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A number of recent papers have looked at framing effects in linear public good games. In this comment, I argue that, within this literature, the distinction between give-take and positive–negative framing effects has become blurred, and that this is a barrier towards understanding the experimental evidence on framing effects. To make these points, I first illustrate that frames can differ along both an externality and choice dimension. I then argue that the existing evidence is consistent with a strong positive–negative framing effect but no give-take framing effect on average contributions.
This paper investigates the effectiveness of peer punishment in non-linear social dilemmas and replicates Cason and Gangadharan (Exp Econ 18:66–88, 2015). The contribution of this replication is that cooperation is quantified across payoff equivalent, strategically symmetric public good and common pool resource experiments. Results suggest that the cooperation-inducing effect of peer punishment is statistically equivalent across conditions. Despite this increase in cooperation, earnings are significantly lower than in the absence of punishment. Institutional features which improve the effectiveness of peer punishment in linear public good experiments may, similarly, make self-governance possible in more complex social dilemmas.
We establish whether the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation is dependent on the degree of approval motivation within teams. Approval motivation is defined as the desire to produce positive perceptions in others and the incentive to acquire the approval of others as well as the desire to avoid disapproval, (Martin in J Personality Assess 48(5):508–519, 1984). Contrary to the theoretical predictions, the results from the experiment suggest that mutual monitoring was not effective in fostering cooperation in teams. Furthermore, the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation was not correlated with the degree of approval motivation within teams.
The Political Economy of Education provides academically rigorous yet clear explanations of the economics and politics driving today's educational systems and how economists analyze them. The book covers a host of topics central to teaching about education and crucial to educational policy. These include how to use the tools of economic and political theory to take critical measure of education's role in social mobility and economic growth, whether good teachers can overcome social class and race achievement gaps, the effectiveness of early childhood and vocational education, and debates on school accountability and whether increasing spending on schooling improves quality. The book also explores worldwide changes in higher education, especially massification and increased stratification and privatization. Written for upper undergraduate and graduate students in economics, public policy, and education and packed with real-world examples, this is an essential text for anyone interested in gaining fresh and international perspectives on education.
Communication is well-known to increase cooperation rates in social dilemma situations, but the exact mechanisms behind this remain largely unclear. This study examines the impact of communication on public good provisioning in an artefactual field experiment conducted with 216 villagers from small, rural communities in northern Namibia. In line with previous experimental findings, we observe a strong increase in cooperation when face-to-face communication is allowed before decision-making. We additionally introduce a condition in which participants cannot discuss the dilemma but talk to their group members about an unrelated topic prior to learning about the public good game. It turns out that this condition already leads to higher cooperation rates, albeit not as high as in the condition in which discussions about the social dilemma are possible. The setting in small communities also allows investigating the effects of pre-existing social relationships between group members and their interaction with communication. We find that both types of communication are primarily effective among socially more distant group members, which suggests that communication and social ties work as substitutes in increasing cooperation. Further analyses rule out better comprehension of the game and increased mutual expectations of one’s group members’ contributions as drivers for the communication effect. Finally, we discuss the role of personal and injunctive norms to keep commitments made during discussions.
The right to free expression is of special importance for any discussion of the legal and social enforcement of morality. This is true for two main sets of reasons. First, the free expression and communication of ideas in a political society profoundly affects its ethical environment. The right to free expression, or more precisely the social condition that is brought about by the adequate recognition and protection of the right, is itself a public good. Second, the free expression and communication of ideas, especially ideas relevant to politics, is widely considered to be a condition of government legitimacy. Governments that wrongly deny their subjects the right to freely express their ideas forfeit a claim to rule over them. This chapter engages with both sets of reasons, which are referred to as the public good consideration and the legitimacy consideration, respectively, with an eye toward clarifying the grounds of the right to free expression and the limits to its scope. The chapter pays special attention to the issue of whether the right to free expression extends to so-called dangerous speech; that is, speech that advocates for violence against the government and/or certain targeted groups.
This chapter explores the entanglement of the process to inaugurate the Casa de Correção with the political crisis that culminated in the suppression of the slave trade after 1850. I argue that the inauguration of the penitentiary in 1850 belongs to the articulation of policies to restructure slavery geographically in Brazil as the country moved decisively, under considerable British pressure, to suppress the contraband slave trade. The chapter probes the July 1850 decree that regulated the Casa de Correção as Brazil’s first penitentiary. It contends that the continued utilization of unfree labor proved to be a crucial part of the campaign to repress the slave trade and the entangled processes through which authorities deployed the prison to administer the ripple effects of the ending of human trafficking. I also interrogate how administrators of the Casa de Correção struggled to implement the congregate regime for prisoners sentenced to “prison with work” while overseeing its other dependencies. This demonstrates how penitentiary labor was deeply shaped by larger societal and economic forces of the Atlantic World.
The chapter provides an overview of the infrastucture concept and argues that it is both an economic and a political concept. It provides an overview of the interdisciplinary literature on infrastructure since the 1990s and situates the book in the debate about laissez-faire and the literature on the American state, taking the side of those who have argued in favor of deeper roots of the American state in the nineteenth century. It also provides chapter summaries and overviews.
In Privatization and Its Discontents, Matthew Titolo situates the contemporary debate over infrastructure in the long history of public–private governance in the United States. Titolo begins with Adam Smith's arguments about public works and explores debates over internal improvements in the early republic, moving to the twentieth-century regulatory state and public-interest liberalism that created vast infrastructure programs. While Americans have always agreed that creation and oversight of 'infrastructure' is a proper public function, Titolo demonstrates that public–private governance has been a highly contested practice throughout American history. Public goods are typically provided with both government and private actors involved, resulting in an ideological battle over the proper scope of the government sphere and its relationship to private interests. The course of that debate reveals that 'public' and 'private' have no inherent or natural content. These concepts are instead necessarily political and must be set through socially negotiated compromise.
This article analyzes an 1869 law from Cisleithania that defined all running waters as public goods. Economic and political actors debated the issue of water rights over several decades in the mid-nineteenth century, as is shown in contemporary publications, proceedings of assemblies, and administrative archives. The legal solution that was ultimately adopted established the management of water rights and uses according to a particular form of property which was intentionally preferred over a system of private appropriation. Looking in detail at what “public good” meant for the actors, this article argues that settling the legal status of rivers served to both consolidate the imperial state's power over society and to make water resources available to a productivist economic system. The new relationships to the environment that emerged during this time were inseparable from contemporary political and economic developments, and legislating was one way to bind these aspects together. Moreover, the case of water rights in the Habsburg Empire adds nuance to binary oppositions between private property and commons that dominate the study of property regimes and environment today. It invites us to consider how the establishment of a productivist economic system rested on a combination of different forms of property and strong state intervention.
In an ideal world, our research efforts would be omnific in nature, pursuing every conceivable scientific trajectory to understand the world with near-perfect precision. But limited by resources, this world does not exist. While we are nowhere near this state of omniscience, our understanding of the mechanisms by which medical science progresses have increased substantially over time. In fact, this knowledge is only likely to grow. The question is, given our knowledge of what influences the rate and direction, are we morally obligated to act upon this knowledge and adjust the trajectory? Chapter 23 reflects on whether medical science is truly morally neutral, the social role of science more broadly, and how we should define "true" progress in medical science going forward.
Chapter 9 is about how public institutions contribute to the trajectory of progress. The most common methods for public involvement are through creating institutions (universities, research facilities, etc.) and through distributing grants. There are any number of combinations by which governments and public institutions can give out grants, with each country having their own unique variation. These mechanisms are crucial in determining the rate and direction of progress. By supporting certain research areas, we commit to making progress in one area while potentially reducing it in others. The chapter is also concerned with how public funding differs from private funding, how important public funding is in steering the direction of research towards areas directly relevant to the common person, and how public funding has become more commercialized.
The goal of the final chapter is to examine the central role of necessities in the epistemological, moral and political theory of An Essay of Human Understanding and of the Two Treatises of Government. A study of the former shows Locke’s preoccupation with classical moral questions such as happiness and the ‘good objects of desires’ and how necessities helped him to strike a balance between tradition and the new science. As a rule of thumb of proper conduct, knowledge of necessities leads to the preservation of life, a human being’s most important duty to God. His doctrine of necessities is what made it possible for Locke to develop the theory of the public good with which, it is argued, he attempted to defeat the egoist theory of self-interest. Examination of his conception of property and money through the lens of human necessities shows a certain ambiguity in Locke’s normative ideals. Nevertheless, my conclusion is that above other considerations underlying the capital-oriented ideals of the period, the last word of Locke’s political theory is the public good represented by preservation and convenience for the commonwealth and, when possible, for the whole of humanity.
The scepticism of the period from roughly 1645 to 1680 prompted philosophers’ attempts to rethink theology and moral and civil philosophy in their search for ideas concerning the common and the public good. Ralph Cudworth’s effort to overcome the challenges posed by fragmentation in religion and politics and to develop a philosophy helpful in uniting society, but not at the expense of liberty, demonstrate that Neoplatonism was an important force during that period. In a sceptical era, John Selden contributed to particularism in natural law. A discussion of Sir Robert Filmer’s life and key political ideas together with the principles of political economy he espoused follows. Given the disintegration of moral theology in that period, the commercialization of societal ties seems to have been unstoppable. Against the Macphersonian critique of possessive individualism, the chapter puts forward the opening argument that both Hobbes and Locke sought to tame the harsh society characterized by the use of credit they saw before them and that they chose to do so by means of political philosophy and natural law.
In the conclusion to the book I offer an appeal to the distilled principles of the tradition of public humanism as associated with Plutarch reception and developed in the opening chapters of the book. I argue that the tradition of public humanism can inspire resistance to excessive cynicism towards the possibilities of public life and to renew some faith in contemporary democratic life.
Government’s task is to achieve the common good. If it takes a long time markets will not do it: banks do not lend beyond the payback time horizon. For better and worse, government acts as the risk taker of last resort. Laissez-faire arose out of the Victorian fossil fuel windfall. But rich societies see beyond the private horizons of business. After WW1 they set to safeguard security by means of infrastructure, healthcare, education, housing, and social insurance. Government authority, alone or in partnership with business, is prone to corruption. The antidote is an independent, expert, and honest civil service. In 1980 politics moved in the opposite direction, imposing business norms and seeking to impose a corporate model on government activity. An opportunistic public–private partnership is no match for pressing social challenges, nor is the academic delusion of self-sufficient free markets. In the face of private impatience, government acts as a commitment agent for society.
This chapter engages with ‘legacy’ in two respects. It argues that Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the so-called right to science, has no legacy. It has achieved only marginal real-world impact and remains largely aspirational – all potential. By contrast, Graeme Laurie’s legacy, grounded in the public good and a strong sense of humanism, is significant and informative. Through multiple strands and projects, he has engaged deeply with the social contract between actors in the health setting, developing and refining the tools that could be used to help shape science and science governance in positive ways. Through an exploration of Article 15 ICESCR and select examples of Graeme’s scholarship, this chapter argues that the manifestation of Graeme’s legacy – the calling upon of his legacy – is what we need to generate some positive legacy for the sadly fallow ‘right to science’ articulated in Article 15 ICESCR. If we do this, it might one day have a legacy of its own.
Personal data increasingly serve as inputs to public goods. Like other types of contributions to public goods, personal data are likely to be underprovided. We investigate whether classical remedies to underprovision are also applicable to personal data and whether the privacy-sensitive nature of personal data must be additionally accounted for. In a randomized field experiment on a public online education platform, we prompt users to complete their profiles with personal information. Compared to a control message, we find that making public benefits salient increases the number of personal data contributions significantly. This effect is even stronger when additionally emphasizing privacy protection, especially for sensitive information. Our results further suggest that emphasis on both public benefits and privacy protection attracts personal data from a more diverse set of contributors.
This essay examines the administrative state as a ubiquitous phenomenon that results in part from the mismatch of incentives. Using two dramatic episodes in the history of economics, the essay considers two types of mismatch. It then examines how economists increasingly endorsed the “general good” as a unitary goal for society, even at the expense of private hopes and desires. More than this, their procedures and models gave them warrant to design mechanisms and advocate for legislation and regulations to “fix” the supposedly suboptimal choices of individuals in service to the overarching goal. The rise of New Welfare Economics dealt an additional blow to the sovereignty of individual motivations, notwithstanding that Hayek and Buchanan warned that this engineering approach allowed social goals to override individual preferences. Throughout, the argument is that it is important to recognize that people within or advising the administrative state are influenced by the same sorts of (private) motivations as actors throughout the economy.
Individuals benefit from maintaining the well-being of their social groups and helping their groups to survive threats such as intergroup competition, harsh environments and epidemics. Correspondingly, much research shows that groups cooperate more when competing against other groups. However, ‘social’ threats (i.e. outgroups) should elicit stronger cooperation than ‘asocial’ threats (e.g. environments, diseases) because (a) social losses involve a competitor's gain and (b) a strong cooperative reaction to defend the group may deter future outgroup threats. We tested this prediction in a multiround public goods game where groups faced periodic risks of failure (i.e. loss of earnings) which could be overcome by sufficient cooperation. This threat of failure was framed as either a social threat (intergroup competition) or an asocial threat (harsh environment). We find that cooperation was higher in response to social threats than asocial threats. We also examined participants’ willingness to manipulate apparent threats to the group: participants raised the perceived threat level similarly for social and asocial threats, but high-ranking participants increased the appearance of social threats more than low-ranking participants did. These results show that people treat social threats differently than asocial threats, and support previous work on leaders’ willingness to manipulate perceived threats.