Using longitudinal Survey of Income and Program Participation data linked to Social Security Administration administrative records from 2009 and 2012, we find negative economic shocks cause 401(k) contribution behavior to react in ways consistent with reactions to fear and past trauma. If employees participating in 401(k) plans did not experience real earnings declines or unemployment spells between 2009 and 2012, then their contribution rates would have been 5% higher and each person would have contributed US $193 more toward their defined contribution plan accounts. We conclude that previous studies may have swung too far in emphasizing inertia as a primary behavior trait explaining workers’ 401(k) plan engagement. Reactive behavior to protect living standards by reducing retirement savings is also important.

Currently, many immigrants are disqualified from Canada’s public pension scheme because of residency requirements. In addition, decades of low income and labour market exclusion prohibit many Canadian immigrants from building adequate private pension savings throughout their working life. Together, these factors present serious concerns for immigrant seniors’ economic well-being. Using Canadian census data spanning a twenty-year period (1991–2011), we find that income from personal savings plans and investments has declined sharply for both native-born and immigrant Canadians, with recent immigrant cohorts faring worst. However, since 1991, native-born and immigrant men living in Canada for 40-plus years had major gains in private employer pensions (Registered Pension Plans; [RPPs]). Yet RPP income for all other immigrant cohorts remained stable or declined during these decades. Thus, the data demonstrate a worrisome growing private savings gap between native-born men and all others in Canada, with newer immigrants and women faring worst.

To improve the design of the pay-out phase of DC plans, this paper proposes a new approach to structure pension products: the Personal Pension with Risk sharing (PPR). By unbundling and valuing the investment, (dis)saving, insurance and risk-sharing functions of pensions, PPRs allow risk management and (dis)saving to be customized to the specific features of heterogeneous individuals. Unlike variable annuities, PPRs allow investment risks to be combined with longevity insurance without giving rise to high year-on-year volatility in consumption streams or opaque and rigid valuation and smoothing rules. The synthesis of a PPR structure provides new opportunities for product innovation and for the comparison of retirement products.

In light of the declining pension coverage of low-income workers, policy makers have discussed requiring all employers to offer individual retirement accounts, similar to defined contribution plans. How likely to participate are workers who currently do not have access to a pension plan? We address this question by using plausibly exogenous variation in pension-plan availability to estimate the determinants of participation in a standard selection on unobservables model. We find that currently uncovered low-income workers are fairly likely to participate in a newly offered plan, yet they are much less likely to do so than currently covered workers.

This work has three objectives: first, to provide a comprehensive review of administrative fees; second, to construct a comparative data set for 53 countries; and third, to perform an empirical analysis that highlights the main determinants of pension fees from a world-wide perspective. The paper provides an econometric analysis by using panel data techniques. It finds the greater statistical significance of market size, result that is reinforced by mandatory pension schemes. Other factors, such as structural country conditions, market's vertical integration and the presence of an occupational pension scheme, seem to be less relevant.

During the post-war years many European countries have implemented far-reaching but diverse pension systems with the objective of providing those in retirement with adequate incomes. In this study, we explore the link between pension systems and the adequacy of retirement income. We analyse the mix of public and private pensions and consider the impact of different policies on poverty rates amongst pensioners. We suggest that only a few European countries have been successful in providing combinations of private and public pensions that improve the adequacy of retirement income.

This article examines, on the basis of longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, the effects of health and employer-provided pensions on retirement decisions, which have not been studied simultaneously in the Canadian context. The results indicate that employer-provided pensions have substantial and significant incentive effects on retirement behaviour. Having poor health substantially increases the likelihood of entering retirement, by up to 25 percentage points. The results corroborate previous evidence regarding the relative importance of attenuation and justification bias in self-reported health measures. Further, the results confirm U.S. and European evidence that employer-provided pensions and health are significant determinants of retirement.

Corporate governance and the theory of the firm are discussed primarily from the shareholders' perspective. This point of view neglects the tremendous effects of private pensions and of co-determination as well as interdependencies between codetermination, pensions and corporate governance. Since in the private pension world the firm serves as an investment tool, the focus should be shifted from short-term interests to concepts maximising long-term shareholder value. In this context, also moderate forms of co-determination might serve as a tool for long-term oriented corporate governance. Given the rise of the European Company, co-determination is likely to spread in Europe. Both, private pension-based corporate governance systems and stakeholder-oriented corporate governance systems should be re-examined in the light of the financial and economic crisis and due to the rise of behavioural law and economics.

During the 1990s a wave of major structural reforms that changed the distributional principles underpinning pension policies spread across Latin America. Outcomes were not always as expected. The implementation of new pension rules in the socio-economic, political and institutional context of Latin America has resulted in a number of inequalities which affect pension system performance and the gains that different income groups and generations may obtain. In order to overcome the distributional drawbacks of reform, Latin American governments may need to afford a new role to non-contributive pensions, as well as consider the application of specific regulatory adjustments to reduce the risks and inequalities involved in the private pillar. Cross-border policy learning may provide useful tools to achieve these aims.