An empirical analysis of what drives members of the House of Representatives to cultivate a reputation as a disadvantaged-group advocate is found in Chapter 4. These analyses use an original dataset of the members of the 103rd, 105th, 108th, 110th, and 113th Congresses (ranging from 1993 to 2015). Findings demonstrate that the greater the size of a disadvantaged group within their district, the more likely a member of Congress is to form a reputation as group advocate. Higher levels of district hostility toward a group reduces the odds that a member will be a group advocate, particularly for groups that are generally considered to be less deserving of government assistance. The results of this chapter also demonstrate that descriptive representatives, those who are themselves a member of that disadvantaged group, tend to be more likely to capitalize on a wider advocacy window to increase the level of representation that they offer than nondescriptive representatives.

This chapter describes and explains the emergence of majoritarian decision-making in twenty-seven lower colonial assemblies in Ireland, mainland North America, and the Caribbean between 1619 and 1776. It documents the peculiar conditions under which majoritarian politics developed in the colonies while also registering the importance of attempts to imitate parliamentary practices. Colonial lower assemblies were created under conditions fundamentally different from those that prevailed in the Westminster House of Commons. Some were part of corporations and proprietorships, not royal colonies; and some initially admitted all freemen, not simply elected representatives. These factors led to distinctive institutional trajectories. In general and over the long run, these factors appear to have reinforced a tendency for the colonial lower assemblies to be or become majoritarian. By scrutinizing the available evidence, one is left with the overwhelming impression of a total embrace of majoritarian politics before the American Revolution and, in most cases, long before that time. As the colonial lower assemblies of North America became provincial congresses and then state lower assemblies, they predictably continued their majoritarian practices. This pattern continued in the first intercolonial assemblies and in the US House of Representatives.

Chapter 3 looks at how the Southern minority used the three-fifths clause, the Electoral College, and parity in the Senate to protect itself from “tyranny” of the Northern majority. Even with the three-fifths clause, the South could not overcome the North’s increasing population advantage. Nonetheless, the three-fifths clause’s “slave bonus” did limit the South’s losses in the House. While the South’s determination to have the number of slave states equal the number of free states ensured that the North would not have a majority. Both parity in the Senate and the three-fifths clause inflated the South’s representation in the Electoral College. Of these two proslavery constitutional provisions, parity in the Senate provided greater protection to the South. Northerners understood only too well the political benefits the three-fifths clause and parity in the Senate conferred upon the South. Antislavery advocates bristled at this, while conservatives believed it was the result of the Founders’ grand plan. Both Northerners and Southerners realized that the three-fifths clause and parity in the Senate added to the difficulty of securing congressional approval of an antislavery amendment. In 1850, the South lost parity in the Senate, never to regain it.

Calls for a return to a traditional method of lawmaking known as “regular order” have proliferated as unorthodox lawmaking has grown more dominant in Congress. Proponents claim regular order enhances deliberation on legislation. This chapter examines deliberation under one form of regular order: open rules permitting unlimited amending in the House of Representatives. We find evidence of substantial minority influence on the inputs and outputs of the appropriations process. Regular order gives the minority party members the opportunity to present and win adoption of their policy proposals. Our evidence also shows that ideological extremists play an outsized role in debate. They offer more amendments than other members, and their amendments tend to win less support and face defeat more often than moderates. The paradox of regular order is that it simultaneously offers the opportunity for bipartisan deliberation over legislation while exposing the majority party to problems that may make its management of the floor more difficult.

Calls for a return to a traditional method of lawmaking known as “regular order” have proliferated as unorthodox lawmaking has grown more dominant in Congress. Proponents claim regular order enhances deliberation on legislation. This chapter examines deliberation under one form of regular order: open rules permitting unlimited amending in the House of Representatives. We find evidence of substantial minority influence on the inputs and outputs of the appropriations process. Regular order gives the minority party members the opportunity to present and win adoption of their policy proposals. Our evidence also shows that ideological extremists play an outsized role in debate. They offer more amendments than other members, and their amendments tend to win less support and face defeat more often than moderates. The paradox of regular order is that it simultaneously offers the opportunity for bipartisan deliberation over legislation while exposing the majority party to problems that may make its management of the floor more difficult.