Chapter 3 argues that the Lockean proviso entails two further conclusions embraced by social anarchists. First the chapter argues that, contrary to what right-libertarians typically maintain, the Lockean proviso implies that no one owns any natural resources. This is because any appropriation of such resources would leave others worse off in a way that the proviso does not allow. By contrast, the chapter argues that the proviso is necessarily satisfied when it comes to each agent’s own body ‒ at least, if self-ownership is interpreted in the way proposed in Chapter 1. Thus, while people do not own any external resources, they can easily come to own themselves via acts of self-appropriation. The chapter then goes on to defend at greater length the interpretation of the Lockean proviso proposed in Chapter 1. Finally, it concludes by discussing what the proposed position implies vis-à-vis the rights of children.

Chapter 1 introduces the five moral principles that compose the social anarchist position. Specifically, it defines social anarchism as the conjunction of five theses: (1) the consent theory of legitimacy, which holds that persons are obligated to obey the laws of the state only if they have consented to do so; (2) the Lockean proviso, which holds that persons can acquire property rights over some natural resource iff they leave “enough and as good” for others; (3) the self-ownership thesis, which asserts that each person has the same rights over her body that she would have over a fully owned thing; (4) the contention that persons do not have private property rights over any external natural resources; and (5) an endorsement of luck egalitarianism as the moral principle regulating the permissible use of unowned external objects. It also adjusts these principles in various ways to render them more plausible.

Chapter 2 argues that the anarchist theses can be derived from a single meta-principle that limits which moral theories qualify as theoretically acceptable. This posited moral tyranny constraint holds that a theory of duties is acceptable only if full compliance with that theory (and the demands of morality more generally) would not allow any person to unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably act in a way that would leave others with less advantage than they would have possessed given some other choice by the agent. After explicating the constraint, the chapter defends its plausibility, arguing that it should be accepted on both foundationalist and coherentist grounds. The chapter then explains how the constraint entails three of the posited anarchist theses (the consent theory of legitimacy, the Lockean proviso, and luck egalitarianism’s responsibility component). Finally, it addresses three potential objections that might be raised against the moral tyranny constraint.