The main aim of this chapter is to show that sexuality and capitalism are intrinsically related. Such an endeavour demands extracting sex from the domains of nature, reproduction, and the private, and relating it to the intricate norms of capitalism. The first part of the chapter looks at why capitalism and sexuality have been articulated as belonging to separate spheres of life. How did it come to seem that “being a sex” and “having sex” is so entirely removed from the “investment of money to make more money”? The second part of the chapter provides an overview of the historical evolution of capitalism and its relationship to sexuality, focusing on the nineteenth-century transition from the household family-based economy to a fully developed capitalist free labour economy. The main characters of this chapter are homo economicus and his economically invisible wife, the producers of valuable social relations, as well as various “reformable” or “irreformable” others whose sex is deemed of no value or even against value. The chapter presents social relations as capitalist and sexual, and treats the dichotomies social–natural, public–private, and economic–cultural as interwoven in the (de)politicization of both sexuality and capitalism.

The report examines whether there is, under international law, a specific Middle Eastern concept of liability for public institutions. While a simple answer is 'no', considering that the Nation-State was unknown in the region for the pre-modern corpus to acknowledge a liability of public authority in the international realm, the chapter proceeds, by way of bricolage, to examine the forms of liability comprised under the three subsets of the question in the volume. It finds in the classical tradition significant attention to the accountability of government under Qur’an 17:34 and its interpretations; a socially stratified understanding of the public/private realm; and a sophisticated corpus in the law of obligations that unifies contracts and torts under a strict liability regime in domestic law.

This chapter concludes by addressing how this book’s analysis reconsiders sovereign power in IR and speculates on a structural model of responsibility that takes hybrid sovereignty seriously.

This chapter concretizes this book’s theoretical and analytical arguments by analyzing two transformations in the political history of the English East India Company (EIC). First, I show that key to the EIC’s success were public/private hybrid relations ranging from contractual, institutional, and shadow configurations. Contractual hybridity was visible through formal and frequent charter negotiations and public exchange of forced loans and other fiscal extractions. Institutional hybridity was evident through the EIC benefiting from insider rules and the rise of MP-Directors as well as more sophisticated informal lobbying. Shadow hybridity materialized through side payments and the presence of back channels through the Secret Committee. Second, the EIC’s self-understanding of sovereign authority shifted from a privilege understood within Idealized Sovereignty to a self-possessed right from extensive enactments of Lived Sovereignty. Meanwhile, the EIC’s sovereign awakening revealed problems with mutually inclusive and nonhierarchical early modern sovereignty that were thus far ignored.

Can States determine unilaterally what counts as a wrongful behaviour in the absence of public international adjudicative institutions? Can meaningful responsibility for wrongful acts exist in the absence of a public adjudicative entity? What happens in the case of a conflict between a unilateral (private) judgment of a State accused of having committed a wrong and the decision of a (public) international adjudicative institution? The authors advocate for a system based on conflicting judgments concerning responsibility made both by international adjudicative institutions (publicly) and by the States themselves (privately), what they refer to as the ‘discordant parity hypothesis’. The case for the overriding power of international adjudicative institutions is based on the importance of the State’s publicly recognized duties. The case for the overriding power of judgments made by States stems from its promise to facilitate active engagement of States with their obligations. The chapter embraces a system that recognizes the normative force of both (and the inevitable resulting conflicts).

This chapter introduces the main argument of this book that global sovereign power is constituted by public/private hybridity in Lived Sovereignty, while sovereign authority is recognized as indivisibly public in Idealized Sovereignty. Public/private hybridity takes on different characteristics of contractual, institutional, and shadow forms based on the formalization and publicization of relations. In relation to hybrid sovereignty, the lived realities of different types of public/private hybridity are in tension with the idealized imperatives of determining what is public versus private.

This chapter illustrates the forms and dynamics of contractual hybridity in American wars using the case of Blackwater. Blackwater’s contractual hybridity was visible in its formal contracts with public funding. Contractual relations created power payoffs by deploying a contractor force for American wars and raised Weberian legitimacy dilemmas from limited contractor oversight and distributed accountability. Security contractors also disturb civilmilitary relations by posing as “civilian combatants” or “unlawful combatants,” depending on the preferred definition under international law. The chapter also follows bureaucratic debates on defining "inherently governmental functions" given contracting, which reveal the effort it takes to balance Idealized and Lived Sovereignty. By being attentive to formalized and publicized hybrid relations, the chapter thus wrestles with unique problems in sovereign governance that challenge the legitimacy of a sovereign authority that contracts itself.

This chapter argues that Amnesty International’s chief sovereign accomplishment in Lived Sovereignty is organizing a global human rights polity from disparate transnational publics. However, shadow relations between Amnesty and governments related to funding, country access, and negotiating reforms in its first two decades threatened to derail the moral purity that undergirds the protection of human rights in Idealized Sovereignty. Successfully navigating shadow hybridity has thus been a central yet understudied feature of Amnesty. The historical analysis contextualizes the difficult choices Amnesty made to become the world’s leading INGO. Amnesty thus helps us see that hybrid relations endure even when the stakes are very high, exemplifying the pervasiveness of hybrid sovereignty in global politics.

This chapter develops the analytical dynamics of public/private hybridity in Lived Sovereignty. It first situates public/private hybridity in the global governance literature and then introduces three ideal-types. Contractual hybridity features formal and publicized performances where sovereign power is negotiated in public/private contractual exchanges. Institutional hybridity features informal and partly publicized performances where sovereign power is negotiated through public/private institutional linkages. Shadow hybridity features nonformalized and nonpublicized performances where sovereign power is negotiated in public/private shadowy bargains. Finally, the chapter presents a Weberian-inspired research design to show off the three ideal-types in the empirics that follow.

This chapter examines institutional hybridity in the International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) regulatory prowess as the primary organized business interlocutor for intergovernmental bodies in global commerce. The empirics follow various ways in which the ICC embeds itself in global institutions through issue-definition, agenda-setting, and rulemaking. Institutional linkages allow the ICC to organize international markets while boosting the privilege of global corporate elites to reap the benefits of trade and investment at the expense of others. Balancing the legitimacy blowbacks to this elitism is at the core of the politics of institutionalizing rules for global commerce. Moreover, the study of the ICC helps us see that “transnational private authority” need not necessitate a retreat of the state, but rather a recomposition of what it means to regulate across borders. The ICC’s Lived Sovereignty relies fundamentally on the Idealized Sovereignty of governments to keep its institutional status.

While the 1790s are often thought of as the most political of years, this chapter uses a range of sources to question that assumption and to point to the extent that much talk about politics was seen as an essentially private matter.That position was one that loyalism and the government increasingly challenged in the 1790s, breaking down long-standing ways of understanding private conversation and political discussion and opening the way for the emergence of a new language and politics for both loyalism and reform at the beginning of the nineteenth century.Using newspaper archives it identifies the emergence of a new lexicon of politics, linked especially to the period 1820-1840, alongside the development of a new set of political practices.In the 1790s those interested in reform faced new and disturbing challenges to their practices and expectations and had to develop ways of responding to a world in which their alternatives seemed to become dramatically starker.

The containment of violence was central to the mission of medieval Japan’s warrior governments, the Kamakura (1185-1333) and Muromachi (1336-1573) shogunates. It was also vital to the survival of the warlords who vied for supremacy in the war-torn sixteenth century. The two shogunates received their mandate to govern from the imperial court. They became, therefore, keepers of public order; the violence of political adversaries was by definition criminal and partisan; the force with which the shogunates responded was an act of peacemaking. With growing political turmoil in the fourteenth century, the shogunate attempted to finesse distinctions between intolerable aggressive warfare and acceptable defensive warfare. The second shogunate collapsed in the sixteenth century and the frequency and pitch of armed confrontations grew dramatically throughout the provinces. The most successful among the rising warlords began to claim the right to legislate on the sole strength of their success. Relying on noexternal source of legitimacy, their laws drew power from the much greater severity of their punishments and the much fuller delegitimisation of all violence other than their own, as seen in the abolition of all distinction between offensive and defensive violence.