During the 1990s a wave of major structural reforms that changed the distributional principles underpinning pension policies spread across Latin America. Outcomes were not always as expected. The implementation of new pension rules in the socio-economic, political and institutional context of Latin America has resulted in a number of inequalities which affect pension system performance and the gains that different income groups and generations may obtain. In order to overcome the distributional drawbacks of reform, Latin American governments may need to afford a new role to non-contributive pensions, as well as consider the application of specific regulatory adjustments to reduce the risks and inequalities involved in the private pillar. Cross-border policy learning may provide useful tools to achieve these aims.

The 2006 presidential elections in Brazil witnessed a dramatic shift of Lula's voting base away from the more developed regions of the country and towards the poorest areas. This paper uses municipal-level data to argue that while this shift represents an important change for the support base of Lula himself, it can mostly be explained by the government's massive cash transfer programme, the Bolsa Familia, and by the empirical regularity with which presidential candidates from the incumbent party in Brazil always perform better in the less developed regions of the country.

This article examines the record of the Peruvian human rights ombudsman between 1996 and 2001, seeking to explain its relative effectiveness under conditions of semi-authoritarian government. It suggests that this can be attributed to three factors: (1) the robustness of the institution's foundations; (2) the capacity of the first appointee and personnel, and; (3) the ability of the institution to build alliances which were able to enhance accountability. Drawing on O'Donnell's theory of a new generation of horizontal accountability mechanisms – that is, appointed, as opposed to elected, institutions – it argues that the human rights ombudsman occupied a distinct position in the Peruvian political system during this period that allowed it to interconnect different actors and arenas of accountability.

This article deals with the process of decision-making in the sphere of taxation in Argentina between 1920 and 1945, focusing on the possible influence of the economic elites in that process. Given the central role of decisions over taxation in any fiscal policy and the momentous transformations that occurred in the Argentine system during this period, analysis of this subject can provide a better understanding of the political role that economic elites in Argentina played between the first presidency of Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916–22) and the ascent of Juan Domingo Perón to the presidency in 1946. Drawing on three key episodes in Argentina policy-making – the attempt to introduce an income tax in 1923, the response to the Depression in 1931–32, and the crisis of 1942–43, this article suggests that parliamentary institutions had stronger resilience in Argentina than is usually believed, and corporatist arrangements became rooted in Argentina only with difficulties.

This article analyses Catholic resistance to the anti-clerical laws of the 1920–1940 period in various municipalities in eastern Michoacán. It argues that the diverse strategies adopted by Catholics in each region was more a response to the variety of local power dynamics at play, than an expression of different religious expressions (sacramental versus ‘popular’ Catholicism). It concludes that the predominance of pacific forms of resistance was the result both of efforts on the part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to reach a modus vivendi with the Mexican state, and of social expressions of Catholicism ‘from below’.