method, the mid-price system, emerged during the nineteenth century. Tied to a market microstructure centring on hoekmannen (market makers), this system transited effortlessly from a public market into a monopoly by 1913, self-governing, still without any government regulation, and offering wide rent-seeking opportunities.

How was Romania able to borrow cheaply on the international capital markets before World War I? We explore this within the context of its three southeast European neighbours, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, using a novel dataset of monthly bond prices from the Berlin and London stock exchanges. A comparison of country characteristics and panel data analysis suggests that Romania was able to borrow under more favourable conditions due to its abundant natural resources and desirable exports.

In Britain around 1900, established financial institutions for long-term savings such as life assurers, and pension funds which were just in their formative phase, did not make material allocations to publicly quoted equity markets or ordinary shares; long-established life assurers, for example, had less than 3 per cent allocated to the asset class (Baker and Collins 2003). Over the following 100 years, this picture radically changed, with equities emerging as the central asset class for many institutional investors and the term ‘the cult of (the) equity’ was coined (Scott 2002; Avrahampour 2015). As the century progressed, institutional investors superseded private individuals and became the dominant holders of British publicly quoted companies (Cheffins 2010). Despite the attractions of the asset class and their generally high returns, within a relatively short period by the end of the century, institutional equity exposure had peaked and was in decline both at life assurers and within pension funds. Here we highlight, and link together, the key actuarial (Turnbull 2017) and investing (Morecroft 2017) ideas that were influential in these developments. We also identify the main individuals who were instrumental in the application of equity investing to institutional portfolios. The article has an emphasis towards years from 1920 to 1960 when most of the changes to investment practice and actuarial theory occurred.

The global banking system can be shown to be a Complex Adaptive System that exhibits phase transitions from time to time. These phase transitions can result in significant financial losses to the community that we estimate to be much more significant than losses occurring during “business as usual” periods. In this paper, we argue that the significant losses arising from phase transitions in the banking system requires a very different approach to regulation than the current Basel regime, and that there is a need to transition the Basel regime from a Federation of Systems to a System of Systems. We demonstrate that the World Health Organisation’s recent management system for pandemics is ideally suited for management of the global banking system and would have greater potential to control the phase transition losses than the current Basel system.

This article studies the relationship between the Irish and London stock markets over the period 1869 to 1929, using monthly data on capital gains. A bivariate GARCH model shows that there were significant volatility spillovers from the London to the Irish market, but not vice versa. This suggests that shocks originating in London were transmitted to Ireland, but that the reverse did not occur. Furthermore, the time-varying correlation indicates that the co-movement between London and Ireland declined during the Irish independence struggle and the establishment of the Irish Free State. The correlation appears to stabilise in the late 1920s.

We propose a model in which financial sophistication improves portfolio returns and therefore the incentive to substitute consumption intertemporally. The model delivers an Euler equation in which consumption growth is positively correlated with financial sophistication. We test the model's prediction using panel data on consumption and financial sophistication drawn from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth. We find that consumption growth is positively correlated with financial sophistication, as predicted by the model. We also provide estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the range between 0.4 and 0.6.

We present an intertemporal portfolio choice model where individuals invest in financial literacy, save, allocate their wealth between a safe and a risky asset, and receive a pension when they retire. Financial literacy affects the excess return from and cost of stock-market participation. Investors simultaneously choose how much to save, their portfolio allocation, and the optimal investment in financial literacy. The model implies that one should observe a positive correlation between stock-market participation (and risky asset share, conditional on participation) and financial literacy, and a negative correlation between the generosity of the social security system and financial literacy. The model also implies that financial literacy accumulated early in life is positively correlated with the individual's wealth and portfolio allocations in later life. Using microeconomic cross-country data, we find support for these predictions.

Often performance of pension funds is assessed based on the development of the assets only, neglecting the simultaneous development of the liabilities. This especially is the case in Switzerland, one of the world's largest markets for corporate pension funds. We create a new liability benchmark for referencing the asset performance. Measuring the asset performance with respect to the liability benchmark yields the Asset-Liability-Result. We apply the model to (i) the Swiss pension fund market as a whole and (ii) an individual Swiss pension fund. With our new approach, we are able to show that the pension funds’ recovery from the recent financial crisis took much longer than the value increase of the asset portfolios suggests. We strongly advocate the use of a liability benchmark for analyzing the entire pension fund markets’ performance and specifically as operational tool for individual pension funds.

Savings banks were created as a means to encourage the newly created working class to save for the uncertainties of urban industrial life. This article explores the success of the Savings Bank of Glasgow, and pays particular attention to the response of savers to the financial and commercial crises of 1847 and 1857. The crisis of 1847 was shallower but longer lasting in Glasgow, while that of 1857 was greatly exacerbated by local conditions in the short term, but of little long-term importance to savers. It suggests that, in both crises, some elements of contagion may have been present but that those who panicked in 1857 were systematically different from those who did not.

This article undertakes a comparative study of the effects of three wars upon the French stock market. Periods of war are highly turbulent financial times and trigger multiple factors to act upon stock prices. The article presents evidence suggesting that stock price behaviour is influenced by the specific way each war is financed. Financed solely by regular long-term debt, the Franco-Prussian War exhibited stock prices that only reflected real activity. On the other hand, both world wars were partially financed by monetary creation but differed with regard to the extent of financial repression. In the case of World War II, monetary creation within a closed repressed economy led to a paradoxical, short-lived increase in stock prices. The article also examines how war affected the characteristics of the market. The Franco-Prussian War caused a durable high interest rate; World War I smoothed out most of the public services firms and increased volatility; whilst World War II affected the components of the stock market. Overall, mainly due to market values being destroyed during the world wars, the importance of the stock market in the economy decreased.

This paper compares the implications of different interest rate models for valuing the so-called OLOs (Belgian coupon bonds). The prices of these bonds implied by some well-known one-factor models are compared to the actual prices observed on the market. Our finding suggest that these interest rate models are unsatisfactory, especially in valuing longer term bonds.