We study an OLG model with child policies and a PAYG pension with endogenous retirement and fertility. The result of the planned economy is compared to the decentralized competitive equilibrium deriving optimal policies. We show that in the presence of a PAYG pension system, the optimal policy mix includes an education subsidy and a subsidy for the supply of labor in old age. Fertility should be taxed or incentivized depending on whether there is full or partial retirement, and on the parameters. We focus on the parameter reflecting the deterioration of human capital and show that a child tax may be required.

This paper studies retirement and child support policies in a small, open, overlapping-generations economy with PAYG social security and endogenous retirement and fertility decisions. It demonstrates that neither fertility nor retirement choices necessarily coincide with socially optimal allocation, because agents do not take into account the externalities of fertility and the elderly labor supply in the economy as a whole. It shows that governments can realize the first-best allocation by introducing a child allowance scheme and a subsidy to incentivize the labor supply of older workers. As an alternative to subsidizing the elderly labor supply, we show that the first-best allocation can also be achieved by controlling the retirement age. Finally, the model is simulated in order to study whether the policies devoted to realizing the social optimum in a market economy could be a Pareto improvement.

In this paper, we analyze the effects of demographic change on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system, financed with a defined contribution scheme. In particular, we examine the relationship between retirement, fertility, and pensions in a three-period overlapping generations model. We focus on both the case of mandatory retirement and the case where the retirement age is freely chosen. In the case of mandatory retirement, increasing longevity has an unambiguously negative impact on fertility and pension payouts and a positive effect on the level of physical capital in the steady state. On the other hand, when agents choose the time of retirement, an increase in life expectancy positively affects physical capital only when the tax rate is sufficiently low and can have a positive impact on pension benefits, because agents may find it optimal to retire later and to decrease fertility less. Finally, the effects of the social security tax on capital per worker are negative with mandatory retirement; however, they could be positive in the optimal retirement case.

In this paper, we consider the effects of population aging on a pay-as-you-go financed defined contributions pension scheme. We show that when retirement decisions are endogenous, aging increases the retirement age and the steady-state level of capital. The effect on pension payouts is in general ambiguous, except for the solution of full retirement, when this effect is unambiguously negative.