The economic discipline plays a performative role in constructing the moral order of market society. Yet, little attention has been paid to what economists explicitly regard as moral or how they conceive of morality. This article reflects a recent attempt to put morals into economics, that is, to introduce morality as a research topic in behavioural and experimental economics. It maps three research programs that theorize the moral economy. The programs emphasize the moral foundations of market society, the moral limits of market expansion, and the moral consequences of market trading and, thus, appear irreconcilable with classifications of economists as market enthusiasts or moral agnostics. At the same time, however, the literature centres on an “economized” form of morality that is corrective to market inefficiencies, attributed to the responsibility of the individual, and expressed in rational terms. In doing so, this literature contributes to redefining moral problems in economic terms.

How is a sovereign prerogative brought to market? We know much about how states shape markets and vice versa, but less about the dynamics when states not only set market rules, but are also the sole producer of the good. This article takes up the case of citizenship by investment—“golden passport” programs that offer citizenship in recognition of an investment in a country—to unpack the challenges that appear when states commodify sovereign prerogatives. In these cases, the state holds multiple roles that generate conflicts of interest and a concern for credibility. To address these concerns, states may adopt two strategies: institute a division of labor in issuing the product, and outsource elements of supervision to third-party actors. Empirically, the analysis shows how migration service providers retooled murky discretionary grants of citizenship in peripheral countries into formal citizenship by investment schemes. The conclusion addresses how these strategies apply in markets for other sovereign prerogatives, particularly government debt, and discusses the implications for citizenship and neoliberalism.

Economic sociologists agree that economic rationality is constructed and that morality and economic interests intersect. Yet we know little about how people organize economic beliefs or judge the morality of markets. We use Relational Class Analysis to identify three subsets of respondents whose members construe economic markets in distinct ways. Subsamples display more structure than the full sample in associations among attitudes, and between attitudes and sociodemographic predictors. The economically advantaged favor market solutions in each subset, but religious and political identities, respectively, predict pro-market views uniquely in subsamples that construe markets through a religious or political lens. Results illustrate the value of distinguishing between construals and positions, and of examining population heterogeneity in opinion data. Self-interest drives faith in markets, but only when people construe markets in ways consistent with their religious and political faiths.

The trans-disciplinary New Institutional framework identifies the importance of incentive structures in preventing opportunism in market making. In recent decades this theoretical tradition has increasingly shifted its attention from formal institutions to identify the significance of cultural processes in countering uncertainty, bounded rationality, and information asymmetries. More specifically the New Institutional perspective tends to focus on the formal mechanisms producing and reproducing culture, as opposed to an examination of specific cultural content. This attention to formal mechanisms means that value-rational action and commitments in market making receive insufficient attention. In order to examine the problems entailed in this trend, the case study of a financial market in which market making was constituted by the values of loyalty, duty, and honor of traders is used.