The author assesses the role of consent in processes of binding dispute resolution before international courts and tribunals. He seeks to demonstrate that ‘consent’ has a particular role in binding dispute resolution. This particular role derives from the special nature of binding dispute resolution processes. They are intrusive and characterized by their uncertain outcome: the implications of State consent to the dispute resolution process crucially depend on decisions of an independent entity, namely an international court or tribunal. Because this is so, States insist on the need for consent, as a precondition of any binding dispute resolution process. At the same time, once consent has been given, control shifts to the competent international court or tribunal. Moreover, by virtue of their decision-making authority, many international courts and tribunals have managed to assert at least a persuasive influence over proper construction of the legal rules at stake, extending beyond the cases immediately pending before them. The chapter traces these peculiarities and examines how the tension between State and courts’ authority plays out in particular disputes.

UN Charter Art.33 points to means such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration to settle disputes and to avoid the risk of use of force. Judgments of the International Court of Justice are of great value also to further develop international law. However, courts are hardly ever employed to save peace by the judicial settlement of big disputes. Following the precedent of the Nuremberg tribunal, special tribunals have been set up to try war crimes. Even more important, an international criminal court has been established. Fact-finding (termed ‘enquiry’) has achieved a prominent role both to solve and to prevent conflicts. Thus, the safeguards system of the IAEA using inspectors, cameras and satellites and environmental sampling continuously verifies that no fissionable material is diverted away from peaceful uses. With much fake news around, impartial professional inspection, monitoring and reporting – for instance, about the use or possession of chemical weapons – has become more important. Diplomacy seeks to secure or create peaceful relations by agreement, precluding or removing the threat or use of force. Examples are given of successes of diplomacy to preserve peace as well as of failures and of talks going forever without result.

This chapter examines the history and nature of the Security Council’s relationship with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the role that this relationship may play in the exercise of the Council’s functions. It briefly recalls the drafting history pertaining to the Court, including its relationship to the Council, the UN Charter provisions governing the relationship between the two principal organs, and the relationship between them – both potentially and in practice. It concludes that a more prominent role for the Court, within the confines set by the Council itself in this context, could strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Council as an institution. Under the framework set out in the UN Charter and considering the Council’s wide discretion as to how it executes its responsibilities, the Council could and may want to consider and make use of the ICJ as a useful tool within its diverse toolbox for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Proposals for the creation of an international security force were actively discussed at the time of the establishment of the League of Nations and were returned to in the period leading to the creation of the UN. The UN Charter contains explicit undertakings in the area of peaceful settlement of international disputes, and various instruments emerged over time as the UN sought to give operational meaning to the peace and security principles in the Charter. We analyze the experience with peacekeeping operations and the lessons that can be drawn from their mixed success. We then analyze the extent to which there has been dramatic erosion in the effectiveness of the uses of warfare to achieve particular national strategic objectives and argue that the current system of global security is absurdly costly in relation to the meager security benefits it confers. We present a proposal for the creation of an International Peace Force, to be established in parallel to a process of comprehensive international arms control. A number of operational issues that emerge when considering the establishment of such a Force, many of them based on an assessment of several decades of experience with peacekeeping, are discussed.

Strengthening the rule of law, at national and international levels, is a key goal of the international community, as expressed in multiple statements of heads of state, high-level meetings and resolutions made under the auspices of the United Nations. Developing an international order based upon the international rule of law is also a core objective of the UN Charter. However, with some limited exceptions, the international legal system has not yet matured into what would be considered a true rule-of-law system. Notable thinkers of various times and places have convincingly argued that the rule of law is a key element in establishing a global, sustainable peace, a perspective complemented by modern peace research. Key international legal institutions, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), remain essentially unreformed since 1945, as do UN Charter provisions on the peaceful settlement of disputes. This chapter sketches a range of potential, interlinked reforms to strengthen significantly the international rule of law, including peaceful settlement of disputes, the ICJ, the International Criminal Court, the establishment of an international judicial training institute and an office of international Attorney General. Further vital steps must be taken towards completing the half-built legal institutions that we currently possess.