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Risk is a central concept in modern regulatory studies. In Chapter 2, the general idea of ’risk’ is introduced. The chapter helps readers grasp its scientific and practical relevance for regulation. The chapter also offers an overview of the importance of risk in scholarly work and policy-making. The chapter emphasizes the extensive and diverse nature of risk studies across different academic disciplines including ’technical’ quantitative methods and sociological critique. It explains how risk identification, risk assessment, and risk management are conventionally understood and highlights their shortcomings and complexities. Additionally, it discusses the trend of ’riskification’ – the tendency to frame a growing number of issues in the language of risk.
The authors critique the NY Declaration on Animal Consciousness, which does not denounce continued captivity and invasive research in the pursuit of animal consciousness markers. They argue that such research often increases animal suffering by accepting harmful practices. Instead, they propose a nonanthropocentric, ethical framework aligned with the Belmont Report’s principle of beneficence, advocating for noninvasive methods in natural habitats. This approach prioritizes animal well-being, recognizing and safeguarding the intrinsic value of all conscious beings.
A wide range of animal taxa, including vertebrates and invertebrates, are controlled or kept by humans. They may be used as pets, for recreation, sport and hobbies, as working animals, as producers of animal-derived (food) products or as biomedical models in research. There is a need for clear guidance on the treatment of animals, regardless of their phylogenetic distance from humans. Current animal welfare concepts, which emphasise animal sentience and the ability of animals to experience negative or positive mental states, are limited in scope to a small proportion of the animal kingdom, as the vast majority of species are (currently) thought to lack sentience. We discuss four options for addressing the question of which basic concept(s) could be used to derive guidelines for the treatment of animal species, sentient or non-sentient: (1) alternative concepts tailored to specific groups of species; (2) ‘welfare’ concepts not presupposing sentience; (3) the precautionary principle; or (4) the concept of animal integrity. Since questions regarding the appropriate treatment of animals, including species with a large phylogenetic distance from humans, have an ethical/moral dimension, we also address who counts morally and how much, and how animals should be treated given their moral status. We suggest that the concept of animal integrity, possibly complemented and extended by the concept of habitat/ecosystem integrity, is suitable for application to all species. However, a current concept of animal welfare should serve as the primary basis for guidance on how to treat species that are sentient and capable of experiencing emotions.
The intersection between energy and the environment is regulated on the basis of legal foundations that international economic law has developed on its own or ‘borrowed’ from (or otherwise relied on) such outside regimes as general international law and international environmental law. The borrowed principles, like sovereignty over natural resources or sustainable development, can find their reflection, directly or indirectly, in trade and investment agreements and case law and will continuously affect new developments in this field. This chapter will show that such foundations stemming from the external sources define the basic contours of State’s rights and duties associated with the energy–environment nexus. Moreover, the international trading and investment systems provide self-created legal foundations for environmental policy space as will also be discussed in this chapter. They define the extent to which energy-related restrictive measures driven by environmental considerations can be accepted. The case of the ECT presented at the end of this chapter is a striking example for demonstrating that the legal foundations are not static and may undergo important changes.
The development of the precautionary principle by the EU Courts has often been interpreted by scholars as inconsistent with another trend in EU risk regulation: one that is evidence-based and relies on impact assessment. This article argues that the two trends – precaution and regulatory impact assessment – are not mutually exclusive. Together they may, in fact, act as a procedural safeguard against discretionary decisions that have an impact on fundamental rights, especially under conditions of epistemic uncertainty. The article illustrates this claim by looking at the decisions to close schools in Ireland during the pandemic.
Our book was written during the COVID pandemic. As a result, it was natural to include a chapter on this topic. In line with the overall theme of our book, we highlight aspects close to the understanding and communication of risk. Topics included in more detail are the inherent danger of exponential growth and the need for adhering to the precautionary principle when faced with a new, possibly catastrophic and hence not yet widely understood, type of risk. The precautionary principle enables decision-makers to adopt measures when scientific evidence about an environmental or human health hazard is uncertain and the stakes are high. A question we address to some extent is whether this pandemic happened totally unexpectedly; was it a so-called Black Swan? We present evidence that it most certainly was not. We give examples of early warnings from scientific publications, highly visible presentations in the public domain as well as regulatory measures in force to absorb the consequences of a possible pandemic. In discussions around risk, numbers, especially large ones, and also units of measurement play an important role; we offer some guidance here.
The Precautionary Principle has primarily found a place within the international environmental law regime, and to some extent, the international human rights regime. It is also, arguably, considered to be a principle of customary international law. While the international investment law regime has traditionally resisted (and still does) incorporating principles from other regimes, a few innovative International Investment Agreements (IIA) have gone against the grain and expressly incorporated principles of international environmental and human rights law. This chapter draws upon a clause in the Nigeria-Morocco Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) of 2016 which mandates that both the investor and the host state shall apply the precautionary principle to their investments. It will enquire whether the precautionary principle has achieved that normative status of customary international law which allows it to be binding on host states by virtue of inclusion in a BIT. Second, it will enquire whether the precautionary principle can be binding on foreign investors as non-state actors.
This paper focuses on the legal adoption and possible implications of the proposed per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) restriction. In the case of PFAS, this restriction puts value on the regulatory efforts to implement far-reaching and ambitious targets amid a high level of scientific uncertainty. The purpose of this paper is to present a report rather than conducting an in-depth analysis of the mentioned field. Overall, the paper argues that such a daring decision might be justified by the precautionary principle. However, the implementation might raise opposition from the stakeholders’ side and might take longer than initially anticipated, most likely with additional derogations concerning essential goods that do not currently have safe alternatives.
Civilisational collapse could occur. The cascading risks attached to climate change could happen within decades or half a century, so it is no longer the next generation that will carry the burdens of the climate emergency. Before the dominoes collapse, we must take climate risks seriously and act accordingly. If we act now, climate risks can be minimised, if not avoided.
Sea-based measures represent a new way of dealing with eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. They refer to different technological innovations that may be implemented at sea to target pollution that has already been released, in contrast to reducing discharges from the original source on land. These measures are not subject to any specific regulation. The Chapter explores how marine environmental law operates in the absence of specific rules and how environmental law principles manage to fill legal gaps. Moreover, sea-based measures raise interesting issues linked to the balancing of interests, as the arguments both against and in favour of the measures are based on environmental protection, and as the environmental impact of the measures is uncertain. A framework for applying the precautionary approach while expanding knowledge on the impact attached to different measures, as developed within the dumping regime, is also explored.
This Chapter studies the management of living resources under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea considering the so-called precautionary principle/approach. It strives to give insights on the question whether the UN Convention demands application of the precautionary principle/approach with respect to the management of living resources vel non. The notions of the precautionary principle/approach, management and lastly that of living resources are discussed to evaluate the demand on common grounds. Taking the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases as a departure point, the analysis focuses on Part XII of the UN Convention. Finally, it gives an outlook on potential consequences of the required application to the ’package deal’.
The protection of marine environment assumes a special place under UNCLOS. Part XII provides for general obligations to protect and preserve the environment as well as more specific provisions concerning the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, including those relating to different sources of pollution. At the same time, Part XII is intended to provide a general framework for the protection of the marine environment. This framework nature is demonstrated not only by the existence of many generally-worded provisions and open-ended obligations which need to be further elaborated but also in the existence of numerous reference to external rules and standards, international organisations and regional arrangements. This chapter examines the contribution of UNCLOS tribunals to clarifying the scope and content of the general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment before moving to discussing the extent to which UNCLOS tribunals have shed light on the normative content of three key environmental obligations and principles in the context of the marine environment.
Law can influence conservation translocations in two basic ways: it can play a supportive and/or a restrictive role. Regarding the first role, legislation can provide support, a mandate, and/or an obligation to consider or perform a translocation. This may involve both general obligations to conserve or restore certain species or ecosystems, as well as specific obligations concerning species reintroductions or other types of translocation. Regarding the second role, legislation can impose limitations on translocation possibilities and/or make translocations conditional on meeting certain requirements. Such limitations and conditions may follow from legislation on native species protection, area protection, invasive non-native species, disease, trade, animal welfare, and several other areas of law. Requirements of both types may flow from international and national law. The legal requirements that will apply to any projected conservation translocation will depend on the countries, areas, and species involved, and there may be significant differences between one project and the next. The applicable requirements may be easy to meet for some projects, and be prohibitive for others. It is crucial that a careful analysis of applicable domestic legislation is carried out in the early stages of any contemplated conservation translocation. Practitioners should also make themselves aware of the relevant international legislation to provide them with the wider legal context of their work, and to help them influence the development of future legislation.
Both the waste regulation and chemicals regulation of the European Union are based on the precautionary principle. The main objective of the chemicals regulation is to protect human health and the environment from the risk caused by hazardous chemicals. The modern waste regulation aims, among other things, at fostering the recovery of waste. These material circulation aims have been recently emphasised by introducing the ambitious circular economy objectives. Many of the waste streams contain hazardous substances that may pose risks to human health and the environment. This article examines the role of the precautionary principle in the circular economy. We argue that sustainable material circulation can only be achieved through a case-by-case application of the precautionary principle, but this also requires participatory discourse in which competing arguments, beliefs and values are openly discussed.
Climate change is the existential crisis of our lifetime, requiring immediate action to limit global warming to 1.5˚C. Countries have committed, through the Paris Agreement, to take measures to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, fossil fuel suppliers around the world continue to bet against the Paris Agreement by further expanding fossil fuels exploration, extraction, and production, which exacerbates the climate crisis and impedes meaningful action to safeguard human rights. As fossil fuel suppliers continue to profit from the climate crisis, they have consistently evaded accountability for climate change by leaning on domestic climate mitigation policies void of supply-side measures and hiding behind a wall of impunity. This chapter examines how climate litigation is closing this supply-side accountability gap through the judiciary, using the Norwegian climate case People v. Arctic Oil as an example. Although a loss for the co-plaintiffs, the Norwegian decision is, in some respects, a step in the right direction and a warning to the fossil fuel industry. This is because, for the first time, the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gas emissions from Norwegian fossil fuel products that are combusted abroad (“exported emissions”) must be considered when analyzing the climate impacts of fossil fuel extraction and production.
This chapter describes five “action areas” in which politically achievable changes over the coming two decades could render humankind a lot safer than it is today. For climate change, these include urgent measures for rapid decarbonization, coupled with ramped-up research on technologies for carbon removal and for solar radiation management; new international pacts among small groups of nations for emissions reductions with mutual accountability and incentives; and pre-adaptation measures for dealing effectively with unavoidable harms caused by global warming. For nuclear weapons, these include preparing contingency plans for major or limited nuclear wars, as well as risk-reduction measures than can be implemented today. For pandemics, experts point to four sensible and affordable measures that would greatly reduce the harms of future pandemics. For AI, an immediate challenge will be to prepare for chronic mass unemployment due to rising levels of automation. Finally, the chapter proposes the creation of a new federal agency, the Office for Emerging Biotechnology, to oversee and regulate cutting-edge developments in this field.
Arguments about the pros and cons and possible effectiveness of face masks have occupied considerable space in specialist, medical venues such as peer-reviewed journals and science blogs as well as public forums such as mainstream media and social media – the latter attracting contributions from medical specialists and lay members of the public alike. The debate has often been heated, and there have also been reports of individuals resisting the stipulation to wear face masks in shops and on airplanes, at times leading to acts of physical violence. Drawing on the narrative paradigm, this chapter examines some of the arguments for and against face masks as articulated by a diverse range of individuals and constituencies, within and beyond the Anglophone and European world, and the justifications given in each case, as well as their underlying values and logics.
Since 1788 settler law has provided a means to either prevent or progress certain forms of environmental change, according to the values and needs of the settler state. These exploitative interests of the settler state were in sharp contrast to the approach of First Nations law, of caring for country, as reflected in the ancient and continuing culture of Indigenous peoples. This chapter examines the shifting nature and focus of environmental law from the exploitative pioneering phase of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the national development and wise use of resources that followed Federation, and concludes with the rise of modern environmentalism from the 1960s. The statutes and cases examined in this chapter range from the free selection and public health acts of the colonial period, to the more recent Environment Protection and Biodiversity Act 1999 (Cth) and Telstra Corporation v Hornsby Shire Council (2006). The historical record suggests a reactionary pattern of environmental exploitation giving rise to settler environmental anxieties that stimulate legislative intervention. Despite the promise of the wave of environmental legislation of the 1970s and 1980s, Australia’s State, Territory and Federal environmental laws have proven to be relatively weak in restraining this reckless pattern of political expediency, developmentalism and short-sightedness.
There is an overwhelming case against the current regulation of AI for existential risks. The regulation would compromise the progress in AI because regulators could not tell which lines of research make existential threats. Part of the reason is that these risks are not imminent and are not probable, thus making identification even harder. Finally, regulating at the national level might empower rogue nations to threaten the national security of well-functioning democracies. But international regulation is not possible, because it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify that prohibited lines of research are not occurring within another nation’s territory. Encouraging with subsidies the development of AI that is not an existential threat is the best way forward, because it will build up knowledge of potential dangers.
In this concluding chapter I present major points of action suggested by the application of the EV model to the case studies and discuss the ethics and policy approaches that can either detract from, or effectively guide, future actions to reduce EV in the human niche. I outline several frameworks and potential trajectories that may guide thinking and action in (re)imagining our future and the role of EV in it. The aim is to set the foundation for future work by researchers, practitioners, and others to build on using the EV framework. This volume is not the place to complete this pursuit, however, because EV is manifold: the only way to address EV holistically is to explore many paths. A final task that remains is to forge a chart of the most relevant ethical approaches and potential policy pathways to reducing EV, and to, likewise, chart the foreseen impact of each approach on the human niche. These outlines of future ethical approaches and policy pathways will guide the continued exploration of the EV model.