We follow Belongia and Ireland (2021) and investigate the role that the Center for Financial Stability credit card-augmented Divisia monetary aggregates could play in monetary policy and business cycle analysis. We use Bayesian methods to estimate a structural VAR under priors that reflect Keynesian channels of monetary transmission, but produce posterior distributions for the structural parameters consistent with classical channels. We also find that valuable information is contained in the credit-augmented Divisia monetary aggregates and that they perform even better than the conventional Divisia aggregates, in terms of highlighting the role of the money supply in aggregate demand.

A mandate framework is proposed for delegating monetary policy to an instrument-independent, but goal-dependent central bank that emphasizes simplicity in both the objectives entering the welfare criterion and those in the instrument rule. It consists of: (i) a simple quadratic loss function penalizing deviations from target variables; (ii) a welfare-optimized, Taylor-type log-linear nominal interest-rate rule with targets that match those in the loss function; (iii) a zero-lower-bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate imposing a low unconditional probability of ZLB episodes; and (iv) a long-run inflation target. In an estimated New Keynesian model with these features, we find that for a quarterly probability of 5%, an optimal annual inflation target is close to 2%, weights for real variables in the loss function are small compared with inflation except for the real wage growth mandate and the optimized rules mimic a price-level rule.

This paper analyzes a regime-switching New Keynesian model to understand what happens to the aggregate economy when the nominal interest rate hits the zero lower bound (ZLB). Contrary to the literature, our model predicts that the aggregate demand curve is not always upward sloping when the ZLB binds. Instead, it depends on expectations. If the expected duration of the ZLB is short but consistent with expectations surveys, the AD curve can be downward sloping. In that case, the fiscal multiplier is moderate and supply-side reforms are expansionary. These results complement existing findings in the literature.

This paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate a small-scale New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations (HE). Agents form expectations via Euler equation adaptive learning (AL) and differ by the model they use to forecast. Type A agents use a correctly specified model, while type B and type C agents use misspecified models. Quarterly US data from the pre-Great Moderation and Great Moderation periods are used to jointly estimate the degree of agent heterogeneity, the AL parameters, and the deep model parameters. Results show that the data exhibit significant expectational heterogeneity, and that the HE model fits the data better than a model with homogeneous agent AL.

Does wage setting exhibit strategic complementarity and produce multiple equilibria? This study constructs a discrete-time New Keynesian model in which households choose the timing of their wage adjustments endogenously subject to fixed wage-setting costs. I explore steady-state equilibrium of the state-dependent wage-setting model both analytically and numerically. For reasonable parameter values, complementarity in wage setting is weak and the steady-state equilibrium is unique.

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models has tended to focus on policy set by an infinitely lived benevolent policy maker, often with access to a commitment technology. In this paper, we explore deviations from this ideal, by allowing (time-consistent) policy to be set by a process of bargaining between two political players with different weights on elements of the social welfare function. We characterize the (linear) Markov perfect equilibrium and, in a series of numerical examples, we explore the resultant policy response to shocks which cannot be perfectly offset with the available instruments due to their fiscal consequences. We find that, even although the players, on average, have the socially desirable objective function, the process of bargaining implies an outcome which deviates from the time-consistent policy chosen by the benevolent policy maker. Moreover, the range of instruments available mean that policy makers will bargain across the entire policy mix, sometimes implying outcomes which are quite different from those that would be chosen by a single policy maker. These policy outcomes depend crucially on the nature of the conflict and also the level of government debt.

Using laboratory experiments within a New Keynesian framework, we explore the interaction between the formation of inflation expectations and monetary policy design. The central question in this paper is how to design monetary policy when expectations formation is not perfectly rational. Instrumental rules that use actual rather than forecasted inflation produce lower inflation variability and reduce expectational cycles. A forward-looking Taylor rule where a reaction coefficient equals 4 produces lower inflation variability than rules with reaction coefficients of 1.5 and 1.35. Inflation variability produced with the latter two rules is not significantly different. Moreover, the forecasting rules chosen by subjects appear to vary systematically with the policy regime, with destabilizing mechanisms chosen more often when inflation control is weaker.

We use laboratory experiments with human subjects to test the relevance of different inflation-targeting regimes. In particular and within the standard New Keynesian model, we evaluate to what extent communication of the inflation target is relevant to the success of inflation targeting. We find that if the central bank cares only about inflation stabilization, announcing the inflation target does not make a difference in terms of macroeconomic performance compared with a standard active monetary policy. However, if the central bank also cares about the stabilization of economic activity, communicating the target helps to reduce the volatility of inflation, interest rate, and output gap, although their average levels are not affected. This finding is consistent with the theoretical literature and provides a rationale for the adoption of a flexible inflation-targeting regime.

This paper embeds labor market search frictions into a New Keynesian model with financial frictions. The econometric estimation establishes that labor market frictions substantially improve the empirical fit of the model. The effect of the interaction between labor and financial frictions on aggregate fluctuations depends on the nature of the shock. For monetary policy, technology, and entrepreneurial wealth shocks, labor market frictions amplify the effect of financial frictions, because robust changes in hiring lead to persistent movements in employment and return on capital that reinforce the original effect of financial frictions. For cost-push, labor supply, marginal efficiency of investment, and preference shocks, labor market frictions dampen the effect of financial frictions by reducing the real cost of repaying existing debt, which lowers the external finance premium.

This paper develops a medium-scale New Keynesian model where consumer preferences depend on government expenditures and public capital is productivity-enhancing in order to account for recent evidence on the effects of government spending shocks. Under plausible assumptions on the degree of complementarity between private and public expenditures and on the output elasticity of public spending and considering alternative monetary policy rules, the effects of fiscal shocks delivered by the model are in line with the evidence.

This paper uses a New Keynesian model with banks and deposits to study the macroeconomic effects of policies that pay interest on reserves. Although their effects on output and inflation are small, these policies require major adjustments in the way that the monetary authority manages the supply of reserves, as liquidity effects vanish in the short run. In the long run, however, the additional freedom the monetary authority acquires by paying interest on reserves is best described as affecting the real quantity of reserves: policy actions that change prices must still change the nominal quantity of reserves proportionally.

This paper estimates a structural New Keynesian model to test whether globalization has changed the behavior of U.S. macroeconomic variables. Several key coefficients in the model–such as the slopes of the Phillips and IS curves, the sensitivities of domestic inflation and output to “global” output, and so forth–are allowed in the estimation to depend on the extent of globalization (modeled as the changing degree of openness to trade of the economy), and, therefore, they become time-varying. The empirical results indicate that globalization can explain only a small part of the reduction in the slope of the Phillips curve. The sensitivity of U.S. inflation to global measures of output may have increased over the sample, but it remains very small. The changes in the IS curve caused by globalization are similarly modest. Globalization does not seem to have led to an attenuation in the effects of monetary policy shocks. The nested closed-economy specification still appears to provide a substantially better fit of U.S. data than various open-economy specifications with time-varying degrees of openness. Some time variation in the model coefficients over the postwar sample exists, particularly in the volatilities of the shocks, but it is unlikely to be related to globalization.