This chapter introduces an idea that has enjoyed a remarkable, if hotly contested, development in the post-Cold War era: humanitarian intervention. Based on a commitment to principles of humanity and respect for life, such action seeks to alleviate the unnecessary suffering caused by violent conflict through intervening in another state, with force under limited conditions. The chapter outlines the origins of humanitarianism and the history of humanitarian intervention before discussing the shift to the responsibility to protect (R2P). As world politics becomes ever more complex, debate about global responsibilities to protect suffering strangers will continue to shape the theory and practice of international relations. While abuse of human beings has not become less widespread, the preoccupation with COVID-19 and domestic priorities meant that little consideration was given to robust action against middle powers perpetrating mass atrocities in such places as Myanmar and Tigray, let alone against major powers in Ukraine and Xinjiang.

Chapter 4 addresses some of the issues that have arisen in connection with the ‘authorisation method’ that was set out in Chapter 3. It first examines some of the initial ways the Council has attempted to obtain a balance between multilaterialsm and unilateralism in the design and implementation of its resolutions which have authorised ‘all necessary means’. One issue that has not been resolved, and is apparent in many sections of this chapter, is the authority to interpret resolutions of the Security Council. In this respect, the chapter addresses the possibility of ‘reviving’ past authorisations, something that has thus far been restricted to the use of force in Iraq betweem 1991 and 2003. The chapter then examines the issue of determining the breadth and scope of an authorisation and the issues of ‘implied’ authorisation, in particular in attempts to enforce what might be perceived as the ‘collective will’ of the Council, as well as the Council providing what might be seen as retrospective or ex post facto authorisation or approval for military action. Finally, it addresses the issue of the forcible implementation of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ concept by the Council.

Chapter 10 focuses on the somewhat controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It assesses the issue of whether the doctrine can be reconciled with the UN Charter, before examining state practice in connection with the doctrine, including taking a look at Cold War and post-Cold War practice in assessing the position of the doctrine during the UN era. Given that the forcible entry by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Kosovo crisis in 1999 proved something of a landmark in terms of events that have shaped the path of the modern doctrine, the status of the doctrine in the immediate aftermath of this intervention is given particular attention, as well as the impact that the war in Ukraine has had and whether there is an obligation to intervene in the context of genocides. The chapter then looks at the Syrian civil war and the relevance of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to that particularly tragic conflict, which continues at the time of writing. A conception of the doctrine that has come to dominate contemporary debates is that of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Given its relatively recent rise to prominence, its impact upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is assessed.

This chapter discusses whether and in what circumstances states can resort to the use of force

This chapter begins the application of Pragmatic Constructivism by interpreting and assessing how, as a community of practice at the macro level, international society has responded to mass atrocity and its challenge to the practices of state sovereignty. It demonstrates how political mobilization on behalf of excluded publics (vulnerable populations) contributed to a reimagining of sovereignty as a responsibility to protect, as well as a normative reassignment of that responsibility to international society when states ‘manifestly fail’. It applies the two tests – inclusionary reflexivity and deliberative practical judgement – to the micro level by assessing the working practices (e.g. penholding, veto reform) of the UN Security Council. While greater inclusivity signposts ways in which the Council can better respond to the public interest, the impact of micro-adaptation is ultimately contingent on a deeper level of change in the identity of member states. Practices of atrocity prevention in the R2P context can act as a pedagogic tool, helping to mobilize the transnational activism that is a necessary part of that progressive change. This discussion extends to nuclear atrocity prevention and the way vulnerable publics deconstructed the Cold War, a lesson that should inform a renewed commitment to deep arms control practices.

This chapter covers the international law governing the use of force between states – the jus ad bellum. This is in contrast to the jus in bello – the law of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law – which regulates the conduct of hostilities once under way (see Chapter 11). Since at least 1945 the use of force by states has been prohibited, except in self-defence or when authorised by the United Nations Security Council. This chapter analyses the prohibition, the two exceptions, and the controversial issue of humanitarian intervention and its close relative, the ‘responsibility to protect’.

Chapter 5 analyzes Eye in the Sky, a 2016 film on drone warfare, to illuminate popular culture’s role in scripting us into being as spectator-consumers while legitimizing the counterterror state’s discounting of life through necropolitical law. The gripping plot, stellar performances, and dazzling displays of technology distract us from, first, the de-democratizing and dehumanizing concealments and erasures that accompany drone warfare and, second, the remaking of lawful authority through a dramatization of the (highly contested) principle of international law known as “the responsibility to protect.” In the process, the film renders visible a particular set of actors, narratives, and questions, while concealing and erasing others, thereby legitimizing drone warfare and valorizing its actors, institutions, practices, and technologies. As text, Eye in the Sky is an instance of the “cultural sensibility … in which killing the enemy of the state is an extension of play” (Mbembe 2019: 73). Given the official secrecy accompanying drone warfare and the film’s convincing incorporation of “fact” into its “fiction,” Eye in the Sky amounts to a compelling representation of the necessity of drone warfare as enacted by lawful military actors with the aim of securing civilians worldwide.

Chapter 6 presents the second of the three case studies: Protecting the Individual Human Being from Mass Atrocities. The case study offers a critical discussion of the literature and the development of R2P. The chapter then analyses the discourse on Libya and Syria concerning actions to protect civilians and the potential use of force to do so. The analysis focuses mainly on UN Security Council deliberations. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the individual human being appears in the discourse on protection as innocent civilians or guilty perpetrators or terrorists. As will be demonstrated, this matters for enabling a politics of protection. By analysing the debate on the intervention in Libya in 2011 and dealing with the conflict in Syria, mainly focusing on the years 2011 to 2015, respectively, I demonstrate how these politics of protection play out

This chapter introduces the jus ad bellum: the rules of law determining when states may resort to war or, more broadly, the use of armed force. These rules must be distinguished from the jus in bello: these are the rules of law that apply in armed conflict (known as international humanitarian law). In order to put the current jus ad bellum rules into perspective, the chapter begins by introducing the concept of collective security and demonstrating how this was applied during the League of Nations era. The following sections set out the relevant rules of the UN Charter on the prevention and regulation of recourse to the use of force, with a particular focus on the prohibition on the threat or use of force. The chapter also discusses the collective use of force, meaning the use of force authorized by the Security Council, and the unilateral use of force in self-defense. Finally, the chapter examines whether new exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force are emerging -- in particular, humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect.

This chapter introduces the jus ad bellum: the rules of law determining when states may resort to war or, more broadly, the use of armed force. These rules must be distinguished from the jus in bello: these are the rules of law that apply in armed conflict (known as international humanitarian law). In order to put the current jus ad bellum rules into perspective, the chapter begins by introducing the concept of collective security and demonstrating how this was applied during the League of Nations era. The following sections set out the relevant rules of the UN Charter on the prevention and regulation of recourse to the use of force, with a particular focus on the prohibition on the threat or use of force. The chapter also discusses the collective use of force, meaning the use of force authorized by the Security Council, and the unilateral use of force in self-defense. Finally, the chapter examines whether new exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force are emerging -- in particular, humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect.

The main aim of this chapter is to give readers an overview of the evolution of African peacekeeping over time, delineating two somewhat distinct histories of the phenomenon. The chapter first examines the orthodox version of the evolution of African peacekeeping. Here, the focus is on the change from the OAU’s principle of non-intervention to the African Union’s notion of non-indifference. The authors trace this normative shift to the period after the Rwandan genocide, and to the broader security concept including the notion of human security. In line with this development, the chapter gives a brief overview of how the African Peace and Security Architecture represent this normative change in its structure and principles. In addition the chapter underlines the longer (pre-)history of African peacekeeping and the links that can be drawn between today’s peacekeeping, the creation of colonial police forces and armies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and European colonial powers’ deployment of African troops for regional 'pacification' military campaigns. The case of Ghana – and the Ghanaian Police Force – is explored as a case study in developing this argument.

This chapter considers the obligations that states are under to protect individuals in third states from harm. In particular, it analyses the duty to prevent or arrest a genocide in a third state, the emerging duty to prevent torture, and the duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law. These all have their legal basis in multilateral treaties. Given the focus on the prevention of serious human rights abuses in other countries, consideration is also given to the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine, which has been endorsed by states in several multilateral instruments and represents a significant commitment by states to people beyond their borders, although it appears to have lost traction in recent years. Finally, the chapter appraises the duty to give safe haven to those fleeing persecution in their home state.