The COVID-19 Pandemic a stress test for clinical medicine and medical ethics, with a confluence over questions of the proportionality of resuscitation. Drawing upon his experience as a clinical ethicist during the surge in New York City during the Spring of 2020, the author considers how attitudes regarding resuscitation have evolved since the inception of do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders decades ago. Sharing a personal narrative about a DNR quandry he encountered as a medical intern, the author considers the balance of patient rights versus clinical discretion, warning about the risk of resurgent physician paternalism dressed up in the guise of a public health crisis.

Aaron Ancell and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (A&SA) propose a pragmatic approach to problems arising from conscientious objections in healthcare. Their primary focus is on private healthcare systems like that in the United States. A&SA defend three claims: (i) many conscientious objections in healthcare are morally permissible and should be lawful, (ii) conscientious objections that involve invidious discrimination are morally impermissible, but (iii) even invidiously-discriminatory conscientious objections should not always be unlawful, as there is a better way to protect patient rights. Pursuant to (iii), A&SA propose a framework that legally allows discriminatory conscientious objections, but that shifts the financial costs associated with such objections from patients to the clinics that employ doctors who discriminate against patients. Though their proposal is controversial, it has attractive features, and merits further discussion. In this paper, I remain neutral on the third claim A&SA advance in support of their proposal, but point out a problem with the two first claims. In the light of my criticisms, I propose to modify their proposal so that costs are shifted to clinics in a broader range of cases.

A 9-year-old boy who was born with bicuspid aortic stenosis underwent two unsuccessful aortic valvuloplasty interventions, and by 2 years of age he developed restrictive cardiomyopathy caused by left ventricular endocardial fibroelastosis and diastolic dysfunction. The attending cardiologist referred the patient to a high-volume, high-profile congenital cardiac surgical programme 1000 miles away that has a team with considerable experience with left ventricular endocardial fibroelastosis resection and a reputation of achieving good results. Owing to problems with insurance coverage, the parents sought other options for the care of their child in their home state. Dr George Miller is a well-respected local congenital and paediatric cardiac surgeon with considerable experience with the Ross operation as well as with right ventricular endocardial fibroelastosis resection. When talking with Dr Miller, he implied that there is little difference between right ventricular endocardial fibroelastosis and left ventricular endocardial fibroelastosis resection, and stated that he would perform the operation with low mortality based on his overall experience. Dr Miller stated that the local institution could provide an equivalent surgical procedure with comparable outcomes, without the patient and family having to travel out of state. A fundamental dilemma that often arises in clinical surgical practice concerns the conduct of assessing and performing new procedures, especially in rare cases, for which the collective global experience is scant. Although Dr Miller has performed right ventricular endocardial fibroelastosis resection, this procedure differs from left ventricular endocardial fibroelastosis resection, and he cannot be sure that he will indeed be able to perform the procedure better than the high-volume surgeon. This ethical situation is best understood in terms of the principles of respect for patient autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. The tension between the imperatives of beneficence and the obligation to respect the autonomy of the patient by acting only with the patient’s best interest in mind is discussed.

Respect for patient autonomy is an important and indispensable principle in the ethical practice of clinical medicine. Legal tenets recognise the centrality of this principle and the inherent right of patients of sound mind – properly informed – to make their own personal medical decisions. In the course of everyday medical practice, however, challenging cases may result in ethical dilemmas for the patient, the physician, and society. Resolution of these dilemmas requires a thorough understanding of the underlying principles that allow the clinician to make informed decisions and to offer considered therapeutic options to the patient. We argue in this paper that there is also need for a transition of moral competency from understanding principles to attaining virtue in the classic Aristotelian tradition. Achieving moral virtue is based on a lifetime of learning, practising, and watching how others, who have achieved virtue, act and perform their duties. We further claim that learning moral virtue in medical practice is best realised by incorporating the lessons learnt during daily rounds where frank discussions and considered resolutions can occur under the leadership of senior practitioners who have achieved a semblance of moral excellence.

There have been intensive debates about euthanasia and attempts to change laws on euthanasia in all countries. What doctors and particularly oncologists think about euthanasia must be taken into consideration, as their voices are crucial in this dialogue. The aim of this study was to find out how Turkish doctors approach euthanasia in the context of cancer. A questionnaire was used to collect data from 85 oncologists out of a total 800 in active oncology practice.

Of the oncologists surveyed, 43.8% did not object to euthanasia. Some 33.7% had been asked to perform euthanasia and 41.5% believed that euthanasia was performed secretly although it is against the law in Turkey. Forty-two doctors (50.6%) noted that they had withdrawn treatment in patients.

Doctors who encounter terminally ill patients with cancer should update their knowledge about patients' rights and euthanasia. Doctors, who are often asked to perform euthanasia, especially in the cancer setting, can help to illuminate the debates about euthanasia.