To comply with Shiʿi theological-jurisprudential justifications and dogmatic traditions, the Iranian postrevolutionary legal system formally enshrined the principle of legality of crime and punishment within the Iranian Constitution and important legal provisions. Despite this formal entrenchment and codification of its criminal law, which together act as a legal constraint on the traditionally excessive power of Muslim judges, the Iranian theocratic system has exempted religious sins from this principle by blurring the distinction between crime and sin and criminalizing certain sinful acts with unclear language. These two legal mechanisms not only violate the principle of legality and amplify legal uncertainty, but their reference to Sharia law also binds the fate of the accused more tightly to the discretion of the judge than to the letter of the law. Consequently, the religiopolitical predilections of judges have become a determining factor in findings of criminal responsibility and imposition of punishment on citizens.

When evaluating religious accommodation claims, courts refrain from examining the relationship between the specific claim and the common religious practice of the relevant religion. This paper rethinks this doctrine. I argue that it stems from understanding religious accommodation as a protection of conscience. This idea itself suffers from conceptual and practical challenges, which can be mitigated if we understand religion as a communal function of conscientious actions. The communal aspect bears practical and moral significance, and I explore three dimensions of it: the epistemic implications; its effect on constituting moral obligations toward others; and its importance as part of one’s culture. A communal-conscientious approach to religion can mitigate many challenges that confront conscience accommodation. This suggests that the relationship between the individual’s claim and their communal practice is crucial and should be evaluated by courts. I conclude by outlining the main considerations for creating a new, nuanced doctrine.

Over the first two decades of the twenty-first century, John Witte, Jr. has not only carefully documented but also creatively promoted in many ways three very important developments: (1) the almost revolutionary worldwide reawakening of cooperation in the fields of law and religion after the termination of their long, fruitful history of cooperation in the mid-1800s; (2) the efforts to strengthen a justice-oriented legal culture in democratic societies and the legal, academic, and political appreciation of human rights (also in disputes with human rights skeptics); and (3) the reconciliation of traditional values and new needs for freedom in the ethos and law of marriage and family.

Welsh jurist and Anglican theologian Norman Doe has pioneered the modern study of comparative ‘Christian law’, analysing the wide variety of internal religious legal systems governing Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant churches worldwide. For Doe, religious law is the backbone of Christian ecclesiology and ecumenism. Despite the deep theological differences that have long divided Christian churches and denominations, he argues, every church – whether an individual congregation or a global denomination – uses law to balance its spiritual and structural dimensions and to keep it straight and strong, especially in times of crisis. This makes church law a fundamental but under-utilised instrument of Christian identity and denominationalism, but also unity and collaboration on many matters of public and private spiritual life, both clerical and lay. Doe has developed this thesis in a series of impressive scholarly projects and books – first on Anglican law, then comparative Anglican-Catholic canon law, then all Christian laws and other Abrahamic laws, and their interaction with secular legal systems. This article offers an appreciative analysis of the development of Professor Doe's scholarship, and situates his work within the broader global field of law and religion studies.

Prisoners have long been recognised as a disenfranchised group. This paper positions non-religious prisoners as further excluded from pastoral care. While chaplaincies aim to serve prisoners of all faiths and none, this paper suggests a hierarchy of access in which the benefits of chaplaincy are more available to some prisoners than others. Shortcomings in secular care mean that non-religious offenders are often the only group unable to connect with like-minded people and it is argued that they are disadvantaged as a result. The paper also explores the challenges for pastoral carers seeking to support inmates equally. It considers the barriers on both sides of the care relationship, specifically the disincentives to chaplaincy engagement faced by prisoners of no faith and the obstacles encountered by the Non-Religious Pastoral Support Network in accessing service users and delivering care. Finally, recommendations are made to narrow the gaps between religious and non-religious prisoners.

In 2017, a Muslim cemetery project was proposed in the municipality of St-Apollinaire, just outside Quebec City. This proposal required a change in local zoning, which necessitated approval from citizens living around the targeted plot of land, through the use of diverse deliberative tools. Drawing on a small-scale empirical study conducted in 2017–2018 with key informants in the cemetery project, this article investigates how these actors lived through, engaged with, and operated within the bounds of law. To do this, I suggest employing a legal consciousness framework to examine how local life is also where everyday lived law occurs. The local governance of diversity in death thus requires a re-evaluation of the “local,” identity politics, relationships, and legal consciousness. Ultimately, this article proposes that local decision-making processes play an important yet underexamined role in the broader conversations on belonging.

In this article, I argue that religious nationalism poses a unique challenge to the liberal theory of religious freedom. In arguing this, the article first develops and defines an ideal type of religious nationalism through an analysis of Hindu-nationalist and religious Zionist thought. I show that religious nationalism in states like India and Israel have the unique status of intimate rivals. They are intimate since they are able to successfully present themselves as the carriers of the authentic character of the nation-state and utilize modern political tools. As a result, they are free of much of the unifying pressures of state nationalism. And they are rivals because they promote a vision of society and politics that fundamentally challenges the political identity of the state. The paper then turns to the justifications and rationales of religious freedom—both in seminal cases and in political and legal scholarship—and applies them to religious nationalism. It argues that the status of intimate rivalry should, depending on which justification of religious freedom we adhere to, change the way in which we morally and legally understand religious nationalism. First, because religious nationalism is intimate—that is, acceptable and mainstream—it should be approached as a part of the culture of the majority. This implies that we should be less concerned about infringements of religious freedom in the case of the adherents and organizations of religious nationalism. Second, the rivalry of religious nationalism is in itself a good reason for the nation-state not to accommodate it.

The tumult of the twentieth century had a great impact on the role of religion in Chinese society. Antipathy toward religion reached its height in China during the Cultural Revolution, one of the few times in history when religion was almost completely wiped out in a single country. Religion in China has experienced a resurgence since the beginning of the Reform and Opening Up period in 1978. With the renewal of religious practice, new proposals have been put forward for the role of religious ideas in public life. In addition to the endurance of Marxist and liberal conceptions of the place of religion in society, new voices have emerged, arguing for return to Confucianism as the source of moral vitality in public life, or advancing Christian public theology as a moral resource for individuals adrift and alienated by the rapid changes of a modernizing economy. These realities have reshaped debates about the protection of religious freedom in China. This article introduces these new social and discursive realities and sets the stage for the articles that follow.