In this paper we study the transmission of capital depreciation shocks. The existing literature in the real business cycle tradition has concluded that these shocks are irrelevant to business cycle fluctuations. We show that they are potentially important drivers of aggregate fluctuations in a new Keynesian model. Nominal rigidities and some persistence in the shock process are the key ingredients that generate co-movement across real variables.

We study a two-country model with changes in the technological growth rate. Such changes are attributed to transitory and persistent shocks in the growth rate of technology. Cases are considered in which agents in two countries do not have enough information to distinguish between the two types of shocks; gradually, however, the persistence of the shock is recognized through the learning process. Utilizing a set of parameters obtained from U.S. and European productivity growth rates, it is then shown that (i) when persistent shocks affect the two countries identically, there is no consumption-correlation puzzle, and the international comovement puzzle becomes imperceptible; and (ii) even when persistent shocks affect the two countries differently, imperfect information plays an important role in explaining both the consumption-correlation puzzle and the international comovement puzzle (provided transitory shocks are strongly internationally correlated and are relatively larger than persistent shocks).

This paper uses a New Keynesian model with banks and deposits to study the macroeconomic effects of policies that pay interest on reserves. Although their effects on output and inflation are small, these policies require major adjustments in the way that the monetary authority manages the supply of reserves, as liquidity effects vanish in the short run. In the long run, however, the additional freedom the monetary authority acquires by paying interest on reserves is best described as affecting the real quantity of reserves: policy actions that change prices must still change the nominal quantity of reserves proportionally.

We compare inflation uncertainty in distinguished groups of economies. Results indicate that during the recent financial crisis the global inflation climate has become markedly more uncertain than previously. We document that in comparison to other economies, member states of the European Monetary Union are less exposed to inflation uncertainty. Three European Union members that are not part of the monetary union and five other OECD member economies serve as control groups. With regard to the quantification of inflation uncertainty, results are robust over a set of alternative estimates of the latent inflation risk processes.

The relationship between recessions and productivity growth has been the focus of an important body of theoretical and empirical research in the last two decades. We contribute to this literature by presenting new evidence on the evolution of productivity in the aftermath of recessions. Our method allows us to distinguish between frontier and (in-)efficiency effects of recessions. We present international evidence for a panel of 70 countries for the period 1960–2000. Our results reveal that the average cumulative impact of recessions on productivity up to four years after their end is negative and significant. This, however, results from a mixture of mechanisms. The level of frontier production increases, but the rate of technical progress decreases, leading to a fall in frontier production. Efficiency also falls, lending support to the idea that recessions tend to reduce, rather than increase, economic restructuring. Long and deep recessions are also shown to have distinctive impacts on productivity.

We explore the roles of subsidies in the Matsuyama model [K. Matsuyama, Econometrica 67 (1999), 335–347] of growth through cycles with a Solow investment phase and a Romer innovation phase when innovation and intermediate goods production rely on existing capital. We show that subsidies to R&D investment or to the purchase of new intermediate goods can arbitrarily reduce the threshold level of capital per type of intermediate good beyond which the economy moves to the innovation phase. Sufficient subsidization can eventually eliminate cycles. For plausible parameterizations, optimal subsidies can achieve significant welfare gains equivalent to as much as 10% rises in consumption at all times.

Edward C. Prescott has argued that mandatory saving is socially desirable because it solves the problem of people intentionally free riding and becoming a welfare burden. Inspired by Prescott's argument, we develop a model in which rational individuals choose between saving and free riding. We find that free riding is a robust outcome for a significant share of the population and that everyone, including the free riders, benefits from the elimination of free riding through mandatory saving. Our results strengthen Prescott's position that free riding is a serious problem and that mandatory saving is socially desirable.

This paper examines an infinite-horizon model of nonlinear income taxation in which the probability that the government can commit is high, but not certain. In this “loose commitment” environment, we find that even a little uncertainty over whether the government can commit yields substantial effects on the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax system. This result holds even though separating taxation remains optimal, as in the case of full commitment. Under an empirically plausible parameterization, our numerical simulations show that high-skilled individuals must be subsidized in the short run, despite the government's redistributive objective, unless the probability of commitment is higher than 98%. Loose commitment also reverses the short-run welfare effects of changes in most of the model's parameters, and yields some counterintuitive outcomes. For example, all individuals are worse off, rather than better off, in the short run when the proportion of high-skilled individuals in the economy increases.

This paper analyzes the process of decision-making on consumption in a two-period consumption setting, assuming the return on savings is uncertain in the sense of Knight [Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston: Houghton Mifflin (1921)]. The results imply that a naïve strategy to save zero is optimal for a continuum of income values. Under the Permanent Income Hypothesis, consumption equals current income only when current income is equal to permanent income. Indeed Campbell and Mankiw [in Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 185–214. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1989)] assumed that consumers who spend their total income are only following a simple rule of thumb. However, the naïve strategy obtained casts doubt on their interpretation.